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ABSTRACT OF TIE THESIS
IN TEGRATION OF COLOMBIAN REFUGEES IN COSTA RICA: AN
ETI INOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO TilI RETUC iI LEGAL, ECONOMIC, ANI
SOCIAL EXPERIENCES
by
Angela P. Bonilla
Florida International University, 2006
Miami, Florida
Professor Victor Uribe, Major Professor
This qualitative study, based on interviews to 17 refugee families, attempts to
identify the reasons behind the lack of integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica.
The model of Immigrant Modes of Incorporation and the studies of Alejandro Portes and
Julia Sensenbrenner about the sources of social capital on migrant communities provided
the theoretical framework used to identify the roots of the integration challenges. The
findings suggest that Costa Rican policies towards the reception and integration of
Colombian refugees are exclusionary. The host labor market is marked by sentiments of
xenophobia towards the sample population while reported cases of persecution in the
country also inhibit this population's economic integration. The lack of social capital
sources contributes to inhibit this community's development, despite their participation in
informal networks. There were signs of collective action. Yet, the refugee community
fails to come together, while it also seems alienated from the community of Colombian
entrepreneurs in Costa Rica.
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"I ra/ther die fiom a gunshot in C olonibia thian starve II clealh while bxintg ny di4gnity
in Costa Rica"
Statm ent from Colombian Refugee in Costa Rica
I. HOW WAS THIS WORK ENVS IONED?
IInroduction
Since the late 90's Colombia has experienced an exodus of its citizens due in
lare part to the country's intensifying internal conflict. Raging for over half a century,
by the year 2003 the devastating conflict placed Colombia as the nation Xwith the second
largest number of Internally Dis laced People (I P) in the world, xwith figur s rging
from one million to over 3 million IDPs. The humanitarian crisis brought about by the
conflict also turned Colombia into a refugee-generating country. By early 2001 the
United Nations High Commissioner Ior Rfugees (UNI ICR) had recognized that due to
the growing violence and numerous human rights violations taking place all across the
country, many Colombians who escaped abroad were becoming rcFge s in need If
international protection and therefore programs to help them needed to be developed.
Costa Rica is one of the countries offering refuge to uprooted Colombians. Along
with UNIICR, in the year 2000 responding to the ma: iv influx of' Colombians
requesting refuge that year the Costa Rican government reactivated the proc handle
the reception and determination of refug status. (nce appro da rf1ugees have three
options fhor durable solutions: integration into the host country; resettlement to a third
country; or, return to Colombia. The UNICR in Costa Rica has decided that local
integration is the mot viable durable solution for Colombian reftg ee i this country.
Costa Rica is one of the fewx countries receiving Colombian refugees that has been
able to achieve a system for refugee processing free of backlogs. Costa Rican officials
estimate a Colombian population of up to 50,000 residing in the country, from which
over 8,000 had been approved as refugees by the start of the year 2004 ("Uni total de,"
2004) and approximately 12,891 had applied for refugee status between 2000 and 2004
("Ecuador," 2005). Yet, despite the efforts of the Costa Rican government and the
JNICR in providing timely responses to requests and assistance to approxed Colombian
refuge~s, a large percentage of these refugees are currently experiencing strong hurdles in
their integration process. A mission undertaken by the International Rescue Conmittee
(IRC) in October of 2003. of xhich I was a member, found that some of these hurdles
include difficulties to find employment or a stable income-generating activity; signs of
increasing discriminatory sentiments among the Costa Ricans toward Colombian
refugees; lack of awareness in the Costa Rican community about refugee needs and
rights; and, the apparent lack of trust, solidarity and network formations within the
Colombian refugee community.
In comparison with the situation of Colombian refugees in countries such as
Ecuador, Venezuela, Canada or the United States, the case of Colombian refugees in
Costa Rica is of special interest as cultural. linguistic and, especially, legal conditions
seem to be in place for a smooth integration. The processing of a refugee status is, for
instance, done in only one month in Costa Rica. This allos refugees to have fast access
to a wide spectrum of rights and services in this country. Yet, refugees seem to be facing
a rather difficult integration process and many look for possibilities to continue their
journey into yet a third country.
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In tacc of these hurdles the question: "Why are C'olomhian re/;igees nol readlil
adapt)ing f/er migrating to C oasia Rica?" becomes the pivotal point for this study. Due to
the challenges faced by Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and the lack of other durable
solutions available for them, it is important to identify the problems that are inhibiting
their successful integration and discuss possible reasons for the existence of these
problems. The failure of the integration process can have detrimental consequences not
only for the refugees themselves but also for Costa Rican society, as refugees could
become a burden to its social and economic systems instead of a contribution to the
country's development. Additionally, this study responds to the need of understanding
the nature of the movement of Colombians across borders in recent years, and identifying
some factors generally required for the cohesive integration of Colombians abroad.
Finally, this case study will also contribute to evaluating some standing academic
theories on the world and experiences of migrants. Following, I will provide some
definitions required for a better understanding of the thesis and evaluate some of the most
relevant academic literature in the field, including some cases studies on integration of
other refugee populations. Then, I will look at the theoretical framework that will support
the development of this thesis to finally propose on a causal model, some of the major
variables this study relies on, and formulate the hypothesis.
Bas c Definitions
In this section I will present some basic definitions of terms that will be used
throughout this thesis in order to provide a stronger foundation to draw the xariables that
will be used later on. First of all, this thesis deals with "refugecs - a particular category of
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migrants in need of a precise definition and differentiation from other closely related
categories, in particular "economic migrants." Thus, definitions to understand clearly
who is considered a refugee xxill he explored in this section. Economic migrants arc
people xxho decide to leave their country of nationality voluntarily in search of a better
litfe. A refugee, on the other hand, is forced to flee the country of nationality due to
political, religious, social (particularly racial) or nationality-related persecution causing a
fear for his or her life. With the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. the
definition of a refugee was made internationally binding within the fiamex ork of
developments in humanitarian international law after the Second World War (WWII).
This definition was limited only to people who had fled due to WWII, as it took into
consideration individuals suffering from events before 1 January 1951. Later, xxith the
1967 Protocol of the 1951 Convention and in consideration of other ref ugee situations.
the definition developed in the 1951 Convention was extended to any person meeting the
initial definition's criteria. The current definition of a refugee, therefore. would read as
fblloxws:
A refugee is a person who owing to vell-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, oxwing
to such fear, is unx illing to avail himself of the protection of that country. or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwx illing
to return to it' (UN ICR, 1996).
Refugees flee in search of safe heaven. They usually flee to states where they look
for protection through a process of asylum or by obtaining ref'ugee status, if these options
Definition adapted from article I of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refucees. Adopted rn 28
1ux 1951 h the tnited Nations Conference of Plenipotenliaries on the Status of RdfuCees and Stateless
IPersns. Words "As a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and." and the N ords.., "a result of
such cxents". in article I A (2) omitted hb 1967 Protocol.
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are available in the country of reception. Once these victims of violent conflict receive
legal protection in a second country, they arguably start a process of integration into these
countries" communities. To have a clear understanding of the process of integration that
is core to this thesis it is also necessary to introduce the reader to discussions about
refugees' processes of integration and the main differences with assimilation and
adaptation processes, which are two other closely related concepts found in inmigration
literature. Even though the very definition of these notions would require us to enter into
some academic debates about what precisely would be the best indicators to measure
them, it is important to provide from the outset a preliminary and tentative definition of
the same in order to orient the reader.
Assimilation is a term that has long been used in immigration literature and it
implies "the disappearance of differences between refugees and their hosts as well as
permanence within the host society" (Harrell-Bond, 2000). Members of the Chicago
School of Sociology, who among other themes concentrated in immigration and its
consequences when immigration theory started to develop in the United States, pioneered
the term assimilation since the 1920s and 1930s, and it remained until the 1960s as the
dominant sociological paradigm in immigration literature. One of its principal proponents
was Robert F. Park (1928), who claimed assimilation was the eventual outcome of 'all
the incidental collision, conflict, and fusions of people and culture resulting from
migration" (Park. 1928). Today the term is still used by some authors to explain
instances when refugees resettle successfully in the country offering protection. Yet, as
ethnic and racial conflict persists in diverse cultures such as the US and ethnicity issues
take more importance in the sociological arena, the assimilation perspective is no longer
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seen by most refugee scholars as describing accurately the successful resettlement of
refueges in host communities.
In the late 197(s and early 1980s the notion of assimilation started to be
challenged and terms such as adaptation or incorporation where first used when referring
to the modes by which immigrants integrate and are accepted into mainstream America, a
region that because of constant immigration has become the subject of various studies of
this phenomenon. Scholars challenging the notion of assimilation opted to use the new
terms after recognizing that in a process of integration, immigrants confront different
situations and hence they do not necessarily need to change their cultural values to find
economic success in America or elsewhere Different rmodels of adaptation or
incorporation haxe been formulated, therefore, based on cases where immigrants find
economic success while usually upholding their ethnic and cultural xalues (Schmitter
Ieisler, 2000).
Despite the other terms used by several immigration scholars to denote the
immigrants' process of making a life in the country of reception, with the United States
of America being a case for which studies abound, this thesis will refer to the term
in/eg-atlion. This is the best concept to refer to processes specific to refbgees.
International Voluntary Organizations and international bodies for refugee protection,
such as the U NHICR, use the term integration when referring to a refugee's rights and
ability to become a successful member in host communities. The UN 1951 Refugee
Convention, however, lacks a definition of the term integration. The absence of a formal
definition in international law thus leaves it open to academic interpretation and debate.
Some such debates are about when should a refugee be considered successfully
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integrated. Others are about the best indicators to deem that integration has occurred.
Thus, as Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2003) have argued,
While the impact of refugees on host populations has been explored at a
theoretical lever there has been little academic research on the costs and benefits
of refugee presence to host populations in a country's specific context. In
addition, methods to quantify levels of integration among refugees and host
communities are lacking in the literature. Indeed, disagreement over the mere
definition of the word "integration" makes analysis of this topic difficult and has
prevented adequate research. (pp. 3).
The mention of assimilation instead of integration in the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention has generated confusion, as it could be assumed from it that refugees are
expected to "assimilate" -adopting culture and traditions of host societies-, rather than to
"integrate" into host communities. Overcoming this confusion Dryden-Peterson and
Hlovil (2003) explain that local integration was actually envisioned as a durable solution
since the establishment of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, for "throughout its articles
it suggests that restoring refugees to dignity and ensuring the provision of human rights
includes an approach that would lead to their integration into the host society" (pp. 3).
These authors recognize that the Convention centered this process of integration
particularly on the responsibility of host states to facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees. Thus, they go on to explain, "recent thinking, however,
emphasizes both the importance of' maintaining individual identity and the possibility of
promoting self-reliance" (pp. 3).
Jeff Crisp (2004) also makes a distinction between assimilation and integration of
refugees. Crisp explains that
The concept of local integration does not imply the assimilation of refugees in the
society where they have found asylum. While the concept of assimilation is to be
found in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the international cormunity has
always rejected the notion that refugees should be required or expected to
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abandon their own culture, as to become indistinguishable from members of the
host community As one scholar (T. Kuhlman) has pointed out, intcgration is a
more useful term than assimilation suggesting as it does that refugecs "maintain
their oxwn identity, yet become part of the host society to the extent that host
population and refugees can live together in an acceptable way. (pp. 2).
Despite these debates and the difficulties in being precise about the boundaries
between a refugee's successful integration or lack thereof, this thesis attempts to explore
howx successfully integrated Colombian refugees truly are in Costa Rica. T hereire, it is
necessary to look at different academic interpretations of integration as wxell as other
academic research focusing generally on immigrants instead of just refugees. for such
immigration research is relevant to this study. To study a refugee's integration process
the first step would be to search for academic works addressing different dimensions of
the issue. Some authors seem concerned with the costs and benefits of refugees and their
integration; others pay more attention to indicators appropriate to measure integration:
and yet others concentrate mainly on strategies to accomplish integration. Out of these
diverse perspectives, one could draw some useful conclusions as to the best variables to
study the issue, though I will actually save the discussion of the variables until reviewing
some available case studies.
Barbara I Iarrell-Bond (1986) defines local integration as a situation in xw hich host
and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources - both
economic and social - with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists xithin the
host community. Other theoretical attempts to define local integration include the work of
Tom Kuhlman (1991), who has developed a framework and outlined the indices that can
be used to measure refugees' integration to a host community. Kuhlman has identified
different characteristics of successful integration such as the refugees' capacity to
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maintain an identify of their own and to adjust psychologically during the socio-cultural
change they tace. Another characteristic identified by Kuhlman is a level of friction
betwxeen the refugees and the host populations that should not be worse than the frictions
within the host population. Finally, he explains that for a successful integration the levels
of discrimination faced by refugees cannot be higher than discrimination levels between
groups previously settled in the host community.
In an effort to find methods to effectively address refugee situations wxhere
voluntary repatriation is not a viable alternative for refugees, Jeff Crisp (2004) explains
that local integration should be addressed more carefully as an alternative and strategies
should be designed to make this alternative viable for refugees. Crisp finds in this process
of local integration three interrelated dimensions, a legal, an economic, and a social
dimension.
In the legal dimension Crisp (2004) offers that refugees should be granted a wide
range of rights. These include the right to seek employment, to engage in income
generating activities, to own and dispose of property, to enjoy freedom of movement, and
to have access to public services such as education. In this process of obtaining rights he
explains that in order to becoming fully integrated refugees ultimately should be granted
the right to the acquisition of citizenship.
Concerning the economic dimension, Crisp (2004) explains that after being
granted these rights refugees would improve their potential to establish sustainable
livelihoods and therefore become less reliant on state or humanitarian aid. In this respect,
Crisp explains that refugees prevented or deterred from participating in the local
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economy, and whose standard of lixing is consistently lower han that of the poorest
members of the host community, cannot be considered to be locally integrated.
I inally, as for the social dimension. Crisp (2004) explains that refugees should be
able to lixe amongst the host population without tear of sy stematic discrimination,
intimidation, or exploitation by the authorities or people of the country granting therm
asy lum.
From the conditions, dimensions, and characteristics explained above., and despite
the fact that a definition has not been formally adopted for local integration, it is possible
to draw common variables that would be useful for this research. F rom this discussion
we can see, for instance, that the process of local integration can be regarded as an
economic, soial, and legal process in which refungees are not ex)ected to assimilate into
hosi Con.nnities but to acquire a range of rights that would make them able to co-exist
and share resources with the host pl)OIF/latiOn? to develol a sustainable livelihood
maintaining their own identity. In this view, ref ugees should 1e able to live 1without fear
of syltemaitic discrinination, ininidation, or exploitation by the authorities or people of
the asyihun country and their standard of living should not he consistentih lower than that
of the pooresi menibers of the hos-,I coannunitv.
From this summary definition of integration it becomes apparent that social and
economic strategies are closely connected. Some case studies highlighting the
relationships between these txwo dimensions will provide more insight into xhat should
be considered a successful integration process for refugees. The examples chosen are
from the mainstream of refugee cases. Most studied cases are of refugees arriving to the
United Mates of A\merica and therefore to a country that is economically UCh stronger
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than the sending country- that usually speaks a different language; and that in most cases
has a different culture from the culture of sending states. Despite the difference betveen
the host community of these various cases and the host community of the Colombian
refugees being studied here, the cases selected are still useful as the integration models
that will later be explored have been developed based on integration processes in
America.
Lirera/ure Revieuw
In the first section of the literature review I will go over previous findings about
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and findings about the integration and assimilation of
Colombian communities in other countries, specifically in South Florida. Then, I will
look at other communities of refugees integrating in the United States to search for
elements in their integration processes that may be particular to their refugee condition
and therefore may be absent in the studies of Colombian migrants to South Florida.
The "l)iagnostico sobre el grado de Integraci6n local de la Poblacion Refugiada
Colombiana en Costa Rica, 2003-2 provides a general profile of the population and a
snapshot of their living conditions in the host community. As a project completed mostly
by students of the University of Costa Rica and sponsored by the UNI ICR. the 2003
Diagnosis may be considered a report of the work performed by the Isoc iaciun
(onsulores Y Asesores Inlernacionales (ACAI) as service providers of the U NHIICR.
These findings are useful, how ev er, especially to understand some of the legal issues
Furthcr rcfcrcnccs of "Diagn6stico sobre el grado de intcracion local de la Poblaci6n Refuiada
Colomnbiana en Costa Rica, 2003, which translates to "The I NIH( R tCR Diagnos \i h out the lntcgration
I)crcc ol the Colomihi a Rd uLIce Population in Costa Rica. 2003" N ill he addrcssed as "Iic 2003
I)iagnosis'.
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related with the process of refugee determination for Colombians and some of ie current
legal challenges due to the undergoing immigration law reform. 1he 2003 Dliagnosis is
also useful to understand demographic information of the refugee population since it
includes the results of interviews to a sarmple of 320 refugee families. Thus, from these
interviexs is possible to get a glance of the refugee's access to social services such as
health and education, their housing conditions, and their occupations. Finally, in the
social area the 2003 Diagnosis also contributed with a survey of the Costa Rican
population to identify the perceptions the host community may have of the Colombian
refugee population.
Yet, these findings provide more statistical data, as a census would, in the areas of
social and economic integration instead of" looking in detail at the integration challenges
in these areas and the reasons behind these challenges. For example in the area of
economic integration almost 20 percent of the refugee population interviexed was found
without occupation. Yet, the 2003 Diagnosis does not provide an explanation of the
causes behind such condition in the cases interviewed. Also the 2003 Diagnosis is not
clear in differentiating between occupations in the commerce sector, as formal
employment and the informal sector, even though 34 percent of the population
interviewed is found to be in the commerce sector. Thus, although the 200 3 Diagnosis is
useful to understand the overall lixmg enx ironment of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica
and can also be helpful as a source of quantitative data regarding this population, it fails
to address x ith neutrality some of the reasons that may be causing the lack of integration
of this population and to provide qualitative data from the refugees experiences.
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Moreover, it is precisely due to the lack of explanations to the challenges faced by
refugees in their integration process that this thesis work was envisioned.
Another area that needs to be explored is the findings about integration of
Colombians in other communities, especially in South Florida. Colombians studied in
this community are not all necessarily refugees. Yet, since South Florida is also home for
a large percentage olf Colombian asylees, then it would be useful to look at their levels of
integration there and at some special characteristics they may have due to their ethnic
condition and social nature. In a research summary report Michael W. Collier (2004)
offers an indication of the lack of integration of some Colombians living in South
Florida, evidenced from the return of many Colombians to their country of origin. Collier
attributed these returns in part to -their inability to reestablish a stable environment,
combined with a loss of social class" (pp. 14). The author also explains that the reasons
the pilot research subjects identified for the difficulty to find employment were the lack
of permanent or work visa and the lack of English language skills. It is interesting to note
these findings, as even before exploring with detail the economic and employment
conditions of the Colombian refugees in Costa Rica, the barriers identified in Collier's
work would not apply to refugees in this country as the native language is also Spanish
and refugees today receive a refugee It) that is supposed to serve as a work permit as
well.
Collier's findings are based in part on the findings of Nathalia Franco (2002) and
Cristyn Casey (2002), who were part of the pilot research team of the Latin American and
Caribbean Center at FIU established to study the Colombian Diaspora to South Florida.
In an effort to understand the reasoning behind the migration of Colombians to South
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Florida, Franco analyzes how Colombians gather information before migrating, the type
of expectations that they create based on the information gathered. and how these
expectations affect their integration in South Florida. Overall Franco suggests that
Colombians experience disillusion after migrating to South Florida due to high
expectations created by false information gathered before migrating. Among these
findings. how cver, it is important to highlight the ones related to the Colombians who
claimed to have fled to South Florida due to persecution. First she suggests that
Colombians wxho were victims of persecution face also difficulties and uncertainty since
their process of asylum approval is usually long and in most cases the social security card
takes longer than it should, making it hard for asylum seekers to work and make a living
in the United States. Moreover, her findings, although based only on qualitative data
from one inter ic , suggest that Colombians once granted asylum continue to experience
difficulties to find employment due to "lack of language skills, networks, and knowledge
of US employment practices (resumes, interx icews and the like) to succeed in the
professional job market" (pp. 89). With the lack of language not being a barrier for
refugees in Costa Rica, it is important to keep in mind the lack of networks and
information about professional job attainment as possible factors contributing to the lack
of integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica.
Another study that may also be relevant is the thesis work of Crx stin Casey
(2002) regarding the effect of social capital on the formation of a Colombian community
in South Florida. Casey found the presence of social capital among this community but
in very incipient forms; she found evidence of community mobilization, especially in
local and Colombian political processes, but also found a negative context of reception
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that has affected the levels of trust and solidarity among Colombians. Moreover, Casey
found evidence of social and geographic fragmentation among the previous waves of
Colombian migrants and the latest wave of migrants, which corresponds with the
migration of refugees to Costa Rica. This community fragmentation, wxhich Casey found
to be based in part on a negative stereotyping among Colombians, also hinders the
development of social capital in this community while also limiting the possibilities for
the formation of a Colombian enclave.
In regard to formal networks Casey (2002) also found that the "third wave" of
Colombians perceive a lack of solidarity among the community while Colombian
Associations' leaders believe Colombians in general do not trust these Associations. It is
important to note however the evidence Casey found of upper class Colombians
developing ties with Cubans and therefore of having the potential to develop bridging
capital. Also while support and cooperation is not perceived in the formal networks,
Casey found Colombians seem to rely more on informal networks formed by family,
friends and close associates. This highlights the tendency Colombians have on
developing social capital of the bonding type instead of social capital of the bridging
type, which explains in part the weakness in this community's social capital development
as an instrument to strengthening the community.
The findings regarding the formation of the Colombian community in South
Florida provide a good foundation to the understanding of some behaviors of Colombians
in Costa Rica, as these studies were done to a group of Colombians wxho migrated during
the same timeframe Colombian refugees fled to Costa Rica. Yet. not all Colombians in
these studies can be characterized as refugees, as South Florida also received a great
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number of economic migrants as also evidenced from these studies. 1 hus, it is still
important to take a look at case studies of other refugee groups. even of different origin
and racial backgrounds, as it is important to identify which variables are significant in the
integration of refugee populations. Since most case studies of Central American refugees
focus in their processes of repatriation instead of integration, it is useful to look at other
refugee groups.
In case studies of refugee integration processes mainly in the U.S. many variables
such as the right to citizenship; trust an solidarity, networks; ethnic enclaves; or ethnic
entrepreneurship, are highlighted as foundations of successful integration processes
(loltzman 2000. Ong 2003, Welaratna 1993, Portes and Stepick 1993). The following
selection of case studies highlights the social and ethnic dynamics of the refugees'
integration process. Later, I will address the economic dimension and find that social,
ethnicity, and economic aspects are in any case closely linked. In both instances, we will
be dealing, though. with refugee groups and recipient countries rather different from the
ones of our interest. Nexertheless, the significance of the following discussion is that it
does provide us some comparative elements making the case of Colombians in Costa
Rica easier to understand by contrast. Unlike Cambodians, Laotians or Sudanese in the
United States. Colombian refugees have great similarities wxith Costa Ricans as far as
ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. Ilowever, in an effort to find the reasons behind
the challenges in the integration process of all refugees and the refugee's feelings of
exclusion, it is important to take into account diverse refugees' integration processes.
This allows us to learn ways in which not only ethnicity but also factors such as
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economic dependency, kinship, regionalism, membership into associations, education and
job experience and skills, among others, play a role in the integration of refugees.
Within the dimension of social and legal integration Aihwa Ong (2003) explores
the process of integration of Cambodian refugees in the U.S, concentrating in the
relationship of integration and the refugees" process of citizenship. Ile explains that the
citizenship process is more than the possession of legal rights, le defines the process of
citizenship more as a process of belonging, which is defined in part by unofficial social
meanings and criteria that ultimately affect the ways in which refugees are integrated into
host communities. In the case of Cambodian refugees the author argues that the cultural
differences of these refugees make them more vulnerable to assimilating into the
American society instead of following a process of integration. Thus, in the process of
legal integration and citizenship building, special characteristics in the Cambodian
refugee population have placed them in a minority and disadvantaged category where
they have received pressure to assimilate into the community instead of integrating
economically while upholding their cultural differences (pp. xiv prologue).
Ong (2003) distinguishes two waves of Cambodian refugees: the first being an
upper class better educated, that integrated more easily into American mainstream. The
second wave of Cambodian and Laotian were peasants that entered the U.S. as refugees
and were later "located ideologically at the underclass end of the continuum, a position
close to the black pole of the ethno-racial scheme" (pp. 86). He found in a report
completed by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) a description of Cambodian
refugees as more individualistic and more prone to place feelings and emotions above
obligations while also having Americans as role models. By being subject to this
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ideological -blackening" the author argues that refugees from Cambodia and Laos came
to be perceived as having more in common with other poor newcomers among whom
they were found in low-wage jobs or largely as welfare recipients. Within this assistance-
recipient structure, this group of refugees found a support network in the social workers
and other professionals providing them assistance. These professionals wcre mostly first,
second or third generation ethnic Americans feeling compelled to assist the huddled
masses, more with the intention of making them simulate the American system to become
self-sufficient citizens than self-sufficient members of an ethnic group they identified
with comfortably. By categorizing Cambodian refugees as disadvantaged minorities and
assistance recipients, most of these refugees where subject to racial differentiations that,
within the American welfare system, made them prone to remain in this system of
dependency instead of becoming self-sufficient.
The process of citizenship explained in this case depicts the ways in which
cultural distinctions are translated into detrimental racial differentiations that can inhibit
the successful economic integration process of refugees. The minority stereotyping
within the legal process of citizenship seen in the case of Cambodian refugees might
teach us something about the case of Colombians in Costa Rica. Even though Colombian
refugees in Costa Rica generally do not have ample ethnic differences with the host
community. becoming a minority due to their immigrant profile alone can be a fact
increasing the levels of discrimination experienced by these refugees. As in the case of
Cambodian refugees, what made them become marginal was not necessarily these
refugees' different ethnicity, since refugees from other Asian countries have easily
achieved economic self-sufficiency. Instead, the fact that they became a minority
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associated with the poorest welfare-recipient Afro American conmumities was the critical
factor. From the author's perspective this association. other cultural conditions of
Cambodian refugees, and the welfare system itself, formed a structure that inhibited the
ability of refugees to become self-sufficient and therefore successfully integrated.
With a contrasting view Usha Welaratna (1993) provides a case study wx ith an
example of how Cambodian refugees feel succssfully integrated as they are able to live
up to their cultural and ethnic values instead of merely concentrating on economic self-
sufficiency. She explains that the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 is a policy by which a
process of Americanization, which can be assumed as assimilation, is enforced in refugee
populations through the achievement of self-sufficiency as quickly as possible".
Welaratna does not specify how this policy specifically enforces a process of
Americanization. I Iowever, through the narrative of nine Cambodian refugees integrating
into U.S. mainstream, the author concludes that by selecting to adopt only certain
American values and activities that are compatible with their own ways of life,
Cambodians can achieve economic self-sufficiency while maintaining successful and
fulfilling lives (p.p. 275). In this case study, it is compared how the American way of
looking at successful integration is founded on the achievement of economic self-
sufficiency ithout which refugees should not be considered successfully integrated.
I However, the author expl svalu sof C mbodian ref geofind atyc nsid r
themselves to be successfully integrated regardless of their economic success. For them,
happiness for having a close family; community and family cooperation* good conduct;
respect for their culture; and the merit of doing a good deed, among other values derived
from their Theravada Buddhist culture, are fulfilling values allowing them to feel well
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integrated. Thus, in this case, even though some authors have described Cambodian
refugees as individualistic, Welaratna argues instead that it is their feeling of family and
community responsibility wvhich makes therm supportive of each other and leads them to
achieve an O:erall feeling of wvell being.
For a host community, however, the fact that refugees will not become a burden
on the social welfare is primordial for the development of policies and institutions
facilitating the integration of refugees. Thus. to develop strategies to help them
overcome their dependency on welfare or humanitarian aid and become self-sufficient,
yet without enforcing pressure on them to change their cultural values, it is important for
states to make efforts to understand the values and cultures of refugees in a process of
integration. Both cases of Cambodian refugee integration are examples useful to
understand the contrasting views on what should be considered successful integration.
From the case studies it can be inferred that feelings of integration are closely related to
both a refugee's ability to achieve economic independence as wxell as his/her capacity to
feel part of a community respecting cultural values and ethnicity. The examples also
suggest that in addition to defining successful integration" from an academic point of
view, it is important to consider too how the refugee community itself defines it.
A group of refugees in the .IS. that are highly dependent on welfare and are
constantly among the poorest sectors of the society are the Sudanese refugees. Jon ).
H loltzman (2000) developed a study of Nuer Sudanese refugees in Minnesota. le finds
that despite efforts, these refugees face problems to find and hold employment due to
reasons such as language barriers and lack of education, job experience, and job skills.
Nuer refugees have tried to understand and accommodate to ways of life in the U.S. Yet,
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their rural background and therefore vast differences in the lifestyles and values of
Minnesota and Sudan makes it even harder for them to integ rate economically. The
integration of this group of refugees varies significantly from the integration of
Colombian refugees since Colombians do not differ so radically from host community
residents. lowever, it is important to bring up the approach to network formation seen in
this case of Sudanese refugees' integration to further explore the relationship betwxeen
ethnic associations and economic independence in a refugee integration process.
Socially, the community of Nuer refugees in Sudan is based on kinship
relationships. Once in America, however, these links are generally lost and refugees are
mostly on their own, ties in the family nucleus becoming primordial. Not used to act
independently. Holtzman (2000) finds that, due to language, culture and shared
experiences, these refugees are driven to form a community. Even though they express a
desire of moving away from seeing themselves identified by the community they were a
part of in Sudan, the author finds that these regional and kin differentiations remain
pivotal in their process of community formation among the Sudanese in Minnesota.
Ethnic mutual assistance associations have been formed to support the integration of
these refugees. These attempts have been useless however, as a race for power within and
the lack of leadership have led some of these organizations to be terminated. American
Churches, on the other hand, have proven to be successful in bringing Nuer together.
T hese congregations provide support in the early stages of the resettlement process and
even economic incentives for their participation in their particular congregations. Yet, the
author does not define the Nuer's participation in these networks as a way by which this
group of refugees would have access to economic mobilization.
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From the cases seen above, it is orth noting how ethnic values mighnh affct
positix ely or negatively the process of refugee integration. In the first study of
Cambodian refugees, ethnic and cultural characteristics placed refugees in a minority
group where they found greater hardships to become economically independent. In the
second case of Cambodian refugees. it was seen how despite sustained economic
hardships these refugees found in their ethnicity and cultural values enough reason to feel
successfully integrated in the host community. From the case of Sudanese refugees, it is
possible to see how ethnicity can become a mechanism to unite refugees and how even
though the creation of netorks is not closely related to economic mobility in this case, it
is linked to a feeling of well being in refugees.
The challenges Cambodian and Sudanese groups have in their integration
processes due to their distinct cultural and ethnic values are not the rule for refugee
integrations in America. A case such as the integration of Cuban refugees has become
material for the creation of models of adaptation, as this case has specific characteristics
placing it among the successful contemporary cases of integration. In the followxing
section the theoretical framexwork will be provided with models developed mostly from
the Cubans experience. In this section the "formulas for success" presented by different
authors will be explained and these theories will then provide the variables needed to
support the dx velopment of this thesis work. As it could be expected, these formulas are
based mostly on economic achievement although it is important to note too that in most
cases this achievement is derived from processes of integration based on special ethnic
characteristics.
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ileoretical Fraimeiwork
Moving away from eases where the relationship between economic and ethnic
characteristics has been loosely explored, in this section we will see examples where
actual adaptation models have been formulated for different groups of immigrants and
refugees settling in the United States. These models address interchangeably economic,
legal, and social or ethnic issues, although the main area of concentration in adaptation
models has been the economic. As we continue to understand the complex nature of
integration processes, ultimately a set of variables will be drawn.
As in some instances the cases used for the design of these models include
refugees, the theoretical body on the economic adaptation of migrants in general provides
a foundation for the study of refugee integration processes. Additionally. despite the fact
that these models address in general the economic adaptation of immigrants arriving in
America, some variables relating to legal, ethnic and social issues seen in these models
are also found in the narratives of refugees' integration explored previously. Therelore,
these models can be used as a foundation to understand the integration of Colombian
refugees even though they are resettling into a different country.
As explained previously, the assimilation approach failed to explain the
resurgence of ethnicity and the persistence of racial inequality and conflict among
immigrant populations. Some of the models of immigrant incorporation challenging the
assimilation approach include the "middleman minority model" (B1onacich 1973,
Bonacich and Modell 1980), the "entrepreneur!ethnic economy model" (1Light 1972.
1979), and the "ethnic enclave economy" (Portes and Bach 1985, Portes and Rumbaut
1990). By looking at immigrants enterprise, the authors developing these models look at
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how some immigrant groups have been able to retain employment and advance the social
and economic ladder not merely because of skills brought from home countries but due to
their solidarity to organize and their capacity to develop ethnic networks. Among these
theories it is common as well to argue that as they are exposed to racism, discrimination
and alienation, immigrants are usually motivated to restore back to their cthnicity.
Through the middleman minority model authors explain how as a result of their
exclusion from American mainstream employment, immigrant groups such as the
Chinese, the Japanese, and the Jews have become small-traders and merchants (Bonacich
1 973, Bonacich and Modell 1980). Bonacich, for instance, linked the success of
middleman minorities to their social solidarity. Yet, in later studies the authors found that
the solidarity characteristic of the first generation eroded in the second one.
The ethnic entrepreneur model initially introduced by Ivan Light (1979) explains
that when facing an integration process into a new community some immigrant groups
have a reactive solidarity. This characteristic makes them take advantage of resources
within their ethnic community. Some resources mentioned include social networks, and
the availability of underemployed or disadvantaged co-ethnic workers. The author also
explains that groups developing entrepreneurial skills respond to a distinct cultural
endowment of certain nationalities that leads them to seek avenues for profitable
enterprise while others remain content with wage employment.
Alejandro Portes is one of the authors responding critically to culturalist
explanations for the development of entrepreneurial skills among some immigrant
groups. lie argues that such approaches lack sufficient ground as they are formulated
after a group has achieved a notable level of business success but fail in identifying
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V\hich groups could acquire such skills. Moreover, Portes and Rumbaut (1996) argue that
these approaches fail to explain how groups with similar cultural backgrounds. such as
the Chinese Buddhist and the Buddhist Cambodian, have such different economic
outcomes in their integration processes (pp. 75).
Along with other authors, by the end of the 1980s Portes and his colleagues and
students developed the ethnic enclave economy model. The main characteristics in this
model are a spatial concentration of the immigrant group, sectoral specialization, and two
labor markets within the group: the primary one with good jobs, decent wages, and secure
employment; and, the secondary one with unskilled jobs, poor wages, and insecure
employment. Based on the segmented market theory, which explains how low-skilled
workers are mainly found in dead-end low-paying jobs, Portes' model explains that
immigrants on the secondary labor market have better chances of moving to the primary
one as they overcome language barriers and usually have more training opportunities
within the enclave. Additionally, businesses developed within an enclave usually start by
serving their ethnic community and later expand to the larger community (Portes and
Bach 1985; Portes and Stepick 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Portes and Rumbaut
2001).
Portes and Rumbaut (1990) advanced the ethnic enclave model incorporating the
variables identified in other models. This model of immigrant modes of incorporation
includes a social and legal framework of analysis, which affects immigrants' integration,
in addition to the initial economic and entrepreneurial framework. The model explains
that the integration process depends on the contexts of reception defined by (1) the
policies of the receiving government, (2) the conditions of the host labor imarket, and (3
25
the characteristics of their own ethnic communities. Since this is the model that better
incorporates the social, economic, and legal aspects already found to be important for the
integration of refugees. the variables of this model will be used for the construction of the
causal model in this thesis.
The policies of the receiving country are grouped into three categories: exclusion,
passive acceptance, or active encouragement. Exclusion forces immigrants into an
underground existence. Passive acceptance means the governments grant access to
immigrants but do not make any effort to facilitate or impede the process of migration.
Thus, as explained by Portes and Rumbaut (2001), "this neutral stance places newxcomers
under the protection of the law but does not grant them any special concessions to
compensate for their unfamiliarity with their new environment" (pp. 47). The third set of
policies, active encouragement, occurs xhen governments take active steps to motivate
the migration of a particular group of migrants or to facilitate their resettlement. The
authors explain that in the case of U.S., for example, this set of policies has been applied
to different refugee flows that have fled communist regimes. Mioreoxer, in different
migration flows studied, the authors have assigned this set of policies to refugee groups
while the other two sets of policies have been assigned to groups that have migrated
under other conditions. [he U.S. establishes the nationalities and numbers of refugees it
is willing to receive each year through a Presidential Determination. Refugees are
processed overseas and before coming to the U.S. they are granted the refugee status and
are ready for resettlement to the U.S. 'Thus, in the case of the U.S, the encouraging set of
policies under w=hich many refugees fall, are a result of the "Determination" passed by
the government.
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The conditions of labor markets are the second set of characteristics taken into
consideration in this model. The common features included in a set of labor market
characteristics include, among others, the receiving government's stage of the business
cycle, the demands for a specific kind of labor, and regional wage differentials. Yet,
Portes and Rumbaut (1990) explain that these characteristics are not as relevant as
sociological aspects of the labor markets such as the manner in which particular
immigrant groups are typified. In this context, the authors explain how groups that are
believed to be workers of a particular sector, such as agrarian labor, would most likely
have employment mainly in this field. Moreover, positive attitudes toward hiring a
particular ethnic group are not common and when they occur are the result of having
employers of the same nationality, such as occurs in "enclave economies" like
"Chinatown" or "Little I lavana". Another important aspect of the labor market explained
by the authors are the resources or ability that immigrants have to escape stereotyping or
neutralize discrimination by, for instance, disguising their nationality or moving to
another region.
The last set of characteristics identified in the immigrant modes of incorporation
model is the ethnic community of the immigrant group. Two possibilities can exist. One
is that there is not a community at all when the wave of immigrants arrives, in which case
the immigrants' integration will depend more on the host labor market. In this case. the
ideal situation is when employers do not discriminate against immigrants for their
education, resources, or the efforts of voluntary agencies resettling refugees. If one of
these conditions were present it would indeed be a decisive factor for their integration.
27
The second possibility is wx hen immigrants arrive to a place where a communnit
formed by co-nationals already exists. In such case, the authors explain that the process
of socioeconomic attainment is entirely network driven, which means that networks
would provide information about outside employment, jobs inside the community, and
sources o credit and support for entrepreneurial ventures. The authors also explain that
these communities could be either formed primarily by manual workers or contain a
significant professional or business element. When immigrants arrive to xworking-class
communities there is usually pressure from earlier ethnic arrivals towards conformity, as
these earlier arrivals expect newcomers to follow the same path they did. Arriving to a
community of members holding higher status occupations is different, as the support to
newcomers is not dependent of their working-class lifestyle and because these types of
communities are usually sources of both low tier employment and employment wN-ith
avenues for managerial or supervisory mobility.
From combining the three main contexts of reception identified in the model of
immigrant modes of incorporation, the authors provide twelve alternative contexts of
incorporation3:
[.I..Oo cromnct P~olic\ H Labor Markli R:ct piion. ow E), Ffihnic Comml nit\
None Working o n Itrep renerial
PAv~\c e ptance Neutral or Pos tI c I
cii A cO Support Neutral or I11, i~ 7 -89
10_icriminator_ I ( 12
Table ha been adjusted from original table on Iortes and Rumbaut 1990: 89.
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Finally, one of the most important factors when looking at how some immigrants
'make it" in America, Portes and Rumbaut (1990) argue., has to do with the human
capital. the motivation, and the resources migrants bring with them. Professionals. on one
hand, might have a tough time in the beginning due to language barriers and lack ofjob-
seeking experience, yet over time they have a high chance of obtaining better-paid jobs.
Immigrants with previous entrepreneurial experience, on the other hand, would most
likely take the road of self-employment, although also after they overcome some barriers
through time. For refugee groups, however, the authors make a distinction. They explain
that for refuees time does not necessarily transforms into better income, as is the case of
regular migrants. They attribute this to the fact that many refugees come from a declining
socioeconomic background. Thus, in most cases the fate of lower income reucees
depends on the kind of community built by co-national higher-income refugees who
usually are the first wave that migrates. The authors explain that this fact brings attention
to their main argument: "Individuals with similar background skills may be channeled
toward very different positions in the stratification system, depending on the type of
community and labor market in which they become incorporated- (pp. 83). This
approach, indeed, moves away from the integration explanations based solely on
ethnicity, as seen in some of the refugee cases reviewed previously, and offers a more
complete and structural method of analysis. Thus, since the model of immigrant modes of
incorporation, which include the policies of the receiving government, the conditions of
the host labor market, and the characteristics of the migrant's ethnic community, has been
the only one including legal and social in addition to economic Cactors, then it will be the
main theoretical foundation for this thesis work.
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Social Capial
Social capital is an additional variable that has not been looked at it in depth yet,
as it is not commonly used by social scientists studying immigration but by sociologists
trying to identify hox communities, immigrant or not, organize to succeed. Despite not
being used by social scientists for the study of immigrant communities, some variables
such as trust and solidarity, the formation of netwxorks, and ethnic support. which are part
of the social capital devclopment, have been important in the cases of refugees and
migrant's integrations seen previously. Social capital has been used more often now to
determine some communities and countries' potential for development. The unit of
analysis of immigrant studies is usually the individual, not the community. This is whlIy
some in academia do not find social capital to be a variable of great significance in the
study of immigrant groups. Yet, as surveys to identify social capital are usually designed
and delivered on an individual basis. this thesis will try to capture the presence, nature
and degree of social capital found in the individuals identified for interviews. Moreover,
as will be explained in following sections, the nature of social capital is also captured
through the solidarity and trust levels identified xwithin a particular community. As seen
in the above literature, solidarity has been a variable commonly identified in processes of
successful integration of immigrants or refugees. Thus, the attempt to look closely at
solidarity and indeed at social capital is fundamental for a comprehensive understanding
of the integration process of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica.
I rticuhLr ciFta IN C bccii dvarinccd bh thc World Iank in StUdiCs oF dcx elopm ni Of SomC cOuniricS.
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Robert Putnam (2003) has been one of the main authors in the study of social
capital. Ile summarizes this concept by explaining, "as used by social scientists, social
capital refers to the social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and
trustworthiness. The central insight in this approach is that social networks have real
value both for people in those networks as well as for bystanders~ (pp. 2). The author
specifies, however, that just as social capital can be useful to advance a community, it
could also be a malign source of power as in the case of, say, the Ku Klux Klan or
organized crime. Thus, the intangible social structures developed by social capital can
have positive effects in one community, negative in others, as well as negative in all.
Putnam explains that there are two types of social capital, the bridging and the
bonding social capital. The bonding social capital is the type where networks are created
by kin or by people who are linked by crucial similarities, such as ethnicity, and is more
inward looking. The bridging social capital is the hardest to create, as it is conformed by
networks of different types of people who are more outward looking. The author
explains how fbr the formation of a healthy community it is important to have more of
the bridging type, especially for a diverse community. However, one could ask for
immigrant communities with similar ethnicities, is bridging social capital the most
recommended type? As seen in the literature explained above, ethnicity is usually a
source of different resources useful for integration processes. Thus, it is to
wonder, as this thesis will, whether or not bonding social capital is more effective in the
formation of immigrant communities.
To study the effects of social capital in immigrant populations Alejandro Portes and
Julia Sensenbrenner (1993) developed a set of hypothesis-like statements in which they
31
summarize how structures of social capital affect economic action in immigrant groups.
To develop these statements or propositions the authors first identify the sources of social
capital. Thn, based on immigration research, they study how each of the sources found
afet positively or negatively immigration. From a definition of social capital developed
by James Coleman, the authors redefine social capital "as those expectations for action
within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its
members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere" (pp.
1323).
For the purposes of this study. even though some authors find two more sources
(-value introjection" and "reciprocity exchanges"), "bounded solidarity" and
"enforceable trust" will be the two sources of social capital taken into consideration.
First, bounded solidarity is defined as a reactive situational sentiment that arises from a
sense of belonging to a particular group. This sentiment depends more on a collective
moral than on its enfbrceability. Thus. it is common to see this sentiment arising from
situations in which a group faces common adversity, although Portes and Sensenbrenner
(1993) specify that such groups need to have as well the ability to activate a cultural
repertoire, brought from the home country, Which allows them to construct an
autonomous portrayal of their situation that goes beyond a mere adversarial reaction" (pp.
1329).
Enfrceable trust as a source of social capital is based on the internal sanctioning
capacity of the community itself. In this case, members of a group behave according to
SColcman dl incs social capital as a varictx ol entitics with two characteristics in cornmmon: Thex all
consist o M sOme aspects o social structures, and they [aci itate actions x ithin that st rcctre" ('oleman
198": 598. Ikund in iPortes and Sensenbrenner 1993: 1321 - i322).
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expectations out of tear of punishment or in anticipation of rewards. Areas of such
punishment or reward usually include financial networks or business networks in
enclaves.
Since one of their objectives is to show the positive and negative effects of social
capital, the following concluding argument and table shall give a clear idea of their
model:
The reactive mechanism giving rise to bounded solidarity in response to outward
discrimination is the same as outlined earlier (based on phenotypical and cultural
differences). The crucial difference lies in the extent of discrimination and its
duration. Protracted periods of oppression, especially in a no-exit situation,
undermine the cultural and linguistic resources available to a group Ior constructing
an alternative definition of the situation. A situation of permanent subordination also
deprives a collectivity of the resources necessary to reward or punish its members
independently, so that its enforcement capacity is entirely dependent on outside
discrimination that forces its members to band together. The downward leveling
pressures reviewed here are a reaction of the partial breakdown of this last source of
sanctioning capacity, as fissures in the barriers confronting the group allow some of
its members - "wannabes" or "turnovers" to escape its hold (Portes and
Sensenbrenner, 2003, 1344).
Social Antecedents Sources of Positive Effects Negative Effects
Social Capital
Outsidc discrimination bascd Prcfrccncc for co-ethnics in
n phciioIypical/cultural Economic transactions
1)it'rences
Blockage of cxit option- BoUndcd SolidaritN Altruistic support of
mmlunity E cl i ing prcssures
Mebes and g,,als
Presci ation of an Frce riding on
autonomous cultural reperto rrc C01mmuni1111
bonds/normls
Ilcxibiility in economic Rcstrictions on
Transactions through iit idual I'recdoi
I Iockacc of ontidc social reduction of r nma aid outsidc
\nd cconoinic opportnneitic contacts
Priv ilccd acccss to
A aihabilit% of in-group Entorccablc Trust cconoInic rcsourccs
Icononmic resources
Reliable cxpctations
C(omncinity monitoring and concerning eflects of
Sanctioniug capaci\ ma lfcasaicc
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CauIsIal Mlode!
From this overview of the literature on refugees' integration processes and different
theories of immigrants' adaptation, understanding the integration process of refugees
specifically might seem a complicated task. Therefore, the following chapters must be
structured based on a clear set of variables aimed at finding the explanations for the lack
of integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica.
First since integration is the main variable of this study, it will be the dependent
variable. The independent variables will be organized into three separate groups, based
mainly in the model of immigrant modes of incorporation as explained in the theoretical
framework and on the integration definition gathered from different authors in the first
section of this chapter, which regards integration as a legal, social an economic process.
The three sets of variables will be, therefore, the government context of reception
explained in a legal framework of study, the conditions of the host labor market
explained in an economic framework, and the nature of the ethnic community explained
in a social framework of study. The social capital formation variable will be included in
the social framework of study since through the exploration of social capital, manifested
through bounded solidarity and enforceable trust, it will be possible to have a more
accurate idea of the community's capacity for development. Additionally, some specific
factors of these three sets of variables were also seen in the literature review and will be
included in the explanations of each set of variables.
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After identifying the presence of the variabice explained above, this thesis will
bring them together to analyze their interactions and therefore explore how these
variables might afct the integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica. The analysis
of these interactions will allow us to answer this thesis's main question: Wi1 are
Colomian riefeces not readily iniegring f a ifr mIraing to C ost Rica" Conclusions
and possible areas of recommendations will be also provided in the finaI setion of each
chapter.
Responding to the question stated above the following hypothesis will be tested
throg hout this research:
lv othesis I;
"There is a "passive acceptance" of the receiving government towards Colombian
refugees that inhibit their legal integration"
I jothesis
"The ng ative conditions of the labor market in Costa Rica inhibit the economic
integration of the Colombian refugees".
1lv iVh 3:
"due to the n(gAive conditions of the host labor market, the lack of bounded solidarity
and enforceable trust within the Colombian community, and the lack of potential
formation of social capital among Colombian refugees, the success of their integration
process is inhibited".
This study will assess the experiences of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica as
well as the positive and negative aspects of the receiving society to find the determinants
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to the refug ees' levels of integration and possible explanations for their challenges. This
is an exploratory research, mostly qualitative, and based on interviews to refugees as
method of research.
T esing Hyl po/hesis 1: The Legal Integration of Colombian Refigees in Cosla
Rica. The first set of variables that will be studied will be the legal aspects related to the
reception and integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica to identify if these policies
can be regarded as passively or actively encouraging or as inhibiting the refugees'
integration. To start this chapter it will be important to look at the history of Costa Rican
policies toward refugees and the overall legal context at the time Colombian refugees
started to arrive. This analysis will provide a foundation for the understanding of the
mlain variable tested in this chapter. Then, variables such as the refugee's possibility to
obtain citizenship and the rights granted to theml througl their legalization process, which
should be equal to the host community rights, will be taken into consideration, as
identified in the integration definition. In this section the rights of refugees will be
analyzed from the perspective of how the law grants these rights and the state's capacity
to respond to the massive arrival of Colombian refugees. Then, the granting of rights will
be assessed from the refugees' perspective, through interview questions aimed at
identifying if they feel they access to these rights. Additionally, this chapter will look at
tile strategies, policies, and laws the government may have developed or failed to develop
to procure the integration of Colombian refugees.
Tesling IJ1pothesis 2: The Economic InTegralton in C'osa Rica. This section will
concentrate on the type of labor market in Costa Rica, more from the micro-social
perspective than the macroeconomic perspective. It will start providing an overvicw of
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the labor market in Costa Rica, focusing on factors that may inhibit the economic
integration of refugees rather than on an overall summary of the economy of the country.
Also to have a clear understanding of the economic conditions of refugees, the chapter
will assess the types of employments of the refugee population interviewed and compare
these findings with the findings of the 2003 Diagnosis about the Integration of
Colombian Refugees in Costa Rica, as they also provide statistical data on this area. [he
definition of integration explains refugees should live in a community with absence of
discrimination and fear, as foundation for their sustainability. Moreover, Portes and
Rumbaut explain that the labor narket is dependent mainly on the way immigrant groups
are typified, rather than on the labor and economic opportunities the community may
present. Thus, this chapter will also identify the stereotypes developed by the host
community about Colombians, if there is evidence of discrimination towards Colombian
refugees in Costa Rica, and the fears Colombian refugees might have towards
discrimination, possible exploitation, or intimidation by members of the host community.
This section will also look at possible barriers to employment such as the lack of
education, job experience in the host community, or low job skills among the Colombian
refugee population. Since the above literature review also showed the limitations
Colombians have to find employment in the U. S., even after overcoming the lack of
working papers, it will also be useful to identify if Colombian refugees in Costa Rica, as
some Colombians in South Florida, face barriers to find employment due to lack of
networks within their new communities and due to lack of information about the labor
market. Finally, this section will also look at the spatial concentration of Colombian
refugees in Costa Rica. It will also inquire if there is sectoral employment specialization.
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Both patia concentration and employment specialization r variables of great
importance to identify whether or not this community has the potential of becoming an
enclave.
Testing Iypothesis 3: Te Sociul negration of Colombian Re/igees in C osla
Ric u. iSince Portes and Rumbaut's main argument is that migrants vith similar
characteristics brought from home may have very different integration experiences, then
this section will not place particular att ntion to the human capital and resources brought
from home by refugees. Rather, the focus will be on the community of C1olombians in
Costa Rica, particularly the spaces where refugees interact with other Colombians that do
not have refugee status, and the potential formation of social capital in this community.
After identifying these main variables. I will look closely at the type of Colombian
community in C osta Rica, focusing on existing networks, the nature of the community,
and the absence or presence of a Colombian entrepreneurial class in Costa Rica
supporting the refugee population. From the overview of other refugee communities in
the litr ture review it was possible to understand the importance that ethnicity plays in
the integration of refugees Negative stereotyping can cause the segregation of a
community while ethnic bonding can develop feelings of social cohesion and strengthen
inde ed the process of integration. For the understanding of Colombian refugees'
integration it will be important therefore to identify if ethnicity plays an important role in
the formation of their community or if on the contrary their Colombian origin gener at
mistrust and fragmentation. After understanding the nature of the Colombian community
this chapter will look at the sources of social capital for Colombian refuges in Costa
Rica. Based on the studies by Portes and ensenbrenner, the goal will be to identify
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bounded solidarity in the form of reactive situations to common adversities, and to
identify enforceable trust from the presence of a sanctioning capacity within the
Colombian community. Following the research emphasis of Portes and Rumbaut on the
social dimension, a section of the thesis will, first of all, focus on the variables
concerning social capital in Colombia to identify general cultural characteristics brought
from home. Also the above literature review on Colombians in South Florida evidenced
their limitations for the formation of social capital based on community fragmentation,
lack of trust and solidarity among formal networks, and their tendency to rely more on
inlformal networks. Thus, it is necessary to identify if Colombians in Costa Rica follow
the same pattern and therefore also face challenges for the creation of social capital and
therefore for the development of cohesiveness within their community.
Design, inplementation and Data Ana/ysis
In order to identify the level of integration of Colombian refugees, I developed a
questionnaire with the variables identified in the literature review and the theoretical
framework. The variables mentioned in the legal, economic, and social sections above
will first help identify if refugees are integrated and then they will help identify the
possible reasons for their lack of integration, if any. This questionnaire was administered
to 17 cases, individuals or families. In depth interviews ranging from 2 to 5 hours were
also conducted as they responded to the questionnaire. After gathering data fromn these
interviews, the results were organized in an excel spreadsheet divided in the legal,
economic, and social sections. Then, through a pattern matching approach a comparative
analy sis of the variables was conducted to find patterns of similarities and differences.
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Since this is an exploratory research, it would have an ethnographic and descrptivc
nature and the results would not be representative of the whole sample refugee population
in Costa Rica but could highlight trends that can be later tested kith a broader
quantitative research.
The process of selecting the families for the interview was based on reaching the
families in a space where they could feel comfortable and not pressured to answer in
ways dif7erent to their experiences. During the assessment trip completed wxith the
International Rescue Committee I was able to interview over 26 families at the ACAI
offices. Yet, from this experience I was able to determine that refugee families did not
feel comfortable responding to the survey at this office. Some of them would wait for me
outside the office until the end of the day to tell me their experiences with detail. Others
would lower their voice while responding to some of the questions, especially to those
regarding their employment conditions. A couple of cases actually cried when responding
to the survey without actually giving me explanations for their frustration. It was not
necessarily the fact that they did not trust ACAI officials, as most of these cases had a
positive experience with the ACAI. It was rather an overall discomfort of opening up to
a stranger at an official site and the fear of becoming more vulnerable in case they said
something wrong during the interview. These reactions prompted me to stay away from
interviewxing families at the ACAI offices during my field trip research and rather to meet
families by referral from other refugee families. Thus, through a connection to a refugee
family in Costa Rica that works at an Internet service site frequented by other Cololmbian
refugees, it was possible to reach and schedule meetings with all the refugee families
inter iewed during the fieldwork for this thesis. From the 17 refugee individuals or
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families interviewed 9 met with me at their homes and the remaining 8 met with me at
restaurants or coffee places where they felt comfortable responding to the questionnaire.
Some of the biases posed by reaching the families in this matter come from the
fact that the contact at the Internet service site was a refugee case in the process of
resettlement. Since another refugee who had actually been resettled to the United States
before referred me to her, and since I had previously completed an assessment in Costa
Rica with an international organization helping refugees, then these refugees perceived
me as someone that could help them in their process of resettlement. The situation of
anguish and desperation experienced by some of the refugee families interviewed became
a negative factor in the perception they had towards outsiders like me, as they assumed
that if someone was at least interested in listening to them, then that person could become
a helping hand. This could have affected the reliability of the study since some of the
most desperate cases could have exaggerated their stories to raise more awareness
towards their particular situations. Thus, to avoid the development of these false
expectations and the weakness of the interviews, I explained to all families interviewed,
even before they met with me, that the purpose of the questionnaire was an academic
study and that my presence in Costa Rica was not related at all with a mission to help
them, advocate for them, or represent them with any international non-governmental
organization. After listening to this explanation and understanding I was not going to
help them in any way, the cases in the process of resettlement thank ie in any case for
being there and listening to their stories. Most of these cases actually talked to me for the
longest periods of time and during my stay in Costa Rica looked for rme several times at
the Internet site to give more information that could help support the thesis work.
41
I. LEGAL INT EGRA ION
In order to assess the legal process of integration and understand how it affects the
OXe r1 integration of refugees, this chapter vill divide the study of legal variables in two.
First, it will look at the "policies of the receiving government," a central element within
w hat the model of immigrant modes of incorporation proposed by Portes and RUmbaut
(1990) terms "the context of reception". The analysis will consider w ihether the policies
of the receiving government are exclusionist, passive, or encouraging towards the refugee
community being integrated. Then, the Chapter will take a look at the definition of legal
integration to understand how it is conventionally understood and as: ssed. This
exploration is relevant since the basic definition of legal integration relates to the
perception refugees have of the rights being granted to them by the host society. By
assessing how the Costa Rican Government has developed the policies that affect
Colombian refugees and then exploring how refugees perceive the rights they have been
granted, including the right to obtain permanent residency or citizenship, this chapter will
conclude with an assessment of positive or negative effects of the legal aspects
surrounding the Colombian refugees* integration process.
To start, it is important to understand the history of Costa Rica's overall policies
tovad. refugee reception. Then, we will look specifically at the legal framework within
xwhich Colombian rfues vere initially proce ssd in Costa Rica to as the character
of the policies developed for this wavc of refugees. However, we will not look merely at
the formal legal context but address the actual reality, particularly the institutional
capmity to implement some of the law's provisions concerning the treatment of refugees.
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In addition to the local legal framework and institutional capacity, we will also refer to
some of the policies implemented within Costa Rica by the United Nations, for they are
also a key component of the context of reception. Finally, taken into consideration the
definition of legal integration and based on the results of the study on Colombian
refugees completed by UNH-CR and UCR in 2003, we will explore which rights have
been granted to Colombian refugees and how the refugee community perceives these
rights.
History oJf Rfigee Legal Processing in Costa Rica
Costa Rica has been a receptor of refugees, asylees, and economic migrants for
several decades. Its political stability, the country s promotion and protection of human
rights, and the positive economic environment, has made Costa Rica and important
pulling force of Central and South American migration flows. Yet, although the Costa
Rican government has made efforts on providing refuge and developing a legal
framework for the processing of refugees, this has been a slow process and the rights of
refugees have not always been protected through the Costa Rican law.
Through Law 6079 of August 29, 1977 Costa Rica ratified the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol (UNI ICR - UCR, 2003). This meant that Costa Rica
agreed to provide protection to refugees and to develop and implement the structures
necessary for this end. In 1978 refugees became a prominent part of the Costa Rican life
for the first time with the arrival of Nicaraguans fleeing the war in their country. This
refugee movement did not impact the legal migration system in Costa Rica too much as
these refugees returned to their country in 1979 when the Sandinistas won the revolution
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n Nicaragua. It was only until the Salvadoran refugees started to arrix in simnilicant
numbers in the early 1980s that the country began developing policies governing refugee
affairs. First in 1980 the UNIHCR took the task of receiving applications for refugee
status. Then by May of 1982, a government cornmission known as CONAPARE
(Comision Nacional para los Refugiados), was formed to expedite the six thousand
applications of refugee status pending. With increasing numbers of Nicaraguan refugees
arriving to Costa Rica", only until 1983 the 1ecree I4845-G created the Refugee Office
of the General Migration and Foreign Direction (DGME), a division of the Police and
Go ernance Ministry' . It was then until August of 1986 that the current Le Gceneral de
iigracion y Exirwnjeria was issued and until 1989 that the regulations for the Law were
devxeloped. Through Article 7 of this Law, the DGME was designated as the responsible
entity for determining the refugee status, resolving about the refugee solicitations, and
providing the necessary documentation to refugees according to the Costa Rican law and
the international conventions (tNHCR - 11CR 2003). The DGME's Department of
Migration for Refugees (DMR) became the governmental institution responsible for
processing the solicitations for refugee status in Costa Rica. This Department was not,
howxever. responsible for proxiding protection or any other service to ref gees.
An important component of the context of reception has been the active
involvement of the United Nations and international NGOs in the handling of refugee
claims xithin Costa Rica. UN's involvement can be considered an intervening legal
, Nicaraguan refugees started to flee again to Costa Rica in 1982, 1043 Nicaraguan ref ngees registered this
ear and then ,73 1 refugees registered in 1983.
*'he Dfecree 14845-G was replaced by 1)eree 3219-4 on Novemer 22, 2004. The newa decree
estahlishes the statistical information that needs to he suhmitted to the UNHCR in relation to the refugee
stalus approa als. The neNN decree also regulates the procedures to grant the rcf ugee stats in Costa Rica.
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variable, for among other things they were meant to facilitate the implementation of the
country's refugee's legislation. In 1980 the UNICR made an agreement with the
I piscopal Church to assist all refugees. Then UN sponsored assistance programs w ere
passes to the Red Cross in 1982. In 1983 the Costa Rican government wished to have the
control of assistance programs and the Instittlo Aixto the Ayiuda Social was created. In
1985 the programs were transferred back to the Amiociaion C'enlro-4negral Atencion a
Re/agiados and then from 1989 to 1993, when most programs of assistance for refugees
were terminated, the International Rescue Committee managed the assistance programs.
With the rise in numbers of Colombians requesting refuge in Costa Rica, by the year
200() the UN ICR designated the .lgenIa ie COslnlvtores y asesores Inernaciona/ues
(ACAI) as the organization in charge of implementing UNI ICR's assistance programs.
specifically developed to serve the refugee population in this country. Today the CAI is
responsible for providing services basically in four areas: legal, social, micro enterprise,
and psychological. Specific services in these areas include legal counseling, case
management, screening and management of cases for resettlement, vocational courses,
and assistance to individuals applying for the refugee status and to approved refugees>
Bridget Hayden (2003) in a study of Salvadorian refugees in Costa Rica argues
that the constant changes and instability in the regulations and administration of refugee
programs reflected a constant attempt to respond to the changing social, economic, and
" he cr itcria f or assistance is defined based orn fouar basic pri nci[plcs: 1.. 1> A-sitncc; is a scra icc, not a ri chit,
2. Assistance should hc fair, acccssiblc, and limited:, 3. Sell'-hellp is thc bcsi. hcllp. 4. 1 he rcf ug1-c Shourldl
partici pate in the search of soluptionsi Additionalix the ('Al, based on I t ~lZ dii ectioans dec loped thae
r ofloxxi ng criteria to prox ide assis 'tnce: 1. Individuals appix i g for the ret Lg satus and appro x d
ret ugeces are eligible for assistane; atter as socioeconlomic studx of the easehas been Performed- 2. 1he
am m uat or fi nanc.ial assistianxce xx ill be based uasi tic as a base; the mi i ainalar 1,1dO loical po pu lat i u ; . The
time of assistance wxill be limited, most of ten wxill no be prov ided for a time,, longeri than three months, and
will he assigned based on the number of family members
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political conditions of the country while also gave indications of how confusing it was for
the Costa Rican government to deal with such large numbers of refugees. Moreover, the
author argues "the Costa Rican government created the category of refugee as a
bureaucratic necessity because the country needed international assistance to deal xwith
the unexpected and unprecedented numbers of Central American refugees who arrived in
the 1980s'". The author moves on to explain that the way to obtain assistance was
through the United Nations and international NGOs, which required for the Costa Rican
government to use the legal categories these entities recognized. The Costa Rican
government created its own legal definitions of asylum and refugee. Yet, these legal
definitions ultimately affected the way Costa Ricans perceived refugcee settlements in
their country.
Before the 1980s Costa Rica gave asylum to professionals, authors, and scholars;
an elite group of people who had fled mainly due to political persecution caused by Latin
American dictatorships. Asylurn was granted by the president's office and this condition
was granted to those with political reason for taking refuge. In 1986 Costa Rica changed
its legal code to include the categories of refugee and asylee in a single system of
classification. Refugees were defined as people who have any other reason to fear for
their lives in their home country, which in the context of Central America in the 1980s
meant the victims of war'". During the 1980s Salvadorans and Nicaraguans were granted
refugee status, rather than asy lee status. Ilayden argues there was a clear bias in the use
of these terms; asylees had always been relatively elite while refugees were common
Most 5alvadorans arrived between 1980 and 1982; these were also the worst years ot the economic crisis
in ta Rica. In 1982 inflation was , etween 90 and 100 prccint in the conntry (Hax dcn, 2003 r
" Throuih the 1984 Cartagena Con ention many Latin American countries ratified a ne di nition or
refu.ee to nlidcle thtse fho Flee From ieneralied violence.
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people, most relatively poor, and many in need of some form oi assistmce because they
arrived wvith nothing and because they were not permitted to work legally in the early
years of their time in Costa Rica.
The Costa Rican distinction is a result of the prior existence of the mainly elite
category of 'asilo" in Latin America, but it also reflects, and was made more
meaningful by, the contrast between a few elite and prolessional asylees and the
masses of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees who came to exemplify the
category "refugiado" for Costa Ricans... Consequently the word took on
connotations within the national context of the time - a context of economic and
political crisis throughout the region that seemed to threaten the most fundamental
aspects of Costa Rican experience. "Refugiado" came to mean, for the most Cost
Ricans, the stereotypes they had about the Central Americans who were the
ma jority of refugiados. The Costa Rican government encouraged the consequent
prejudice against refugees by subtly using the refugee policy to deflect criticism
against the state for worsening social conditions toward an outside cause. (pp.
28).
In addition to the basis for discrimination caused in part by the legal
characterization of refugees, the Costa Rican law has been restraining refugees' access to
housing and social programs. Article 2 from Law Number 5662 of lsignaciones
I"wnilires December 23, 1974 and Article 42 from Law Number 7052 of Sisierm,
JFinlancier(o Niacional para La V Fivienda November 6, 1986, limit the access to the National
Fund fur Housing (FONAVI) and the Fund for Social Development and Family
Assignations by specifying such funds should be given only to Costa Rican families.
These restrictions violate Articles 19,33,50,51 and 65 of the Political Constitution of the
Republic of Costa Rica and articles 13 and 21 from the 1951 Refugee Convention. A
legal action to change these articles was introduced in 1997, but no changes have been
made to the law so far. Actually, on February 26, 1999, the Constitutional Court voted
against the unconstitutionality of Article 2, arguing that excluding foreigners as
beneficiaries was not limiting their right but instead guaranteeing the State's capacity to
protect its citizens by securing the use of some economic resources to the benefit of a
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certain sector of the population (Deftnsoria de los Ilabitantes, 2003 . Moreover, the
Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Article 2 arguing this benefit should be kept only to
nationals since there are not enough resources to meet the needs of poor Costa Ricans.
Based on Article 2, the Article 4 of the FODESAF law establishes that 20% of the funds
for the pension program will be taken from the Fund for Social Development and Family
Assignations, which must be available only to Costa Rican citizens. Thus, as the Costa
Rican Ombussman reports, since the Regimen No Conlrihibiivo de la Cja C'osctarricense
te Seguro Social receives resources from other funds in addition to the Funds for Social
Development and Family Assignations, then there is no legal ground for excluding
foreigners to receive pension benelits from this Regimen No Conlrihulivo. 1 he
Ombussman presented a resource to have the Court ruling reconsidered. In 2003 the
Ombussman received an answer restating the position to keep the pensions program only
to Costa Rican citizens and to date refugees are excluded from this pension program.
The history of the legal conditions surrounding the integration of Central
American refugees in Costa Rica during the 1980s was characterized by the inconsistency
in the structuring of the legal framework for the integration of refugees, the slow
implementation of needed law, the prejudices created against the category of refugee as a
consequence of the legal denominations adopted by the government, and the urgency of
different Costa Rican governments to remain as a sanctuary for refugees regardless of
their pressing economic needs. Costa Rican migration officials somnetimes harassed
Salxadoran refugees as they used to go to the refugees' homes to verify refugees were not
working before 1984, year in which the law was changed to allow refugees to work as
Additional re frences to the reports of the Dcfelsoha e los Ihlbitanttes will he addressed as the " ('osta
Rican Omusmnxrrf or "0 )mbussmnan"
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wage-laborers. Even after the change of law, it was only until 1985 that the mechanism
for issuing a work permit to refugees was instituted and in practice, even the legal work
was difficult to attain for refugees (Basok, 1993). Moreover, based on reports made by
UNI 1CR, 95 percent of the work permits requests made by refugees were denied by the
Labor Ministry (UN 1CR -1UCR, 2003). Despite of changes in the legal framework to
provide protection for refugees during the 1990s and still current legal battles that will be
studied later in this chapter, the history of legal integration of refugees provides a
foundation for difficulties and continued dilemmas in the current process of integration of
Colombian refugees.
Deinition of Legal Integration
The legal integration of refugees can be defined as the process by which refugees
receive from the host state a progressive recognition of rights equivalent to those of host
nationals or equivalent to the most favorable conditions to foreign nationals in the host
state. This process should be geared to the acquisition of permanent residency or in some
cases citizenship in the host state. The process is also defined in the context of the
refugees' duties and responsibilities to the host state. The success of the legal integration
process is reflected in the materialization of diverse social, economic, cultural, and civic
rights recognized to refugees (UN HCR - UCR, 2003).
Legal lProcess of Re/it fugee Status Recognition to Colmnbian Reugees in Cos/a Rica
To decide if the policies of the Costa Rican government towards Colombian
refugees are exclusionist, passive, or encouraging it is necessary to look at the way the
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Costa Rican government has handled the legal processing of Colombian refugees as wel
as the measures it has taken to address issues such as citizenship and other rights refligees
are entitled to receive.
The legal environment for the refugees' integration has evolved from the instable
developments in the 1980s, times in which it would be fair to affirm that the policies of
the Costa Rican government were not exclusionist, since the government was trying to
handle the refugee influx. Yet, the policies were not encouraging either as rights such as
the right to work, to no discrimination, to housing and social programs, or to permanent
residency, wxere not accessible by refugees due to legal restrictions in the Costa Rican
law. Although some laws have changed in recent years to better integrate the recent
movement of refugees in Costa Rica, it is necessary to assess if these changes suffice flr
an appropriate integration of Colombian refugees in this country and to decide if the
government has neutral or encouraging policies.
Since the creation of the DMR and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Costa
Rican government started to build the capacity to handle the influx of refugees primarily
arriving from other Central American countries. Yet, by the year 2000 these refugees had
either returned voluntarily to their original country, had been resettled, or had integrated
in Costa Rica. Therefore, by this time the DMR's capacity had been drastically reduced
while other NGOs that had been working with refugees switched operations and focused
on serving other needs in the Costa Rican community. Colombian refugees started to
come precisely at this inauspicious time.
As explained previously, Costa Rican law established that the solicitations of
refugee status are to be processed in one month after all the documnents have been
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presented to the DMR. In 1999 the DMR received 88 solicitations Ior refugee status
from Colombians and by the year 2000 that figure had jumped dramatically to a total of
1.451 solicitations. The processing of these solicitations did not respond to the 30 day
timeframe designated by Costa Rican law and by January 2001 a total of 1,338
solicitations were still pending. With a very low average of 46 refugee resolutions by
month from an average of 442 solicitations, the U NHCR signed an agreement called the
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) project with the DMR. The objective of the
agreement was to reinforce the DMR's processing capacity and speed up the procedures
to determine the refugee status of applicants.
Through the provisions of personnel and technology the refugee resolutions
increased to a monthly average of 514 by the end of 2001. However, due to the long
backlog of unresolved cases, by the end of this year there were still 2566 cases pending
for resolution, most of which involved Colombian petitioners. Despite achievements, the
RSD project had to be suspended by the end of 2001 and forging new alliances with the
civil society in Costa Rica became a priority. Indeed, a new alternative to continue
addressing the handling of cases was developed and the project between UNI CR and the
University of Costa Rica (UCR) was created.
The project "Fortalecimiento de la Protecci6n de los Refugiados y Migrantes
Vulnerables en Costa Rica" developed by UNIICR and the UCR was developed as a
community project of the University (TCIU) Law School to strengthen the protection and
assistance to refugees in Costa Rica. The project was based on incorporating students
from different schools of the University in different functions of the legal processing and
assistance functions to refugees.
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The students' main responsibilities include the collaboration with the IM as
assistants to refugee eligibility officials. Their functions as assistats include creating
resolution propositions for the determination of an applicant's condition of refugee,
creating ordinary resources of appeal, exit permits, re-entries to Costa Rica, resolutions
about family reunification, migratory certifications, reorganizing the files, and
interviewving refugee applicants. Another main function of TCU students has been
collaborating with the ACAI in various aspects including legal, social, psychological, and
micro enterprise assistance. In the legal area TCU students have been providing legal
counseling about immigration, civil, family, housing, and employ ment issues, and they
also have been helping refugee status applicants to organize the papers and documents
necessary to present to the DMR office. Also in the ACAI office T CU students provide
social assistance by assessing the refugee's socioeconomic situation to determine the
economic assistance as well as by helping them with issues related to housing, family
reunification and psychological support.
A third area of TCU students' support includes the elaboration of the
"Diagnostico sobre el grado de integracion de la poblacion refugiada en el pais". This
document, as well as following surveys of both the refugee and the local populations, has
been developed with the objective of making an introductory study of the refugee's levels
of integration. The results of the study are aimed at educating government and non-
goxvernmental organizations about integration process and allow for the development and
implementation of appropriate policies'. A final area of TCU students support include
An eample ol how this stuIy has becri ciTiicicnt incluidcs thc rtetiiis relatcd to the IcvcIs of cmplox mcnt
of the rclugcc popuIation. The results sho Ned a ery high pcr clnagc oi uncmplo\ mnIt among r gccs.
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the elaboration of a database and the analysis of the resolutions from the Constitutional
Chamber in matters related to refugees and migrants.
The students participation was decisive in helping the )MR reduce the backlog
that had been accumulating for almost two years. From 2089 cases that were still pending
in January 2002., only 20 cases were still pending by August 2002 and by the end of this
year the backlog had been eliminated. To date TCU students continue to participate in
different activities related to the integration of Colombian refugees including, among
others, the processing of the refugee status with l)MR, the screening of cases for
resettlement, and studies of the labor market in Costa Rica to strengthen employment for
refugees.
Although this student participation has been very effective to speed up the process
of status approval and to alleviate the burden of the agencies helping refugees, some of
the activities students perform are still arguable, as these activities require personnel with
more experience. At the DMR, students were in charged of the cases' interviews and of
recommending if a case should receive or not the refugee status. At the ACAI, students
are in charged of interviewing the cases applying for resettlement and also recommending
if the case should be referred to the ACN R. The Director of the DMR, responded in an
interview conducted by the IRC commission where I participated, that DMR officers
supervise the students and revise the recommendations, changing them if needed.
Management of the ACAI office also responded their students were supervised by
officers of the organizations. Yet, from some interviews with refugees in Costa Rica, a
sense of discomfort was expressed in regard to their recommendations fi status
recognition or referral to resettlement.
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)any of the families interviewed had gone through the process o resettlement
and were waiting for an answer regarding their referral. The families who made the
complaints expressed they thought their cases could have been delayed since the person
w ho interviewed them seemed young and inexperienced. The interviewer is supposed to
make an initial assessment trying to identify if the case has a well-grounded fear of a
continued persecution in Costa Rica. This interview serves as a first screener of the cases
to later refer only the cases that seemed likely to be persecuted to the UNIICR. ACAI
personnel expressed on February 2005 that a larger number of cases were requesting
resettlement. It is likely that ACAI personnel are not necessarily checking all
recommendations made by students due to the great amount of resettlement cases. This
will in part explain why some refugees have to write directly to UNI ICR or go directly to
their offices, even if this process is not encouraged by UNIICR, out of the necessity of
being heard by professionals and later enter the process of resettlement.
As seen above the Costa Rican government with the help of UNIICR and the
UCR, has been strengthening its response capacity to handle the influx of Colombian
refugees, even if that process meant delegating important responsibilities to students at
the risk of not providing the fairest treatment to refugees. As refugees continued to arrive
in large numbers, the government, responding to economic pressures and fears in the
community of job displacement, started to adopt a more restrictive position towards
allowing retugees to enter the country by establishing a visa requirement. Then. as
Colombians with visa continued arriving to Costa Rica and continued receiVing refugee
status, although in less numbers, the Costa Rican government started a law project aimed
at restraining the refugees' access to permanent residency.
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To understand why the Costa Rican governmet has been adopting restraining
policies, it is important to take a look again at the history of refugee migrations to C osta
Rican. Since the 1980s with the influx of Central American refugees, Costa Rican media
has been affecting ticos' perception of refugees by causing alarm and creating a sense of
loosing control over levels of unemployment in the country. Reports in Lu Remblica on
July 1982 with headlines such as "A thousand Salvadorans enter per month~ (I layden,
2003), fueled fears in the community of how thousands arrived to the country in need of
assistance and willing to take any type of work. A decade later, since Colombian
refugees started to arrive in larger numbers after the year 2000, main national newspapers
such as Nacion also published articles with alarming headlines including -Costa Rica
takes the third place in the continent in migration". This article starts by reporting, "Costa
Rican authorities recognize their preoccupation due to the high migratory burden the
country takes, where 10% of its population are foreigners. Costa Rica, being a small
country, is the principal receptor of migrants in Latin America" ("Costa Rica ocupa.,
2004). It then moves on to explain Colombians are the second largest foreign population
after Nicaraguans and recognizes that the establishment of a visa requirement for
Colombians issued by the government has been a successful measure to diminish the
amount of requests for a legal migration status' '.
When Colombians started to arrive to Costa Rica in the thousands and the media
started to report the Colombian exodus, Colombians were first seen as a harmless
migration movement due to their middle to high-class profile and the investment
T ranslaion from article on La Nacion dated iune 10, 2004.
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expectations in Costa Rica. In 2001 Costa Rica's main newspaper La Nacion reported the
Colombian exodus as follows:
Who are they? The profile of these immigrants is different from the Central
Americans that Costa Rica has received up to know, based on the data of the
National Council of Migration. Eduardo Vilchez, Migration Director, defines
them as affluent and auto-sufficient people. IH says this is a positivxe migration,
able to being assimilated by the country. based on its dimensions today. In an
interview given to La Nacion a few days hefore passing away, the Costa Rican
Ambassador in Colombia explained that the majority of people fleeing to Costa
Rica were people with a small capital between $25.000 and $50,000 (colones)
who are trying to escape violence... Chancellor Roberto Rojas explains that
although it is not discarded that people linked to crime may arrive, this risk is
minimum... Chancellor Rojas said that the government would not establish a visa
system. They are the type of people we are looking to attract, they already haxe
education, they bring an income, and they are not a burden to the social serices
of the country (1-Exodo colombiano", 200 1). '
Yet, these positive and harmless descriptions as well as the public opinion
towards the Colombian migration changed rather fast, resulting indeed in the first change
in policy that affected the migration of Colombian refugees to Costa Rica. By September
2001 newspaper articles with headlines like "refuge solicitations increased in a 6,910
percent" ("Alud de Colombianos, 2001 )', started to announce the possibility of issuing a
xisa requirement for Colombians in an attempt to stop refugee arrivals and alle iate the
completely crowded Migration Offices that were trying to help these cases. Shortly
after, by March 2002, the government was announcing the visa requirement to Colombia.
While during the first public announcement the Costa Rican government did not offer an
official explanation for the new policy and said that they were going to facilitate the
system so Colombians could get multiple entry and tourist visas, two weeks later the
Costa Rican Vice President announced in Bogota that the visa system was going to be
" ranslated Fromin article in La Nacion dated Sunday March 25, 2001.
I Trans'ation 'rom a ticle in La Nacion d ed Sundayeptember 16. 2001
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temporary. The Vice President explained the system was going to be in place just while
the security agreements between the Costa Rican government and the Colombian
government were ready to learn information about the individuals who were trying to
enter Costa Rica. Other official declarations included Costa Rica's government concerns
over the increase of the numbers of victims from the Colombian conflict as a result of the
peace process rupture, which could worsen the violence in Colombia and create a new
migratory flow.
To date the visa requirement has not changed for Colombians and refugees
continue to be approved after the visa was established for Colombians. Yet, it is
important to note that the number of Colombians arriving to Costa Rica changed
dramatically after the visa requirement was established. The numbers of refugee status
requests reached a peak of 1073 solicitations on April 2002, as Colombians seemingly
rushed to enter Costa Rica before the deadline of the visa requirement was due and then
the number of solicitations came down to a continued level of 250 solicitations after May
2002.
After this first government measure to control the arrivals of Colombian refugees
was introduced, the government continued the development of policies that would make
the legal integration of Colombian refugees more difficult. To understand how this legal
change affected refugees, first it is important to explain initial regulations established by
the Law.
The Article 36 of Law number 7033, which is the General Law of Migration,
established that temporary residents are all foreigners who, without the intent of staying
permanently in the country, enter the country under the category of asylees and refugees,
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among other categories". In relation to the change of status trom temporary to permanent
resident, the Article 58 of the decree number 19010-G, which is the decree that makes the
Regulation of the General Law of Migration. establishes which documents are necessary
for the application of status change. The Law establishes that the applicant should present
the application at the General Consulate in the country of origin and to have all necessary
docunentation certified there. Since this was not possible by refugees, who could not
return to their countries of origin, it was permitted that refugees presented a sworn
declaration to the DMR in Costa Rica. Yet, on August 2002 the government established a
series of restrictions and since then sworn declarations were no longer accepted as a
mechanism to replace the certified documentation needed for the change of status.
On February 2003 the government established an additional detrimental
restriction regarding this change of status. The Article 79 of the decree number 1901 0-G,
established that a temporary resident can apply for permanent residency after a)
presenting an application authenticated with a lawyer and b) had lived continually in the
country for two consecutivey after having received the temporary resident document.
Refugees were affected negatively when the Executive Decree Number 311 86 of
February 5 2003 eliminated the article 79 and therefore eliminated the option for refugees
of applying for permanent residency after two years of being temporary residents. The
arguments for the change in this decree included, among others, that the General Law of
other categories of orcigners receiving the temporary resident status include, prolessional sc ientists.
technicians or specialized personnel who are hired by companies or estalished institu tions that de clop
activities in the conntrv; entrepreneurs. husinessrnen. and directors ol national or forei gn c( mpanies
students: religions people who pertform activities that are part of their cult or teachings: the spouse and
minors of the individuals in these .ategories: those authorized by the General Direction of Mi-gration: and
the oxners and crew, of tourist and recreation ships. The Article 35 of this Law establishes that imestors
and retirees are entitled to receive the permanent a isa status.
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Migration does not establish that temporary residents can change their status just as a
result of time, and that the Law's Regulation should include the norms to determine
requirements and procedures to allow the application of the Law, Without establishing
things that are not contemplated by this Law. The arguments for the change in this
decree also bring up the Article 67 of the Law, which establishes that the foreigners
accepted in the country as temporary residents or no residents can stay within the country
for the lapse of time authorized and should leave the country once this time comes to an
end. The reasoning used in the decree Number 31186 does not mention, however, that the
Article 67 also establishes that the Law's Regulation is the one to determine the terms of
stay, based on the categories of arrival and permanence, as well as the extensions. Thus,
although the Law clearly establishes the right refugees have to obtain permanent
residency. the Executive decree is deliberately, and still arguably, negatively affecting the
integration of Colombian refugees.
As it will be explained in the chapter exploring the economic integration, refugees
face great challenges to obtain and secure employment due to the type of document they
get. Permanent residents and citizens receive a ceduila, which is a resident ID, whereas
refugees holding the temporary resident status receive a refugee ID. xhich is often not
recognized by employers as an authentic document certifying legal work authorization.
T o date the only viable way for refugees to obtain the cediul is by Nwaiting five years
after their reiugee status approval date to apply for citizenship.
Another important governmental measurement that will affect the legal
integration of Colombian refugees is the project to change the Migration Law. In
response to the changes in the migration environment in recent years, the Costa Rican
59
government drafted a new Migration Law that was approved on October 27, 2005 ( a
Nacion, October 28 2005). This Law is specifically looking at encouraging organized
international migrations as an important development mechanism while simultaneously
discouraging and strongly sanctioning any mechanism that may allow or support irregular
or unorganized migration flows. To implement these changes the Law project is aiming
to establish the Superior Migration Council formed by the Ministries of Presidency.
Public Security, Cult and Foreign Relations, Government and Police, Labor and Social
Security. and Justice, The Council will advise the executive on any matter related to
migration and will revise any international treaty of migration nature. The Law project
will also establish the judicial structure for the creation of a Migration Police to control
and guard people entering and leaving the country as well as the stay of foreigners in the
country. U.,NI ICR officials in Costa Rica have been providing recommendations
regarding the need to implement definitions in the law that would protect the refugee's
rights.
The law proposed does not include any definition regarding what means refuge.
as it is established in the 1951 Convention of which Costa Rica is signatory, and it
does not make reference to the fundamental principle of no return even though
this principle is included in the Costa Rican constitution. Additionally the
proposed law includes additional motives to cancel the refugee condition
opposing the 1951 Convention; for example, any sanction that may lead to the
cancellation of an individual's refugee condition would be applied automatically
to the individual's family members without considerations of their individual
needs for protection.
Finally, the law proposed does not guarantee to the refugees their right to work.
Even though Costa Rican authorities respect this right in practice, this right must
be part of any new law in a way that refugees may achieve self-sufficiency in the
local society ithout this being a burden to the government" ("Costa Rica:
ACNUR", 2005).
Tc\t Tranated by Angeda Bonilla from La Nacion, August 12, 2005.
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The Costa Rican Ombussman, as secretary of the Forum in charged ofdrafting the
Migration Law project in 2000, recommended that such project should chance its
national security approach to adopt a human rights approach. The Ombussman also sees
with concern that the different migrant categories are not being defined in the Law
project but instead in the regulation that will be drafted after the project is approved.
Since the Law project has a restrictive character, the Ombussman sees the importance of
defining with clarity categories such as the temporary residents, permanent residents, and
refugees. It specifically sees with concern that the new project places refugees in a
special category that cannot be understood as a permanent nor temporary resident
category, which as well as to the other categories not properly defined, causes confusion
in relation to the refugee's change of status and does not recognize the explicit rights
refugees are entitled to receive.
As evidenced from interviews to refugee families and individuals, the issue of
permanent residency or citizenship does not seem to be of great concern for refugees
now. From the 17 families responding to questions regarding their expectations to
become citizens, only four cases responded they were looking forward to becoming
permanent residents or citizens, two cases actually with hopes of improving their
conditions ater receiving the residency. From the remaining families three either did not
know about the legal limitation or did not care about it while the other ten cases did not
want to become residents or citizens as they were already very disappointed with their
lives in Costa Rica and were more interested in leaving the country if possible. Thus, for
many the battle is already lost. Not becoming permanent residents or citizens means
refugees need to remain within a legal category that isolates them from the mainstream
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Costa Rican society. Remaining as refugees, instead of allowxing them to access a status
equal to regular residents of the country, ultimately affects their access to some rights the
1951 Refugee Convention and even the Costa Rican Constitution wish to uphold Ir all
refugees. It is not surprising indeed that many refugees express feelings of despair and
have great difficulties integrating in Costa Rica.
Rights Granted to Colombian Re/h gees in Costa Rica
In order to continue understanding how the law and other related government
policies affect the integration process. it is necessary to assess the process of granting
rights to Colombian refugees in Costa Rica. The rights granted to refugees in Costa Rica
are based on fundamental rights established by the 195 1 UN Refugee Convention and the
Universal Declaration of Iluman Rights. They include, among others, the right to no
discrimination for any reason (race, religion, or country of origin), which was established
in article 3 of the Convention. Similarly, the right to no return. wxhich is the principal
right granting protection to refugees, also found in the Convention. Additionally the right
to family reunification found in the Declaration of Human Rights.
Currently the right to no return for individuals applying for the refugee status is
granted while the person is in the resolution process, which is today back to the one
month timeframe. If a person is denied the refugee status, the individual is still able to use
different legal resources to appeal the decision. First, the individual can present an
ordinary resource responding to the decision of the [MR Director. Simultaneously, the
person can present an appeal resource to the Ministry of Government and Police,
responding to the decision of the ordinary resource. Both resources are presented at the
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same time since they have to be introduced within the first five days after the resolution
of refugee status is given to the individual. If new documents supporting the protection
claim of the individual appear, the law allows for the introduction of an extraordinary
resource of revision. While these resources are processed, the individual is granted
protection in Costa Rica. Once all the resources are processed and the resolution
continues to be a negation of the refugee status, then the Costa Rican authorities mandate
the individual to obtain legal status through other means or to leave the country by his/her
own means. If a person with an expired process of refugee status determination is found,
he/she can be deported to the country of origin. To date there are very few deportation
cases of Colombian nationals from Costa Rica. Yet, the JNHCR - UCR report in 2003
found that between July 2001 and August 2002 forty one percent of the cases that had
been negated presented the ordinary resource, which indicates that a very high percentage
of individuals applying for refugee status are active in the usage of resources that allows
them to exercise their right to no return.
After the refugee status is granted to an individual, the protection and therefore
right to no return is effective through the expedition of legal identity documentation and
work authorizations. The refugee IDi card is issued to refugees for a one-year term once
the g tus is approv ed, and is renewable for equal periods of time year after year.
Similarly, travel documentation is issued to refugees upon request of travel authorization.
The refugee ID) is the document that identifies refugees as temporary residents and
has a stamp authorizing refugees to work in Costa Rica. The second diagnosis about the
degree of the refugee's local integration in Costa Rica, completed by the UNIICR and the
[CR in 2003, found that there were several limitations in the documentation given to
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refugees, especially in regard to its quality and accountability. These limitations, the
document explains, results from the lack of uniformity, consistency, and presentation of
the documentation giv en to foreigners, migrants, individuals in the process of refucee
status application, and approved refugees. tUINI ICR's and TCR's second diagnosis also
found that the informal presentation of the refugee ID has a direct impact in the refugee's
access to housing. employment, health, and education. Employers and public officials
usually recognize the resident iD or cedu/a, which is consistent in its color and format,
and are usually not familiar with the refugee ID.
From the 43 interviews and many more conversations I conducted with refugees
in Costa Rica, over half of the cases expressed the refugee I) did not serve as a work
authorization document. Actually, even ironically one case responded she works as a
housermaid without providing work authorization proof because when she has shown the
refugee ID she has not been able to get employment, even in the same line of work. Two
recently approved cases also explained that on top of the inefficiency of the refugee ID,
they also had problems at the time of receiving the I) because the machine to produce it
at the DMR was broken. Another case that had been approved for over two years also
mentioned this problem when he went to get his refugee ID renewed. This case
mentioned an official explained to him that he could not tell when the machine was going
to be fixed because they did not have money to fix it. "Now I actually feel like an illegal"
this case expressed, and adds. "any wax is not like if' I had used it to find work since I
work in the streets". Since the machine was not working refugees received a piece of
paper without a picture that even less people recognized as legitimate documentation and
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even worst, continued contributing to the general public contusion about the legitimacy
of this document.
Many cases interviewed expressed the relugee ID worked as a document for
identification but had a limited use as a document to obtain employment. Tw o cases that
did not complain about the inefficiency of the refugee ID as a work authorization
document were cases working independently. One case was a cosmetician and the other
one was a contractor. These cases get their clients mostly through referrals and expressed
the document has identified them to conduct their activities. T wo other cases that also
mentioned the refugee IID was useful expressed they never got a job after presenting the
ID. Yet, that the ID1 had served as a document to prove their status and their legality in the
country when they secured employment after being referred by friends. One case also
mentioned his employer recognized the refugee ID. Yet, that this had alienated him from
coworkers and that he had suffered discrimination with this ID.
The lack of access to permanent residency and indeed to having the cedula
instead of the refugee ID has not only limited the refugee's right and access to
employment but also the access to many other rights refugees should be entitled to
receive if treated as the 1951 Convention says. From interviews to refugee families, 1 I
families, from the 17 families responding to questions about acces to credit and the
Costa Rican financial system, responded they do not have access to credit due to the lack
of a resident II or cLedula. Additionally, six families expressed they did not even had the
opportunity of opening a bank account without the resident ID. One refugee, who had
actually worked in a financial firm, even said she knew from her work that it was almost
impossible for Colombians to obtain credit since most applicants were refugees and such
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status did not guarantee that the individual was going to stay in the country to meet his or
her financial obligations. She said as well howev er, that there was not an impediment for
refugees to open a bank account with a refugee IL and $10,000 colones.
The fact that many refugees have had barriers to open a bank account results from
the fact that until 2003 banks were not recognizing the refugee I and the government
was not enforcing the acceptance of this I) as proof of identity. A Colombian refugee
presented a resource of unconstitutionality that was later won and contributed towards
having main hanks accept the refugee ID as proof of identity. After 2003 main banks in
Costa Rica were notified and instructed about the legality of the refugee ID. Yet, some of
the refugee families expressing they had were not able to open a bank account arrived
recently, which shows some branches are still not well trained about the legality of this
document. Actually, one refugee case who was able to open the bank account even
expressed he actually paid $15,000 colones to a bank official in order to being able to
open his bank account. Thus, even with a legal resource now instructing institutions to
respect the refugee right to have access to the financial system, the lack of education and
information about the refugee rights among different institutions makes it very hard for
refugees to access a right that the State is helping them to access. On this respect, an
official from the Costa Rica University working in the students' project about the
integrations of refugees, responded in an inter,. iew that their group was working in an
outreach effort to educate the Costa Ricans about refugees and that one of the sectors that
was harder to access for presentations was precisely the banking sector. This not only
shows the difficulties refugee advocates have to face in their day to day jobs, but also
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shows the overall negative community attitude towards refugee issues. which will be
explored in more detail in a later chapter.
In regard to the refugees access to credit the situation is even more complicated
and limited. As explained before in words of a refugee, access to credit for ref ugees is
almost impossible". It is not only the fact that refugees have barriers due to the lack of
cosi gners, which is a condition even requested by the UJNII(C'R for its micro enterprise
program. The main problems refugees face for their access to credit is the fact that they
do not have a permanent residency. A refugee who found the negation to credit by the
Banco Popular y lDe Desarrollo Comunal a discriminatory action also took this situation
to the Court. After introducing a protective resource in 2003 claiming the bank should
have not denied him a credit for having a temporary residency, the Court found this had
been indeed a discriminatory action. The bank argued they could not extend a credit to
someone who, in legal terms, was not expected to live permanently in the country. The
Court, based on Articles 7, 1 3 and 18 of the 1951 Refugee Convention ratified by Costa
Rica. and based on Article 19 of the Costa Rican constitution found that having a
temporary residency was not a legal ground for the bank to deny credit to refugees and
that the bank should look at other mechanisms to guarantee the repayment of any
financial obligation assumed by refugees. The Court ruled in favor of the refugee and set
a precedent to avoid discrimination to refugees and the violation of their rights. Yet. as
the refugee who worked in the financial institution responded, banks are not informed
about this ruling and continue denying credit to refugees. Actually, from the 17 families
interviewed in regard to access to credit, only one case had receixed credit after
presenting a letter from his employer certifying her was paying taxes. The remaining 16
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families expressed they had heard refugees were not entitled to receive credit because
they ere not residents.
Other important areas where refugees should be granted equal access to rights as
Costa Rican citizens are education and health. In regard to health the Costa Rican law,
based on the 1951 Gene a Convention, protects specially children and pregnant women
through Law Number 5395, Law Number 7739, Articles 21 and 50 of the Costa Rican
Constitution, and Decree 28118-S. Through these laws children and pregnant women
should receive health benefits with no restriction. The JN ICR-U jCR 2003) Diagnosis
reported the claims of some refugee pregnant women who had not been helped. 1 he
Diagnosis also reported ACAI officials explained one of the reasons for these claims is
the confusion in the health centers and hospitals referral system. not the lack of proper
identity.
Refugee adults also have access to health services through the Caja Cos(iarriccnse
del Seguro Social (CCSS). The UNI ICR established and agreement xith the CCSS in
1990, providing refugees access to the contributive regime of the social security.
Refugees have access to health benefits when their employer contributes to the CCSS and
refugees make monthly payments of $5,600 colones. Yet, since only a small percentage
of refugees in Costa Rica are formally ermployed, most refugees do not have access to
regular health benefits through the CCSS. In order to fill this gap in the refugee's access
to health benefits, the ACAI provides a three-month medical insurance to refugees who
are in need of such service. From the 17 families responding questions about access to
these health services only lour refugees confirmed they were receiving regular health
cov crage through the CCSS, and se en families confirmed they had received the
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insurance form ACAI. One of the refugees interviewed was even schedule to surgery and
expressed that knowing everything was going to be covered gave him great comfort. The
remaining six families did not have any type of health coverage although some feel
confident in case of an emergency they will be helped in any medical facility xith their
refugee status.
Refugees' access to education is actually not as fair as the access to health. The
Geneva Convention mandates signatory countries to give equal access to refugees in
elementary education and to give the most favorable treatment, and never less favorable,
to foreigners in general. 'he Costa Rican constitution through Article number 78 makes
the provision of elementary education and basic education in general mandatory for
everyone, including refugees. The last two years of secondary education are not
mandated, however, and the acceptance and provision of these services depend on the
schools.
Despite the law providing for schools to accept refugees in elementary education,
refugees face mostly economic challenges that limit their access to education, both at the
elementary and higher education levels. From the seven families with children in Costa
Rica of school or College age who responded to questions regarding their access to
education, only three families responded they were able to pay for the enrollment and
monthly fees of their children's education. Actually, the problem with the access to
education is mainly economic. Families living under very precarious economic
conditions cannot afford their children's school and there is not financial aid available to
them. Even three single mothers interviewed confessed they had to send their children
back to Colombia, to stay with relatives in a main city and axxay from the place were they
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suffered the persecution., as they were not able to pay for education and after some time
the family got more desperate seeing their children getting depressed from doing nothing
at home. One of these cases xwas able to reunite with her daughters when she obtained the
resettlement to the United States. The other two cases have not been able to reunite with
their siblings and haxe only been able to see them wv hen family members bring them back
to Costa Rica for vacation. Another single mother, who has a son that used to go to a
university in Colombia before fleeing the persecution, also expressed her concern, as she
did not see any possibility for her son to study in Costa Rica. The situation for college
students is even more worrisome as higher education refugee students are not charged
resident fees to enter colleges or universities but instead international students fees. This
refugee expressed in the interview her son had been looking for a job for some time and
that she xxished he could leave the country since she did not see aly future for him in
Costa Rica.
The ACAI does not offer financial assistance to pay lor school but they offer
courses in some technical areas like computers. Some refugees take advantage of these
courses waiting to have more access to employment after completing the courses.
I lowever, the main limitation refugees without children see in regard to their education is
that many refugees have actually professional or technical degrees and they are not able
to validate their titles in Costa Rica. The regulations of professional Colleges and the Lee
del (onsejo NA'cioinal dIe Reclor- es (CONARE), actually apply the highest fees to
temporary residents for the processing of their titles. From the 17 families responding to
questions regarding their access to education, 11 responded they have not bee able to get
their professional tittles validated, Three of these families actually said they were even
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willing to pay the lee of $99,000 colones to validate their titles but expressed frustration
due to the complex process to get these validations approved. For example if a family
used to leave outside Bogota, where the Costa Rican goeinent has its Embassy , then
they need to arrange for a relative to travel to Bogota to take originals of the titles to be
certified by the Consular officers. Another refugee interviewed even expressed, -I think
one of the main reasons I have not had success finding employment is that I have not
been able to validate my title. I think the government makes these restrictions purposely
to block the refugees' success".
The lack of access to a permanent residency in Costa Rica has limited refugee's
access to a treatment equal to that of the receiving country's residents, as the 1951
ieneva Convention mandates, and therefore has limited the refugees access to some
fundamental rights such as access to some financial services, to employment, to social
funds, and to education. This is a deliberate legal restriction, as not having access to the
permanent residency is the result of an Executive decree, which restrains refugees to do
so. Additionally, other legal measures have been developed to limit the refugees' entry to
the country and to inhibit their access to certain social services, creating indeed an overall
feeling of discomfort and alienation in the refugees that is hard for many of them to
overcome.
It is also important to highlight that after the visa requirement was imposed, many
Colombian refugees have been arriving to Costa Rica through the Panama border, as they
are not able to get their Visas in Colombia and therefure only see the option of crossing
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the border undocumented. Once they are in Costa Rica they can receive refugee status
just as if they had entered the country with a Visa. Yet, as reported by two cases
interviewed, refugees are put in jail and threatened with deportation while legal
representatixes start their process of refuge application wxith the D1MR. Thus, right after
fleeing persecution, some refugees find a prison in Costa Rica for the first days after their
arrival, instead of shelter and refuge.
It is fair to recognize the advances the Costa Rican government conducted
throughout the 1980's and 1990s to create a legal framework suitable for the integration
of refugees. It is also important to recognize the efficient response of the U .NICR and the
University of Costa Rica to help the government when Colombian refugees started to
flow massivcly into the country in 2000. Yet, granting the refugee status is not enough.
Refugees should be able to have access to the same rights Costa Ricans have, and with
the latest limitations in the legal framework of integration for Colombian refugees in
Costa Rica, their access to many rights has been inhibited. Taking into consideration the
latest developments in the legal system in Costa Rica and also the wax Colombian
refugees perceive their access to different rights, it is therefore necessary to conclude that
Costa Rican policies towards the integration of Colombian refugees are exclusionist.
Since the hypothesis I of this thesis work says "There is a "passive acceptance" of the
receiving government towards Colombian refugees that inhibit their legal integration"
and the findings suggest the current legal system is excluding Colombian refugees instead
of passixely accepting them, then the hypothesis I of this thesis is not supported. By
concluding that the Costa Rican policies are exclusionist, the overall environment for the
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successful integration of refugees is therefore harmed and more complex than originally
estimated.
The office of the N ICR in Costa Rica and the ACAI office have legal
departments with lawyers fighting for refugees' rights and representing them in some
cases related with claims of discrimination or violations of their rights. These legal
departments also help refugees to have access to rights such as resettlement and farnil
reunification by helping them process their cases. With almost nine thousand approved
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica this legal representation gets easily overwxhelmed,
specially as from seeing in this chapter the Costa Rican law itselfdoes not alS.a protect
refugee's rights. Yet, at least these offices exist to help refugees in their claims and also
to fight back governmental initiatives aimed at developing more policies that could
continue harming the integration of refugees in Costa Rica. Also the Costa Rican
Ornbussman has received some claims from refugees regarding violations of their rights.
Yet, many families interviewed did not know about the existence of the Ombussman as
an entity that could represent them and other families expressed the Ombussman had
referred them back to the UNIICR.
In addition to having access to legal representation, it is important to note that
despite the limitations refugees have to access some rights, such as the right to work, the
right to a work authorization document, and the right to education, there are other rights
that are more easily accessible by refugees thanks to laws created during the 1980s and
1990s and the permanence of the UNI ICR office in Costa Rica. These rights include the
right to no return, the right to documentation, the right to freedom of movement, the right
to family reunification, the right to ACAI's assistance, and the right to housing. The fct
73
that reIugees have access to these rights, however, does not tae up for the e tremel
detrimental consequences some government initiati es have caused in the integration of
refugees in Costa Rica. Thus, the exclusionist character of the Costa Rican go ernment
policies remains as the appropriate way to describe this context of reception.
74
Il. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
One of the most important aspetis in the process of int raion is the capacity
refugees may have to become economically independent and able to sustain their
households. From interviews to olombian refugee families in Costa Rica it becaime
evident that economic achievement and stability is one of the areas most valued by them.
RefIu g's economic independence depends on different variables and although the
ecnoniic environm nt in Costa Rica will be considered into this analysis. it is more
important to look at the labor market from a micro-social rather than a macroeconomic
perspective. Economic integration models such as the model of immigrant mod 4
incorporation discussed in the first chapter, which provides a structural way of looking at
the possibilities of economic integration for a refugee community, concludes that it is
necessary to pay attention to sociological factors affecting the access to the labor narket.
Thus, analyzing the labor market from a micro-social perspective means w will be
looking at how the Colombian refugees are typified by the host society and at hox the
stereotypes developed by the host society may affect the rege'capacity to access the
labor market. Then, we also need to assess the barriers refugees usually find to access
employment by looking at the areas identified by Porte :Ind Rurmbaut (1990) and at the
area identified by the refugees themselves. Finally, we will need to find if there is a
spatial concentration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and if there is a sectoral
empiyment spec ializ lion to a: the potential of the rc ig cc 'ommunity to form an
enclave econormy in Costa Rica.
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Oiervicw of the Labor Market in Cosia Rica
The data provided by the Nation Report from I990n to 2003 indicates that Costa
Rica had an unemployment rate of 6.7 percent by 2003. From the 1.640.387 Costa Ricans
occupied in 2003 the five areas of occupation with the highest numbers of employ ment
xere commerce with 322,392 people occupied; agriculture with 239,811 people
occupied: the manufacturing industry with 230,058 people occupied: construction with
109,616 people occupied, and the real estate and entrepreneurial activities xwith 1 01 ,234
people occupied. In regard to the labor market changes during the late 80s and 90s in
Costa Rica it is worth highlighting that the size of the agriculture sector decreased from
34.6 percent in 1984 to 19.5 percent in 2002 while the sizes of the financial and the
commerce sector increased during this period from 2.9 percent to 6.2 percent and from
9.5 percent to 13.9 percent of the labor market respectively (Global Policy Netwxork,
2004).
Ihe Nation Report from 1990 to 2003 informed that 1990s was not a lost decade
for Costa Rica. However, with a weak start due to the debt crisis recovery in the 1980s,
the development of the country was not sufficient for the challenges it has to face noxw.
Since 1990 the population has grown in Costa Rica in over one million people, xx hich
represents an average population growth rate of 2.5% throughout the decade, as by the
year 2003 the total population was 4.169.730 and the population in 199 was 3.050.556.
(Proyecto Estado de la Naci6n, 2003)". Even though Costa Rica's population growth rate
is lower than the growth rate in neighboring Central American countries like Nicaragua.
the population growth rate is considered dramatic by Costa Ricans due to the small size
m Additiona0 rverenc s to the "Prow ccto Kstado dc la Nacioi, 2003" wiii be dddreses ad the Nation
Repot
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of their country, In addition to the increase of the Costa Rican population, the 2000
Census actually showed a more complex situation related with the "demographic bonus".
Costa Rica has enjoyed a "demographic bonus" for some decades now, meaning there has
been a decrease in the dependency rates. The dependency rate is given by the proportion
of people below the age of 15 and above 65 with respect to the number of people
considered productive between the ages of 15 and 65. The current rate has decreased
from 70 in 1984 to 55 today and is expected to be of 44 dependants for every 100 people
in productive age for the year 2018.
The development of any country can depend greatly on how good the
demographic bonus is used. Due to the current low fecundity rate, the young generation
in Costa Rica is the last generation that will have a relatively low dependency in the
future. I lowever, this nay become a problem or an advantage depending on how the
education and the labor market evolve for this generation. If the young generation
receives strong education and is able to access quality employment to increase the
country's productivity, then they may represent a boost in the development of Costa Rica
for the next three or four decades. Yet, if this generation does not become more
productive, then they will become dependent of the next generation., which Xwill be
smaller to sustain them and therefore could dramatically affect the already vulnerable
pension and social system.
Today the challenge to set the foundation for a future boost is great, as the country
has not taken advantage of the demographic bonus and a population that could be moire
productive now is wasting its potential. Today the majority of the working age population
is those who joined the labor force a decade ago. This is problematic since during the
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1980s the secondary education coverage declined considerably in Costa Rica and
therefore the people in age to work today are not able to produce at their full potential'".
Additionally, even though the education coverage has increased in recent years, this
improvement has not been enough for the increased amount of children in ages between
13 and 17 years old.
Since the education and training years have already passed for the majority ol the
population in age to work, then the government needs to concentrate in offering higher
quality jobs to them rather than on providing more education opportunities. Yet, since the
early 1990s the labor force rate has been increasing at a faster pace than the employment
generation rate, which in sore years has actually declined. Dynamic sectors such as
tourism and the new export agriculture have not made up for the loss of employment
opportunities in the traditional agricultural sector. Thus, Costa Rica actually reached its
peak of unemployment of 6.7 percent in 2003 while the lack of use of the labor farce
increased by 5 percent in the last decade as well.
The need to make the young generation a more productive one pushes the Costa
Rican governent to take special measures today, in view of the need to avoid a future
burden to the state. Current levels of savings and investment, both private and public,
need to increase. Also, the government needs to promote the rapid expansion of quality
eniployment opportunities, in part also to revert the growth of the informal sector2", while
also guaranteeing the provision of secondary education to all who need it. lmproving the
"The Nation Report explains that there are not exact measurements of the productiVitN in Costa Rica due
to a lack of reliable data. Yet, based on preliminary hindings the report suggests the pr-oductivity of Costa
Rican w I orkers o1y increased 1 4 percent from 1984 to 2000.
" The creation of employments in the informal sector in 2003 was o( 6 percent wxhile in the same year the
creation ol emploo ments in the lormal sector was o1 33 percent. This trend tends to at cct the li inug cluatity
o ( costa Ricans due to the incomes vulnerahility and the lack ol access to social security provisions.
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quality of employment is also a great challenge as during the last decade the informal
sector generated more new employments than the formal sector while an important part
of the formal labor force continued to experience problems with the quality of their
employments. As a result the salary gap increased between the haves and the have not
with the Gini coefficient reaching 0.4 in 1999 and increasing since this year, while the
developments in the human index were seen only for the richest groups of the population.
A higher (iini coefficient is evidence of a wider economic gap among a country's
population. By 2003 the Costa Rican G ini coefficient was 4.3.
With these challenges the pressures to improve the conditions in the labor market
to set the foundation for future economic development increase considerable fr the
government. [his scenario may also create higher expectations for Costa Ricans wanting
to see more policies to protect their labor market and diminish the competition for quality
employments in a professional field with already limited opportunities. It is actually
argued that Costa Rica has been strongly averaging one of the highest GDP growth rates
in Latin America, of 4.3 percent between 1994 and 2003. Yet, since this growth has been
mostly based on foreign investment, the foreign payments have also increased while the
growth rate of the gross per capita income only increased 2 percent between 1992 and
2003.
The labor market environment is therefore not without challenges. Although
poverty levels in Costa Rica have been declining since 2000, the weak labor market has
mostly affected the poorest sectors in the country as evidenced by the unemployment rate
among the poor, which increased from 8.3 percent in 1994 to 16.7 percent in 2003. In
response to the labor market vulnerability the Costa Rican government started a national
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program to strengthen it in 2003. It is still early to make an assesment of how this
national program has changed the quality of employments generated or the
unemployment rate, wxhich remained at an average 6.7 percent in 2004. Yet, as scen in the
prev ious chapter, some of the measurements taken by the Labor Ministry in this National
Program were also directed at integrating the refugee population to the labor market in
Costa Rica. Although it may also be early to assess the success of the Labor Ministry
program with the refugee population, it will be possible to draw some preliminary
conclusions from the interviews to refugee families that will be seen in this chapter.
Employent Conditions o/ Colombian Refu gce
Before going into detail about the presence or absence of discrimination towards
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and the refugees employment conditions in their newx
country of residence, it will be useful to take a look at the breakdowxn for the refugees'
regions and cities of origin provided in the 2003 Diagnosis. It will be important to have a
look at this information to understand the percentages that have a rural background
versus the percentages of refugees that have an urban background. To understand the
refugee's employment conditions and their regions of origin the 2003 l)iagnosis,
prepared by the UCR and the UNICR, provides the results of surxvey conducted with
320 Colombian refugee families. These results allowed the UACR students participating in
this project to present a snapshot of the economic, social, and legal conditions of the
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica, Yet, since 60 percent of these intcrviews Nwcre
conducted in the offices of the ACAI and the )MR offices, then families intcrviewxed
could have been frightened to answxer the surxeys and indeed their answers could have
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been biased'. Moreover, the surveys that were given to refugees in their homes were
given to refugee families selected by ACAI officials. Since the ACAI office is directly
funded by UNIH CR. which is involved in the preparation of this l)iagnosis, then it is
necessary to compare the results of the Diagnosis with the perspectives refugees provided
in the interviews conducted for this thesis work. The following table summarizes the
findings on regions of origin in Colombia. It is important to highlight, howexver, that the
rural and urban percentages found on the interviews conducted during the I RC
assessment trip and the fieldwork differ significantly from the results found in the 2003
Diagnosis. From the 43 cases interviewed during both trips 65 percent of the cases are of
urban origin while 35 percent of the cases are of rural origin.
Table 1. Refugee's Urban/Rural Background
Origin Number of famiies Percntage
Urban 262 83%
Rural 44 - 4%
Background cannot be I I 3%
established from data
on 2003 Diagnosis
lotal __d _317 Y 1 00%
Source: Summary from box 1. 12 Colombian Refugee Population Place where they lived
before coming to Costa Rica, by sex of head of family. UNH1CR - UCR Diagnosis About
the Degree of Local Integration of the Colombian Refugee population in Costa Rica,
2003.
From the 302 families that responded the survey regarding their occupation in
Costa Rica for the UNIICR - UCR Diagnosis, 246 heads of family had an occupation by
the time of the interview and 56 or an 18.54 percent did not have an occupation. Also
from these 246 heads of family with an occupation 37.92 percent were working
independently while 61.67 percent were wage earners and only 1 head of family was an
Rcfcrcncc to intcrvicws at the ACAI olticc was pro idcd in the l'inal section of chaptcr I in this thesis.
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employer. It is important to note here as well that from the 246 heads of family with an
occupation, 25 percent of them only work part time or by hours. The Diagnosis also
provides a breakdown of the occupation type and a comparison between their occupations
in Costa Rica and in Colombia before fleeing. The following table summarizes these
findings.
Table 2. Occupation of Colombian Refugees in Costa Rica and Colombia
Occupation Colomi Cos( a Rica
Not occupied 8.04% 18.54%
Commerce 29.26%0 29.4%
Adnistrati 14,1500 0,260
Manufacturing 9.32% 9.60%
Transportation 4.82 7.28%
Services 4.5% 6.62%
Professional I 12.86 5.630%
C nstruction 6.750 5.30o
(her 2,89"o 3,64"o
riculture 3.2200 2.65%
rechanic 1 .2900 .9900
Medicine 1.61% .33%
Cattle sector 1.29% n/a
1 otal 3 11 302
Source: Box 12. Colombian refugee population. Type of occupation in Colombia and in
Costa Rica, by genre of head of family. UNHCR 1 UCR Diagnosis About the degree of
Local Integration of the Colombian Refugee Population in Costa Rica, 2003.
In regard to occupations besides the difference between the cases that were
working in Colorbia and are not working in Costa Rica, which shows that approximately
10 percent of the heads of family that were able to secure employrment in Colombia have
not been able to secure it in Costa Rica, overall the refugee's working fields in both
countries reain similar. The results also show that the quality of employment tends to
decline as the employment in the professional and administrative fields felt for over 3
percent. Yet, this is not as alarming as it is to consider that almost 30 percent of the
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refuigees interviewed claim to be in the commerce sector and for this population this is
mostly informal activities in the streets, by hours, and usually with incomes that do not
even reach the minimum wage in Costa Rica.
Actually when looking at the Diagnosis' snapshot of the Colombian refugees'
poverty levels, it is easier to get a more accurate idea of the vulnerable economic
situation of this population. To understand the parameters first it is important to know the
Costa Rican standards. The minimum wage in Costa Rica in 2005 has been
approximately $90,000 colones. The average monthly income for a Costa Rican
household was $261,532 in 2003 while the average monthly income for Costa Ricans in
the public sector was $242.000 colones, in the private sector $135,000 colones, and in the
commerce sector $143,025 colones in the same year. (Proyecto Estado de la Nacion,
2004). The Diagnosis showed that 46 percent of the families interviewed had no income
or an income below the minimum wage of $90,000 colones. Additionally, 27 percent of
the sample had an income between $91,000 and $120,000 colones, which is still an
income far below the national average level in Costa Rica, where the poverty line is set at
$120.000. Moreover, only 21 percent of the refugees interviewed had an income above
poverty levels and just 5 percent of the refugees interviewed had a monthly income above
$201 ,000 colones and therefore were considered well accommodated. Therefore, these
figures indicate that 73 percent of the refugee sample had incomes below the poverty line
and 95 percent had incomes below the national average household incomes. Moreover,
the Diagnosis takes a look at the socioeconornic index of the refugee sample by assessing
ill based on the possessions in their homes and including basic services, they are able to
meet their basic necessities. [hese findings reveal that 78 percent of the families
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interviewed live in a low economic level and therefore do not meet their basic necessities
vvhile 18 percent of the sample population live in a medium level and only 4 percent of
the sample population live in a high economic level.
To better understand the economic situation of the Colombian refugee population
and what it means to live in Costa Rica with incomes below poverty levels, it is important
to understand what refugees do, where they work, and what do they have to do to make a
living. Especially since so many refugees were categorized in the commerce sector. it is
important to see what mostly means to be in this sector. Since the UJNI ICR-ACR
Diagnosis section of economic integration was based on a short survey , the researchers
did not go into detail about the quality of the refugees' employments or occupations. The
research format for this thesis work was more open and in many instances the interviews
with the refugee families took over five hours. This gave me the opportunity of exploring
and learning about their occupations to find out information beyond the economic
potential they had to meet their basic needs.
To give a general picture from the 17 families interviewed during the field work
on February 2005 and the 26 families interviewed during the IRC assessment trip to
Costa Rica on 2003, 37 percent of the families interviewed were unemployed living out
of savings or transfers from Colombia by the time of the intervievvs. Some of these
families had been recently granted the refugee status, so they were also receiving the
financial assistance from ACAI. Yet, most of the unemployed families had been living in
Costa Rica for longer periods of time and therefore it wvas not likely that they received
T'he surs cN about the cconomic integration to the heads of family was only I I questions and then the
same I questions to ihe head of family's partner if this person wxas Colombian.
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financial assistance from ACAI unless they were in a resettlement process or faced
critical conditions related to a continued fear of persecution'.
A couple of the unemployed cases had arrived during the last four months before
the time of the interview. These cases, like Eduardo and Doris, usually lived the first
months out of the savings they brought from Colombia and from the sales of personal
items, as in most eases it takes them between tour to six rmonths to ind their first
occupations. By the time of the interview Eduardo and Doris had not received financial
assistance from ACAI, which is not offered to all cases, is usually given to the ones that
request it and prove to be in need24 .
But most cases unemployed by the time or the interview had been in Costa Rica
for longer periods of time. These cases usually have had unstable occupations in the past.
Ramon, a refugee who had been in the country for three years by the time of the
interview, is an example. Ile said he has never been able to find a stable job and that he
has done all sort of activities to pay for his rent. At the San Pedro mall he was hired
temporarily to replace a sales person on vacation, but by the second week his employer
stopped paying him and at the end owed Ramon $24,000 colones. Among other
temporary jobs he also worked as a dishwasher, as a car washer, and even sometimes
went at 3:00 AM to the drivers license office to sell position in the waiting lines before
the office opened. ie also sold purses and crafts in the street that a Colombian friend
Not all Camilies in a resettlenieit process actially received ACA ' financial assistance. Many I anilies
wcrc actnal l in the process of resenlement and only two of them, which where single mo thers a ith
childrena wrc the recipients of financial assistance w hile their resettlcincit cases Nw here appro' ed and they
were able to travel to a new host country.
During the interviews several cases actUally eXpressed the financial assistance aas never offered to thenm
during their first mionths after approx al. Some even claimi it aas the person in the front desk of the A('Al
offes, ho told themlci they shoUld rcqnest the assistance as it aas their right to receiae it.
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have him in consignation. le even wanted to start a micro business with this activity but
he never got credit at the ACAI office due to lack of a credit history. Then the person
lending him the merchandise went back to Colombia and it was time for him to look for
another activity.
Most of the cases interviewed who were unemployed and had been in Costa Rica
for longer periods of time, presented this type of unstable labor background. Then, in
addition to the 37 percent unemployed cases, 19 cases (44 percent of the families
interviewed) were in the informal sector and not surprisingly, also mostiy with unstable
occupations. As in Ramon's case these occupations ranged from illegal sales in the street
of borrowed merchandise, handcrafts, or homermade foods, to door-to-door sales,
domestic services, or independent car wash, among others.
Most of the income levels of the families working in the informal sector are not
only unstable, but also usually not sufficient to allow them to pay for expenses related to
their basic needs. Ramon actually said it was depressing to remember he has found
himself many times sleeping in the "plaza", which may not be an isolated circumstance
as the incomes of 17 out of the 19 families in these activities range between $30,000 and
$90,000 colones and the lowest rent for a room paid by a refugee from the interviews is
actually $25,000. Besides the ACAI office these cases do not have a social base of
support in case of not having income to pay for rent or food, as the nature of their
occupations does not allow them to be part of the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social
(CCSS). Moreover, in addition to saying the income from sales in the informal sector
was not sufficient to pay for living expenses, at least two of the cases interviewed said
they had to sell personal items such as cologne or a gold ring to complete the rent. i Thus,
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in reality some of these cases actually make up for their living receiving money from
Colombia or from relatives living in other countries, while many that have the
responsibility of sending money to their families live with the pressure of knowing they
are not providing for their loved ones.
The case of Adrian is one of the most striking cases as far as how far can a
refugee go to overcome his desperate situation. He went through Panama without a visa
to enter Costa Rica in 2003, as he fled in a rush after being cornered by both the
guerrillas and the paramilitaries in the oriental plains of Colombia. After his arrival he
laced discrimination in finding employment, as he claims employers would not accept
him with a refugee ID. The only occupation he found was selling in the streets the
calling cards that a Colombian friend gave him, even though it is illegal to sell in the
streets of San Jose without a permit. Adrian claims he received a threat while working in
the street by one of the persons who used to persecute him in Colombia, "he told me that
if I thought I was going to be hiding all my life I was wrong" (Interview with Adrian,
February 2005). With fear from this threat and since he could not provide for his wife
and daughter displaced in Bogota, Adrian started to look for ways of moving on to a
country where he could obtain enough income to live and send back to Colombia. With a
brother in the U.S., Adrian purchased a false visa to cross the border with Nicaragua
shortly after he received the threat. But his journey to the U.S. came to a halt when he
was intercepted at the border by Nicaraguan authorities and taken to jail in a bordering
Costa Rican town. Ile spent a month in jail and was then released with the legal
representation of an assigned Costa Rican lawyer. who he said, "was very good to me".
ie moved back to San Jose after this experience and started to work in the streets again,
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although this time making his own handcrafts as he said this activity at least allowed him
to make 10 to 15 thousand colones more per month.
In the two years that passed after his journey attempt Adrian has not been able to
find a job that would allow him to make a good living. Potential employers have been
rejecting his applications when his criminal background is checked. lie now feels very
depressed and frustrated as he cannot go hack to Colombia, he cannot leave Costa Rica,
and he cannot work in anything good either. ie has not stopped thinking about
possibilities to leave Costa Rica and even tried resettlement but was never called hack.
By the time of the interview he recognized the threat he received was probably a had joke
of the person he recognized, as he never received another threat or intimidation, even as
Adrian continued working in the streets and therefore was easy to tound. But recognizing
he did not have an imminent threat has not helped him much. Ile has really good
relationships and knows a lot of people, both from Colombia and Costa Rica, as he seems
charismatic and a good person to talk to. But even knowing people in the street and being
a likable person has not helped him get a good employment. As he recognized he had a
talent for handcrafts he even tried to legalize his business by putting a commercial boot in
the street. But the disappointment came again. The officials in the municipality told him
refugees were not allowed to get a boot in the street, that he needed to be a resident. Also
that he needed a checking and savings account to have a boot, vwhich he never even tried
to open since he has heard that banks sometimes do not open accounts to refgees.
While most of the refugees in the informal sector were earning below $90,00(
colones, one case actually said he was doing better with his income but still was looking
for options to leave Costa Rica, vwhich means he was not quite integrated either. This
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case said he was making up to $500,000 colones as an independent contractor, actually
working with a firm of engineers that is apparently getting a lot of construction
businesses in Costa Rica and owned by Colombian investors. Cesar came with
construction experience from Colombia and in the beginning, when looking for a job in
this field nobody hired him, as he was not familiar with the construction terminology in
Costa Rica. lie got a job in a financing firm and then through referrals of Colombian
friends he started working first in construction hired by other contractors and then as an
independent contractor. But despite his employment success, Cesar had to apply for
resettlement xhen guerrillros that used to persecute him in Colombia found him, looked
for him at his previous home in San Jose, and then even tried to kidnap him on December
2004. lie said he could not stop working as he has two daughters and a wife in C olombia
waiting for his transfers every month. Yet, his fear grows stronger every day as lie thinks
the gierrillero he sent to jail for the killing of his father will not stop until ie gets
revenge.
Unlike the atypical case of the construction contractor, the employment and living
conditions of the earlier cases discussed, the ones involving Adrian and Ramon, are more
or less similar to all the other cases unemployed or working in the informal sector, which
accounts for 81 percent of the families I interviewxed during both the IRC assessment trip
and the fieldwork trip in February 2005. There is one variation from this pattern in cases
like that of Cesar, who had actually found a successful occupation but had become
unemployed or are in the resettlement process due to fears of persecution. I will look
closer at these cases later on in the chapter, in the section assessing what are the
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employment barriers refugees find. In the meantime it is important to also look at the
remaining 19 percent of the sample I interviewed.
Tfhe cases that by the time of the interxiew xere occupied in areas different than
the informal sector were more stable but not all necessarily living better off. From the 43
cases interviewed 6 cases had formal jobs, 3 in services, I in manufacturing. 1 in
administration, and 1 in construction. The other 2 cases had a formal employ ment, 1 in
services and the other one in a professional sales position, while also both having
independent income generating activities. Both of these cases had incomes for over
$150,000 colones ($300 US) while the incomes of the 6 cases formally employed ranged
hetxeen $90,000 ($180 U S) and $160,000 colones ($320 US), xith one case wxorking in a
professional service field also with an income oxer $450,000 colones ($900). From these
8 cases only 2 felt comfortable, secure and hopeful in Costa Rica: Wilson and his xxife
xho are xxorking in their professional field and make approximately $450,000 colones for
their household, T'he other case is Francisco, who works in a company owned by
Colombians in a sales position making $250,000 ($500 U S) and also has an independent
business driving a cab at night and making an additional $150,000 colones ($300 US).
The overview of these cases' employment situations show that the economic
situation for refigees is, in most of the cases, quite more dramatic than what can be
concluded from seeing a relatively high percentage of refugees without an occupation or
xx ith an occupation that places them in the 3 or 4 loxwest dec15 of the 10 economic dlecils
or economic levels in Costa Rica. But the situation for Colombian refugees does not
seem overall much different than the situation for prexvious waves of ref'uuees. As
explained by layden (2003) in her book Salvadorans in (C osa Rica, reseaiches of this
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population during the 1980s found that approximately one-fifth worked in agriculture.
one-tenth as professionals, a third in industry and artisanry. and 40 percent in services.
The balance of occupations this author provided can be summarized as follows:
They often worked in the informal sector during the years when they could not
work legally, and some remained in that sector in the 1990s. In Costa Rica many
men worked in construction at some point and many worked as shoemakers. T he
latter occupation was attractive because they could work at home with less danger
that they would get caught working illegally. An important source of enployment
for women was domestic work. Some men and women also sold things, especially
clothing, door-to-door, and some managed to find a professional employment.
(xvi Introduction)
bThus, by comparing both populations it is possible to see that the occupations are
similar. From the group of refugees working formally there were some Colombian
refugees working in construction and domestic work as the Salvadoran refugees. Also a
high percentage of these refugee populations worked in the informal sector selling in the
street and many also as artisans. Additionally, very few cases were able to find a
professional occupation. But Colombian refugees have a distinctive characteristic. As
opposed to Salvadoran refugees, Colombian refugees have a legal status to work; they do
not have to be hiding from authorities. In the following section I will be looking at the
barriers to employment found by the 2003 Diagnosis and at the barriers described by the
refugees themseles, This section will then shed more light on the problems many
Colombian refugees face to successfully integrate economically in Costa Rica and the
reasons for facing these barriers despite having the legal right to work.
Barrier Face(I by Colombian Refugees to Find Employm1vent
The 2003 iagnosis included in the survey given to the refugee families included
a question to identify the reasons by which refugees were not readily integrating into the
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Costa Rican labor force. From the 320 families interview;ed only 145 Lamilies answered
the questions regarding these barriers, 77 out of the 80 cases unemployed and 68 out of
the 148 cases that had a tormal salary employnmeat by the time of the interview. T he
results are summarized in the following table.
Table 3. Harriers to Find Employiment Identified by Colombian Refugee lead of Family
on LI NICR - CR Du(nr-i, About the Degree of Local Integration of the
Colombia Population in Costa Rica 200
R1aon for nemployment or Problems Ansrs Answers Percentage
to Find Employ ment U nemploy ed Employ ed
Cases Cases
Th re is no emplo ment - No V acancies 24 22
Delay with w orking papers - problems with 16 22
working papersLiscrimination for being Colombian 14 4 12
Incapacity due to pregnancy or sickness 8 9 I 2
Difficulty to revalidate professional title - 2 6
does not have a title
Age 4 0 3%
Takes care of children 3 0
Lack of experience employer requests I2 2%
experience
Lack of acqlaintances 0 3 2%
Works for hire 2 0 %X
Wants to work indepedent 2 0 1
Because has been fired 10 5%
Total 77 _____68 1100%
Source: Box 16 and Box 17 from the Diagnosis About the Degree of Local Integration of
the Colombian Refugee Population in Costa Rica, 2003.
From the results of the Diagnosis it is important to highlight that while the
responses from the unemploy'ed and ernployed population were roughly similar, a greater
number of the employed cases said they had problems before finding employment with
the working papers while fewer cases of the unemployed group said they had problems
due to delays with the papers. The slight difference of thinking in both groups is
important to note, as this is also one of the main reasons mentioned by the groups I
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interviexed. Also as for the reason regarding discrimination for being Colombian it is
worth noting the majority of cases who mentioned it are the unemployed cases. This is
also relevant to note as from seen in the cases explained above and in other I will move
on to describe next, it seems that those who are able to integrate feel more at ease living
among Costa Ricans and seem to have fewer discrimination complaints.
The barriers identified by the 26 cases inter viewed during the IRC assessment trip
are relatively similar to and consistent with those identified by the UNIIC R-UC R
Diagnosis cases. The results are provided in the following table:
Table 4. Barriers to Finding Employment Identified by Colombian Refugees During IRC
Assessment Trip
Reasons Identified As Barriers to Find Employ ment Total Percentage
Cases
Discrimination for being refugee- employer does not accept 6 23
Refugee I)
Discrimination for bein Colombian 4 15%
l)is rimination for being an immigrant as employer prefers to 9 35%
hire Costa Ricans
I ack of txperience ___14%
I ack of emplo mtent opportunities 4 I 40
Costa Rican emblos ers want to take adv antage of refu ces 3 _ 1I %
os not have vvorkingpjpr_ -1 4"
Iii r c e no b =rri rs to findin emplo ment 1 4"
During the IRC assessment trip the cases interviewed were asked to respond
xxhich was the main barrier to finding employment. Yet, during those interviexxs relugees
tend to mention other reasons as w el to justify their inability to find employment. Thus,
for the field trip to Costa Rica, the reasons identified during the IRC assessment were
given to the families interview to be graded in order of relevance in their oxwn cases fom
0 to 5, ith 0 being not relevant at all and 5 being a very important ieason for which they
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have had difficulties finding employment. The results from the employment barriers
grading are provided in the following table:
Table 5. Barriers to Finding Employment Identified by Colombian Refugees During Field
Trip on February 2005
Reasons identified as Barriers to Find Employment Grade from 1
to 100
1iscrimination for being refugees as employ ers do not accept refigee 81
Costa Rican em pyers want to take 9 69
Iack of references in Costa Rica __
Discrimination for bei_ Colombian 67
Discrimination for being immigrants as employers prefer to hire Costa 67
' Ricans
Colombian em loxers want to take adsanta e of refuees 65
ack of information and guidance 49
I.ck of employrment opportunities 47
I ack of luck 8
Total cases interview d 17
It is important to note the difference between the results in the Diagnosis and the
results from the fieldwork interviews in the area of lack of employment opportunities.
The introduction to the economic environment in Costa Rica in the beginning of this
chapter explained how the economy has a limited capacity of generating new
employments and that the situation gets more difficult as the generation of quality
employrments is even more critical. The Diagnosis also explains that the majority of
Colombian refugees arrived between 2000 and 2001, years in which "Costa Rica was
characterized by a worsening of the employment conditions, as the employment rates in
the informal sector reached the highest levels of the cuinquenniun" (UNI ICR . UCR
Diagnosis, 2003). Yet, even though the unemployment rate has deteriorated even more
going from 6.1 percent in 2001 to 6.7 percent in 2003, a comparison shows that while the
Diagnosis shows a total 32 percent of refugees said the main barrier to find employnent
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xas a lack of employment opportunities, only 1 case from the 26 interviewed during the
IRC assessment in 2003 identified this reason as a barrier to find employment. Moreoxer,
from the grades given to the nine barriers identified to find employment, the refugees
interviexed in the 2005 fieldwork placed this reason in the eighth position.
As explained by one of the refugees interxiewed in 2005, -It has anything to do at
all with few employment offers because I read in the paper at least 4 to 5 offers that could
fit me but vxhen I apply I'm always rejected. sometimes they say the position has been
taken, and then I look at the paper again the following week and find the same positions"
(Interview to Arturo, February 2005). This refugee actually explained that even though
the Labor Ministry has tried to help him by giving him a refugee registration that certities
the professional areas in which he can work, this paper has not helped him at all to find a
job. IIc actually argues the problem seems to be that Costa Ricans prefer to employ other
Costa Ricans and one time, he added, a Costa Rican employer even tore apart his resume
right in front of hin as soon as he noticed he was a Colombian refugee.
But besides this great difference, the results from the Diagnosis surveys and the
assessment and fieldwork interviews have an important similarity pointing to the same
direction: the reasoi refugees identified to be the most important barrier to find
employment is the refugee 11), and this is not perceived as a legal barrier but as
discrimination as they see themselves identified as refugees with the document and
therefore rejected as such. The fact is that after talking with the person in the Labor
Ministry in charge of overseeing that the refugees' working rights are upheld, he
explained the reason why employers rieject the refugee ID seemns to be a lack of education
about this new document rather than discrimination.
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This reason was evidenced by refugees like Ramon, who said that when he shows
the refugee ID some employers have told him that it is false and do not even bother
calling to verify this is a legal document and work authorization. Other cases like Camilo
and Zulani say they have been able to find employment because they actually do not
show the refugee ID. In this case Camilo lost his refugee status, as he had to travel back
to Colombia because his daughter got really sick. After six months the people who used
to persecute him in Colombia found him again and, through the Panama border and
without any papers, he had to go back to Costa Rica, where his wife remained,. Upon his
return he was not able to renew his refugee status and found a lawyer that was able to get
him a working permit that Camilo has to renew every three months. Camilo does not
know exactly what type of status he has in Costa Rica although he feels he is a refugee.
Ile says he has not had a problem with his temporary ID even though it says he is
Colombian. I-le works as a security officer earning the minimum wage. Camilo's wife,
Zulani, still has her refugee status but since she has not had luck finding work with the
refugee ID, she said she prefers to work independently in domestic services and to avoid
saying she is a refugee so that she does not have to show the IId. Moreover, Zulani said
she mostly works with Colombians and even with co-nationals she prefers not to say she
is a refugee, otherwise they do not call her back.
But the lack of an effective and known refugee work authorization does not seem
to be the only reason limiting the refugee's access to the labor force. Judging from the
refugees' experiences and as evidenced by the fact that the second most important reason
found during the 2005 fieldwork seems to be the perception refugees have that Costa
Ricans are trying to take advantage of their refuge condition, it can also be concluded that
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many Costa Ricans may not feel entirely comfortable with so many Colombians trying to
make a living in their country. Actually, as explained in the first chapter, the fact that
Costa Ricans are not taking well more immigration in their country is tied to the legal
barriers imposed on the refugees' right to access residency. As seen before, if refugces
were to receive the residency as they were entitled to before the law was changed, then
they would have a residency card instead of a refugee ID. laving a residency card would
probably change their economic conditions dramatically, as then probably many refugees
that explained the refugee IID is the main barrier to find employment because employ ers
don not recognize it, would likely integrate to the labor force easily once they present a
residency card. Thus, the legal conditions for refugees, chosen by the Costa Rican
government in the best interest of its citizens, are currently affecting negatively the
economic integration of refugees instead of contributing to making refugees a productixve
factor in the Costa Rican economy. It cannot be said that the government has adopted
these policies due to xenophobic sentiments of its own or due to the xenophobic
sentiments of the Costa Rican population. Yet, as seen in the previous chapter, the
problems of the xenophobia felt by refugee populations are not new and although the
Colombian population is different than previous Central American waves of refugees in
that they receive a working paper within a month from applying for the refugee status
once the status is granted, this does not mean that Costa Ricans see Colombians without
prejudice.
Ihayden (2003) in her book about Salvadoran refugees in Costa Rica explains that
in addition to Job loss during the 1980s, a period of national unemployment getting
expanded, prejudice against refugees was exacerbated by a belief that the country was
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taking care of them. She explains Costa Ricans did not realize many of these expenses
were paid by foreign money. So she explained that even beyond the economic burden,
the problem in the Costa Ricans mentality seemed to be more related with issues of class.
She explained Costa Rica was in danger of losing even the appearance of middl-class
character because refugees could form an underclass and the retirees an upper class.
Thus, Costa Ricans feared refugees could make inequality more visible in a country that
had fought against this inequality and also feared a situation of marginality could create
social unrest in the country.
Since refugees have expressed concern about a negative attitude from Costa
Ricans, the 2003 Diagnosis also surveyed Costa Ricans to identify how they perceived
the Colombian population in their country to therefore have a better idea of these argued
xenophobic sentiments. They tested the perceptions of the Colombians both as migrants
and as refugees to see if there was a difference in their perception. From 417 Costa
Ricans interviexxed by phone, 257 people said they had not had any contact with
Colombians and 16( people said they have had contact with Colombians, so the results
shown below are mainly from these 160 answers. Although this amount of people is not a
representative sample of the perceptions of the Costa Rican population in the Central
Valley, which is where most Colombian refugees live, it provides at least an introductory
idea of what this sample population may believe about Colombians.
Table 6. Costa Rican Population Rates Colombians With Whom They Have Had Contact
Opinion Total Percentage
Cases
No contact with Colombians 257 _ 61 .6%
Problematic 73 17.5%
Good people. friendly, 54 1 '9%
commnati.- ,c
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calmI-_ _ Respectful. ell educated. descent, 8.9
cal int to live in peace 8 _.9%
Distruutfl weird 5__.2%
They come to exp lot, take advantage 2 .5%
and displace ticos
Har orkers, honest l .2%
Total 417 100%
Source: Box 28. UNI ICR - UCR Diagnosis About the Local Integrations of the
Colombian Refugee Population in Costa Rica, 2003.
When looking at these results, the refugee's claims about discriminatory attitudes
towards them are not surprising. As the results wvere given, most of the people
interviexed think Colombians are problematic (17 percent), an additional 1.2 percent
think they are distrustful, and another .5 percent think they are displacing Costa Ricans
from their jobs. T his gies a total of 19.2 percent of the cases inter iewed giving negative
perceptions of Colombians. In contrast 12.9 percent of the Costa Ricans interv ieXed
think Colombians are f'riendly and commnunicativ e, 1.9 percent think the are xwell
educated and respectful, and a .2 percent think the are hard workers and honest. Ihis
gives a total of 15 percent of the Costa Ricans interviexwed giving positive perceptions of
Colombians. The UNH CR-UCR Diagnosis did not include wxhat the 257 Costa Ricans
interv iewxed that have not had a contact with Colombians may think about them, arguing
that their opinions would not be as relev ant since they have not had any contact. Y et. not
having contact does not mean a Costa Rican does not have already a set perception
towards the Colombians, based for example on what they may hear from other Costa
Ricans. [hus, it is possible that if these questions were asked to those 257 Costa Ricans
the percentages of negatix e perceptions would be higher.
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Moreover, the entire sample of 417 cases were asked if Colombians should have
the same rights as Costa Ricans and an alarming 67 percent of the eases intervi ewed
responded Colombians should not have the same rights as nationals while only 33 percent
responded Colombians should have the same rights. Irom the group that responded no
equal rights, 52 percent argued that the priority should be given to Costa Ricans. F rom
the group that responded Colombians should have the same rights to nationals, 45 percent
said they should be equal in front of the law and God and only 10 percent of this group
saw therm as deserving of the same rights because they were already part of the country.
It is important to note from this survey as well that when the researchers tried to
make a distinction between the perception of Colombian migrants and the perception of
Colombian refugees, 52 percent of the 417 cases called said they did not know Costa
Rica had Colombian refugees. This is important to note since, as noted by the UNI -CR -
11CR researches, not knowing many Colombians are actually refugees "may difficult that
nationals give them an opportunity, a place and the respect refugees deserve as human
beings, with the respective rights and duties". Moreover, besides the 233 Costa Ricans,
from the 417 sample. that did not respond the questions about their perception of
Colombian refugees, 91 cases had a positive perception of the Colombian refigees and
69 cases had a negative perception. This shows that apparently the same sample has more
positive attitudes towards Colombians once they are informed Colombians are refugees.
Yet, a change in the perception Costa Ricans have of Colombians if they knew
Colombians are refugees may be difficult, as from the sample of 417 cases, 59 percent
already think Colombians are fleeing due to the conflict in their country and only 27
percent think they arrive to Costa Rica to find employment. Thus, even though many do
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not knoW Colombians are in Costa Rica as refugees, a high percentage of the sample is
already ax are of the conflict Colombians are fleeing and that know- ledge has not ignited
more tolerance towards this population yet. As one of the refugees interviewed during the
2005 fieldwork explained, "being a refugee is the worst thing one can be in Costa Rica.
The Community sees refugees as nobody. They know refugees have persecutions
problems but they can care less. I realize Colombians are starting to be known as good
workers, but most ticos still think that Colombians are involved in bad things" (Interview
to Rodrigo, February 2005).
There are some reasons to explain why so many Costa Ricans are prejudiced
against Colombians. First of all, springing from the perception regarding previous wxaves
of refugees, particularly Central American ones, there might be a lingering generalized
feeling against any foreigner coming into the country. Colombians could thus be the most
recent target of a longstanding sentiment. Secondly, perhaps an important additional
reason is the tightening labor market described at the beginning of this chapter. It is
reasonable to expect Costa Ricans will discriminate against any foreigner threatening to
take awray from them one of the scarce jobs their challenged economy is making available
to anyone these days.
But, going beyond general xenophobic feelings, economic or class issues, another
explanation that may contribute to understand the xenophobia of Costa Ricans against
Colombians may have to do with the negative media coverage of Colombians in Costa
Rica, as explained by officials of the NG) El Productor in Costa Rica. This organization
has mostly worked in Costa Rica to uphold the rights of migrants for many years and
thereore has rmostly worked with Central Americans. In the interview wxith the IRC
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assessment team in 2003, one official from this organization id CostaI Rca had too
many sns ationalist media and that they had noted an "explosion" of articles reporting
Colombians as criminals.
Actually this type of coverage is not only seen in sensationalist nedia. T' e fact is
that Colombians have been involved in some crimes in Costa Rica, su h s hc killing of
Ivannia Mora, a journalist from the most important newspaper in Costa IRia, Nacion.
("Un ano prisi6n", 2004, "Llanadas vinculas a-, 004, "Sospechosos levaban", 004,
"Refugio abrio", 2004). What was probably more detrimental to the image of C olombian
ref v w -s the fact that two of the three Colombians that apparently participated in this
crime were refugees. Thus, the articles covering the crime facts were rev I ed in a way
that raises concern about the integrity of the entire refugee population, not only the
integrity of the people involved in the crim e. Yet, as explained by Arturo, a refuge who
w in the process of resettlement after being followed and threatened several times in
Costa Rica, "there is even a worst problem with the media covcrage of Colombians in
Costa Rica, the problem is that I know of many Colombians that have hn psc cu ted
and have made claims of their problems to the OH., xhich is the police intelligence in
Costa Idca. But I have never seen in the media coverage of the thr ts or criminal acts
against Colombian refugees here. So the media is only interested in covering news r lated
to Colombians when they are the aggres ors, not when they arc the victims (mnt rxiew
with Arturo, February 2005).
With regrettable events like the killing of this journalist and other reported crimes
by Colombians like robberies in Costa Rida, it can be understood why from the UNI C R
-UCR survey on the opinion of Colombian refugees. 7 percent of the cases interviewed
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answered Colombian refugees xere conflictive, narcotraffickers and illegal while an
additional 4 percent said they lie to obtain the legal status. this may seem a very small
percentage to account for the feelings of xenophobia. But these answxers in addition to the
fact that 67 percent of the sample interviewxed think Colombians do not deserve the same
rights, may lead to conclude that many more Costa Ricans of the sample interiew ed
have some degree of negative assumptions towards Colombians. Thus, to the fact that
Costa Ricans are already seeing their country's economy as too small and fragile to
support this wave of migrants and the fact that Costa Rica has already dexeloped a
culture of xenophobia against previous waves of refugees, it is necessary to add the fact
that some Colombians are not helping in the projection of a good image but on the
contrary are portray ing a criminal and not reliable one.
In addition to the already dark scenario for the economic integration of
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica it is also important to note that the discrimination
towards Colombians is overt and even though the labor law does not allov distinctions
for race, employers seem to get away with exclusionary decisions based on nationality.
When looking at the employment sections of different Costa Rican newspapers it is
common to find adds requesting people for different positions and adding Tno
Colombians please' . In all <airness, it is necessary to say I also found ads specifying that
Colombians were preferred for the position. However, I called two of the numbers in the
newspaper and found out both positions were for sales on commission only and door-to-
door.
Other situations explained by the refugees during the 2005 fieldwork also shed
light to discriminatory attitudes to obtain employment, in their neighborhoods. or at the
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job site. Ramon, for instance said that when he tried to apply for Micro credit at the
ACAI office they told him he needed to get two co-signers, preferably Costa Ricans,
since Colombians had a bad reputation. An employer, he said, also told him he could not
employ him because another Colombian had stole from his warehouse and therefore he
could not trust people from that country. Eduardo and Doris also said they feel
discriminated, especially in their neighborhood. [hey said when they arrived they tried to
make friends and started greeting their neighbors in the mornings. After some time they
stopped greeting people as they never replied to them or even looked at them, like
ignoring them completely. Sofia for instance had a bad experience when she went to rent
an apartment with another Colombian friend. The landlord, she claims, told them directly
he would not rent to them because they were Colombians.
But not all cases have felt discriminated against and as Rocio, other refugce
interviewed, it all depends on each person. Before the interview she used to have her
own business and has always been very involved with public relations in San Jbose. As
such, she has been able to develop strong relations both with Colombians and with Costa
Ricans. In regard to the perceptions of Costa Ricans towards Colombians she said, "I
never say that I have been persecuted because that would change my image in people's
mind and that would affect me. I never say I am a refugee; I do not like to put myself in a
separate group. I have always said I am a resident, even when I have to show my ID. I
think some refugees have created their own stigma and I do not want to alienate myself
(Interview with Rocio, February 2005). Thus, although Rocio has been able to overcome
the discrimination by disguising her refugee status, as the previously mentioned case of
Zulani, who also hides her status and actually prefers to work under the table, this
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alternati;e has not worked for others. Arturo for example also said he rather sais he is
not a refugee to avoid inconveniences. Yet, he has never been able to find an occupation
in Costa Rica, not even in the informal sector. It is possible that the difference between
Arturo and cases like Rocio and Zulani is that Arturi has not able to develop the
relationships wxith Costa Ricans and Colombians that refugees like /ulani and Rocio have
been able to develop, and this may be an important lactor in the successful economic
integration of Colombian refugees.
I will go in depth on hoxw the relations refugees develop in their new community
may affect their overall integration. Yet before moving on, another interesting finding is
evident from talking to the refugee cases at length. It is important to learn than in some
cases the refugees' vulnerable economic situations and unemployment are not necessarily
caused by not being able to find an occupation but instead by fears of persecution. Two
of the cases xho were unemployed by the time of the interview had actually good jobs
before being unemployed but lost their stability due to fear of persecution. One of these
cases, Karen, a single mother of an eight-year-old girl considered herself lucky to find a
job in a financing firm and to receive a salary of $250,00 colones ($500 US). The first
job she got in Costa Rica xas at a retail shop owned by a Colombian, although earning
only $18.000 colones a xeek ($36 US). Then, she moved on to selling clothes iin different
cities of Costa Rica with two partner friends, but at that tile Karen started to be
threatened. Karen participated with other refugee friends in a video hlat xas transmitted
in Colombia and denounced the situation of refugees in Costa Rica. She explained the
people who used to persecute one of the refugees who participated in the video identified
her this refugee aid started to threat all the participants in the xvideo to find her. Karen's
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friend was resettled to the U.S., but the other friends of the video remained in Costa Rica
and had to face threats that eventually made them also look for resettlement options in
other countries. Karen's daughter became extremely nervous and depressed from the
threats and seeing men following her and her mother. The girl could not continue going
to school and Karen had to quit her job in Alajuela as a credit promoter in the financing
firm to take care of her daughter and take her to therapy in San Jose. While the
resettlement case was being processed ACAI offered the psychological support to
Karen's daughter and also provided emergency cash assistance. Karen also received
financial assistance from her sisters in the U.S. while she was unemployed in Costa Rica
and after some months of waiting she and her daughter were eventually resettled to the
U.S. where she met with her sisters and started to rebuild her life all over again.
Another case interviewed did not enjoy the luck of the resettlement option and
unemployed, was running out of her savings by the time of the interview. Rocio fled
Colombia due to paramilitary persecution and arrived to Costa Rica in 2002. After she
started working in a company owned by Colombians serving coffee, she moved on to
sales in this company and then to independent real estate sales. She was able to save
enough money to start her own business, a beauty salon in one of San ,ose s most
important malls, even without the support of the micro credit loans for reiugees from
ACAI. After opening a stable business on her own and becoming an employer with net
monthly incomes between $250,000 and $300,000 colones ($500 - $600 US), Rocio's
success came to a halt when she bumped into the right-hand man of the paramilitary
commander that had ordered to kill her in Colombia. This person recognized her and told
her "Mrs. Carmen, how small is the world, and we thought you were in the US"
106
(Interview with Rocio, February 2005). [ven though the person did not even remembered
her name correctly, Rocio has been sure he recognized her and from that moment started
feeling extremely nervous and paranoiac. She changed the color of her hair after seeing
him walking around the mall where she had her salon. Then, she could not control her
anxiety and ended up closing her salon and selling everything as she lelt too exposed in
the mall.
Rocio then started working taking care of an elderly man, "in a house without the
need to be seen in the streets" as she said, while her resettlement ease was being
processed. She was never called back for an interview and that meant her case had not
been taken into consideration. It was actually weak, as she never received a direct threat,
they never followed her, and they never looked for her directly as many other refugees in
a resettlement process claim. Thus, even though seeing people who had persecuted her is
not argued, the fact is she became very Vulnerable due to the insecurity environment
some refugees claim to feel in Costa Rica. This feeling of insecurity drove her to loose
her economic stability and join the group of unemployed refugees. By the time of the
interview, after her hopes for resettlement had faded, Rocio was starting to rebuild her
life yet again. She was helping a Costa Rican friend in an exporting business vithout a
pay and once again, hoping to get the chance of proving her selling abilities to join her
friend's company formally.
Conclusions
After exploring in this chapter the fragile labor market in Costa Rica, the mostly
precarious economic conditions of Colombian refugees, and examining the barriers they
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identify to finding employment, it is fair to support our hypothesis 2 and affiirm that the
negative conditions of the labor market in Costa Rica inhibit the economic integration of
Colombian refugees. It has been found that the labor market for Colombian refugees in
Costa Rica is characterized by a vulnerable economic situation for most of the families
interviewed and from which many do not seem to find an exit option: by a w'eak labor
market that has mostly affected the poorest sectors in the country for the past years due in
part to its incapacity to generate quality employment and despite being a relatively stable
economy compared to others in the region; by some cases of persecution and insecurity in
the country that affect the refugee's employment attainment and stability: and by an
alarmingly high degree of xenophobia's towxards the Colombian refugee population.
Only very fewx of the cases interviewed felt they had hopes in the future or
chances fbr a new life. Actually from the 43 cases interviewed in both trips to Costa Rica,
29 cases or 67 percent wanted to leave the country and while 15 cases had initiated a
process of resettlement. mainly due to security reasons, another 9 cases said they were
interested in starting such process.
Some of the barriers to finding employment proposed by Portes and Raurnbat
(1990) in their model of immigrant modes of incorporation included the lack of
education, job experience in the host community, or low job skills among the refugee
population. Yet, as evidenced by the surveys conducted during both trips and the surveys
completed by the 2003 Diagnosis researchers, none of these barriers seemed to be
25 In addition to the perccntagcs of Costa Rican's that had a ncgativc opinion about Co0lmbians pro idcd
by the Diagnosis and explained in this chapter, a technical report from the labor Ministry prepared in
20(2eonel udes there is approximately a 4O( of xenophobia against Colombians. The report does not
eplain hoxw such number is lound. HO waceier, -ix en the oflicial source of the information it is worth noting
this data.
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releant in the case of the Colombian refugee population in Costa Rica. An additional
variable introduced by Portes and Rumbaunt as a possible advantage for the economic
-ntegration of refugees is their spatial concentration. In this respect Colombian refugees
do not seem to have the potential to create an enclave economy as even though they
concentrate in San Jose and towns surrounding the Central Valley like Alajuela and
leredia, from the surveys regarding their employment and the surveys that kill be
explored in the following chapter regarding the social connections, it does not seem that
Colombian refugees live in a specific geographic area within the cities where they live.
Thus with the rather negative conditions in the Costa Rican labor market faced by
Colombian refugees, as I repeatedly heard the refugees' unlucky accounts of their lives in
Costa Rica I kept asking myself, what is the difference between the successful cases and
the unsuccessful ones? The background seems similar in many of these cases, yet can it
be that some just have more luck than others? The receiving environment in costa Rica is
also constant for all of them, so why do some cases seem to overcome this overall
negative stereotyping while other cases seem to get stuck with it? Luck is not a valid
academic reason to account for this difference. Therefore, in the next chapter I will
examine the social integration of Colombian refugees to get a better insight on what can
be the reason behind a positive or negative integration of refugees.
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IV. SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Ilaving already reviewed the variables related to the economic and legal
integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica, this final chapter is going xamne the
variabli pertainin to the social integration of this population. The theoretical overview
of chapter 1 allowed us to draw two sets of variables to explore th e sal integration of
this group of refugees. The First set of variable derives from Portes andI Rumbauts model
of immigrant modes of incorporation (1990). The variables in this roup have to be
studied after establishing if there was an ethnic community already living in Costa Rica
by the time the refugees started to arrive. If it is established that such community existed,
then the authors explain the social integration is entirely network driven which means
that networks would provide information about outside employment, jobs inside the
community, and sourc of credit and support for entrepreneurial vcntu r:. If, on the
contrary, there is not sufficient proof of the existence of a Colombian community by the
time refugees started to arrive, then the authors explain the social integration will depend
mainly on the host labor market, which was already -xplored in the third chapter of this
thesis.
In addition to looking at the variables from Portes and Rumbaut's (1990) model
this chapter will also explore the social coh sion of the Colombian ref uge community in
Costa Rica by looking at the sources of social capital within the refug c omnunity. fo
start it is important to take a look at the levels of social capital in Colombia to identify
general characteristics brought from home. Then, in order to analyze the sources of social
capital it i necsary to explore the nature of groups and networks within the refugee
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community and the Colombian community in general, and specifically look at the
refugees' membership and interactions in such networks and groups. as these are the
space where the social capital can develop in the form of bounded solidarity. hen, it is
necessary to look at the levels of trust in the community and their adherence to norms to
detect the presence of enforceable trust as a source of social capital. Finally, it is also
indispensable to look at the potential for collective action among the refugee community
as an output measure of social capital. By looking mainly at these three areas it will be
possible to identify the presence of bridging or bonding social capital. While Portes and
Sensenbrenner (1993) identify bounded solidarity and enforceable trust as the sources of
social capital mostly found in groups of immigrants, this chapter will also explore the
possible presence of bridging social capital. As other authors, such as Robert Putman
(2003). explain that bridging social capital may be of greater effectiveness for the
development of a community than bonding social capital.
Ret eirin~ (Coombian Connuily
The model of immigrant modes of incorporation developed by Portes and
Rumbaut (1990) explains that the economic integration of immigrants depends in part on
the absence or presence of an equal ethnic community already integrated in the host
country. In the case of Colombians in Costa Rica, the interviews with refugee families
and field research provided a general picture of this scenario at the beginning of the
2000s, time in which Colombian refugees started to arrive massively in Costa Rica.
From the 17 refugee families who answered questions regarding the knoxledge of
a Colombian community living in Costa Rica before the year 1999, only one person
I1l
admitted knowing about Colombians who had lived in Costa Rica for over 30 years. This
timeframe corresponds to the Colombian wave of economic migration during the 1970s.
Yet, Costa Rica did not seem to be the preferred destination of Colombians at that time.
Another of the cases interviewed responded she knew Colombians who had migrated
since 1997, but not before that year. The other 15 cases interviewed had not heard about a
community formed by Colombians that migrated before 1999.
From the descriptions by the only refugee interviewed that knew about
Colombian migrations to Costa Rica before 1999 and an interview with the Colombian
Ambassador in Costa Rica. Mr. Julio Anibal Riaho, apparently a very small group of
Colombians settled in Costa Rica in the late 1970s. From that original migration there is
today a group of approximately thirty people that frequent the Colombian Consulate and
participate in cultural activities organized there. The refugee interviewcd explained the
ladies from this group of Colombians get together and organize charity events among
other social activities. However, besides getting together for social activities, there is no
evidence of this group of Colombians ever organized formally in any type of association.
Moreover, in reference to the interactions between these ladies and Colombian refugees,
the person interviewed explained the ladies were a very closed group and rather elitist.
She then added that the ladies helped families of Colombian refugees they und in need
sometimes, but besides the charity interactions with refugees she never knew of other
activities with this population ever taking place.
In addition to the lack of any oral evidence concerning the presence of a
Colom-bian community in Costa Rica prior to 1999, there is not any other type of
evidence pointing in that direction. Newspaper articles, periodical publications, and
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1onographs are inexistent on the subject. It was not possible to establish, thereloie, if
there is a strong community of Colombians that migrated before the wave of Colombian
migrants and refugees that started to arrive to Costa Rica in 1999. Since this comuinity
does not seem to have been present by the time the wave of our interest arrived,
6olowing ,Portes and Rumbaut (1990) the economic integration of a group of migrants
like the one under consideration may depend therefore on the host labor market. The
authors move on to explain that the ideal scenario for the successful integration of
refugees would be if employers do not discriminate against immigrants for their
education, resources, or the efforts of voluntary agencies resettling refugees. In the
chapter relating to the economic integration of Colombian refugees it was concluded that
the integration of Colombian refugees was quite difficult due in part to a weak labor
market in Costa Rica that does not even generate quality employment for its national
population. [he host labor market is also characterized by alarming xenophobic
sentiments towards the Colombian refugee population specifically, as well as toward
other immigrant groups. Finally, among other characteristics identified in the third
chapter, the host labor market is also negative due to the refuges< precarious economnic
and employment conditions, which by themselves are an additional barrier to their
economic integration.
Thus, if Portes and Rumbaut's (1990) model explains that in the absence of a
receiving community the social integration will be determined by the nature of the host
labor market, it would be fair to conclude that the Colombian refugee community also
experiences negative conditions for its social integration. Yet, before rushing to such
conclusion it is also important to explore the presence of sources of social capital among
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Colombians to have a more complete picture of their potential for social integration in
C:sta Rica. After looking more closely at the retugee's levels of social interaction and
potential for developing positive social capital, it would therefore be appropriate to test
the hypothesis number 3.
Finally, one of the most important factors when looking at how some immigrants
"make it" in America, Portes and Rumbaut (2001 ) argue, has to do with the human
capital, the motivation, and the resources migrants bring with them. Professionals, on one
hand. might hae a tough time in the beginning due to language barriers and lack of job-
seeking experience, yet over time they have a high chance of obtaining better-paid jobs.
Immigrants with previous entrepreneurial experience, on the other hand, would most
likely take the road of self-employment, although also after they overcome some barriers
through time. For refugee groups, however, the two academics make a distinction. As
seen in chapter 1 of this thesis, the authors explain that for refugees time does not
necessarily transtorms into better income, as is the case of regular migrants. They
attribute this to the fact that many refugees come from a declining socioeconomic
background. Thus, in most cases the fate of lower income refugees depends on the kind
of community built by co-national higher-income refugees who usually are the first wave
that migrates. Since the fate of refugees is proven to depend more on their interactions
with higher-income co-nationals than on their human capital, and there was not a
community of Colombians by the time of the refugees' massive arrival, then it is
necessary to look more closely at the nature of their community to identify whether or not
there is some support from other groups within the Colombian community.
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Social Capital in Coloibia
Since the refuge cmniufity in Costa Rica has rcentl igrated from Colombia
and they arrived with pre-determined attitudes towards co-national ased on their
previous experiences, it is helpful to have an insight on the characteristics of social
capital in Colombia. John udarky (2001) measured the social capital in Colombia
through the development of a barometer called the BARCA . This stUd .Ias geared
mainly at m asuring the social capital in dimensions related to the Civic Society and their
trust, participation, and interactions with the State, its institutions and the different
segments in the so iety of political participation. Although this measurement of social
capital is highly c innra ted in scenarios of political interactions, there are still useuI
insights on the type of social capital that pr dominiates in Colombia's society.
From the comparison of trust in strangers and perceived corruption. Sudarsky
(2001) concluded, through the BA CAS that Colombia's social capital is wcak. This
phenomena, he argues, is proved with the crime, violence, and 1aw .ssnss that abounds
in the absence of social capital in the sociy s it is commonly seen in I iosi societies.
II found a relatively higher trust in the Fiscalia than in other institutions tested and
highlights this finding as a valuable source of social capital. Yet, trust in other public
institutions, such a: in the p rtim ent, the political parties, the labor unions, and the
guilds, is fr gile and calls for an improvement in transparency to increase civic
picipation.
udarsky (2001) also concluded with a vey I ar mcssage regarding the social
capital in Civil o Ictv: Civil Society is the reservoir more important for the generation
of s cia apital and its development through increased membership in secular non
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religious organizations is a clear path to do so~ (pp. 42). The fact is that when Sudarsky
tested the participation in intermediary organizations, higher levels of trust and
membership were found in the Church than in guilds, labors unions, or political parties.
The complexity here is that in the Case of Colombia, there is not a negative relationship
between going to mass and civic participation. as was found by Putman in Italy, and
membership in a religious organization was not found to have a negative effect on social
capital either. Actually the membership and trust in this arena does no seem to have
anything to do with social capital. Thus, the potential for social capital found in the form
of trust and membership in this civic participation does not contribute to the actual
generation of social capital and therefore Sudarsky suggests the civic action should be
done in the non-secular arena. A more recent study about the political culture of
demnocracy in Colombia suggests that participation in church activities continues to be the
most common in Colombia, along with participation in teacher-parent associations
(Rodriguez-Raga and Sel igson, 2004).
In addition to Sudarsky's measurements of social capital and evidence of its
weakness, other authors such as Mauricio Rubio (1997) and Maria Mercedes Cuellar
(2000) actually were arguing that the levels of social capital in Colombia were high, but
were of the perverse type. In Chapter 1 of this thesis it was explained that just as social
capital has been related to the development of some communities, it could also be
characterized as negative, or perverse as these authors denote it.
Cuellar (2000) explains that the levels of social capital are high, as measured in
the participation of Colombians in different associations and in comparison with
international standards based on income levels. Yet, she also notices that the foundation
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for this social capital has levels of trust unusually low among the members that associate
with each other. She finds alarming the Fact that those who present higher levels of
participation in associations and group activities have less respect for norms and are more
prone to get involved with illegal activities such as drug trafficking. Thus, she concludes.
It seems that the country's institutional structure, not responding to the
population's demands, has open the space for the appearance of ample networks
of associations that, on one hand, include those of the criminal type that resort to
murder, kidnapping and extortion, that operate informally, and that allow its
members to obtain, through diverse ways. .hat they could not obtain in these
association s absence, and on the other hand, include those organi/ation that form
to defend and substitute formal institutions and that haxe adopted grcat strength
(pp. 873 - 873).
Mlauricio Rubio (1997) also concludes that the levels of violence and criminality
are not the result of absence of social capital, but on the contrary, the result of high levels
of social capital of the perverse tpe. To support his argument Rubio provides an analysis
of the strength of social capital in regions like Antioquia, which have been traditionally
considered Agenuine examples of -good" social, cultural and economic development.
Rubio pointed out two factors in the region's history that favored the development of
social capital: "1) the level of trust between strangers taking part in the economic
exchange process and 2) the ability of the bAmily institution to "open up to" or "adopt"
outsiders, thus facilitating the configuration of associations beyond the family nucleus"
(pp. 7 - 8). It is important to highlight that this second factor actually can be related to the
creation of bridging social capital, xhich as seen in the first chapter is belie ed to be
more efficient for the economic development of a community. Yet, in addition to the
development of these two factors, Rubio also explains that detrimental "rules of the
game" also developed in the region and 'led to the consolidation of informal institutions
that, it is nox acknowledged, facilitate rapacious behaviors and rent-seeking" (pp. 9).
I 17
The author explains these "rules of the game" come from a history of informal
activities in the region, especially in the mining industry unrelated to existing colonial
legislation and the commercial trade, that "could have had the consequence on the
Antioquia institutions of an increase in threats and the use of force as mechanisms for
maintaining public order and enforcing property rights" (pp. 10). Thus, despite the first
two positive factors developing in this community, the weakness of the institutions and
specific cultural characteristics that also developed in the community provided the
foundation for the rise of a perverse social capital in wNhich,
The networks, the contacts, the power relations, the legal system. the informal
norms of behavior, the political activities, the reward system established in this
society, inspire rent-seeking, or criminal behavior, to the detriment of productive
activities an technological innovation. The organizations that develop successfully
in this environment privately become more efficient and powerful and they
reinforce socially unproductive rules of the game, given that they progressively
restrict the overall opportunities for economic growth (pp. 17).
On one hand, Sudarsky (2001 ) argues that there is a weak social capital in the
country and that the high levels of violence are a consequence of its absence as seen in
Mafiosi communities. On the other hand, Rubio (1997) actually argues that it is precisely
due to the high levels of perverse social capital that certain communities such as
Antioquia allow for the dicelopment and strengthening of criminal organizations like the
Medellin Cartel. Sudarsky also suggested that the civil society in Colombia was a good
reservoir of social capital but that the associations and activities should be encouraged in
a non-secular environment. Yet, from the evidence in Antioquia suggested by Rubio, it
was actually in a non-secular arena that the positive factors of the social capital
devclping in the region were corrupted, as it was within a commercial arcna that the
social capital became perverse. With Sudarskys' views opposing Rubio and Cuellars'
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(2000) views it is difficult to conclude what is the specific nature of social capital in
Colombia. It is possible to conclude, however, that the social capital in Colombia is either
weak or perverse and therefore not good for the healthy development of the community.
Also it is possible to see that in all the studies the levels of trust of the civil society in
Colombian institutions is low, with exception of the iscalia and as found more recently
the Procuradaria and the D eI nsoria dcel Pueblo (RodrigueiSaga and Seligson, 2004).
Therefore the society tends to evolve more comfortably in an informal set of rules.
The next section will provide a close look at the nature of the Colombian
community in Costar Rica, the existence of groups and networks and the participation of
refugees in such netwxorks. From the previous analysis of social capital in Colombia it is
possible to see already that social capital does not seem to be a factor favoring the
de cloprent of a Colombian community. Thus, after establishing if it is possible for the
Colombian community in Costa Rica to dex elop social capital, it wx ill be important to
assess if such capital actually helps the integration of refugees or if it is detrimental to
their integration.
Social C apital Aunong Colonbians in Costa Rica
As seen in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, social capital has
been used often to determine some communities and countries' potential for
development. Therefore, analyzing its nature among the Colombian refugee community
can be useful to determine if this community has the potential to integrate socially in
Costa Rica. T o approaches wxere identified for the study of social capital; the first led by
Robert PLutman (2000) and the second led by authors such as Alejandro Portes (1993). On
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one hand, Putman cxplores social capital as the extent of the people's involvement in
groups and networks. Then, based on the level and nature of these involvements, the
health ot the civic community is assessed, assuming that social networks have real value
both for people in those networks as well as for bystanders. On the other hand, authors
such as Portes explore social capital from the perspective of the resources that individuals
are able to obtain from their interactions within the groups and networks they are a part
of. Despite the different approaches to study the subject, one analyzing the interactions
and the other the resources gained from such interactions, both approaches agree on a
number of things. They concur that to study social capital in different communities it is
important (1) to look at the groups and networks formed in the community, (2) at the
perceptions of trustworthiness among the members of the community, and (3) at the
norms of cooperation and potential for collective action that can result from the existing
social capital. These three lexels of study will be explored within the Colombian
community in Costa Rica as the sources to identify the existence of social capital. Yet,
before looking at each variable closely, it is important to provide an introduction to
general social characteristics of the Colombian community in Costa Rica.
Colombian communilY in (Co sa Rica. After interviewxing 17 families of
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and talking to several other Colombians living in this
country without refugee status, it was possible to get a fairly good understanding of the
nature of the Colombian community in this country. Overall, the results show a wide gap
betwecn the refugee community and the community of Colombians that migrated to
Costa Rica also around the year 2000 as investors and entrepreneurs. Behind this
apparent lack of unity there are also noticeable sentiments of distrust and general
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characteristics of alienation among refugees, which provide a very weak foundation for
the development of social relations and networks.
The entrepreneurial class of Colombians in Costa Rica seems to have a healthy
and encouraging environment for the development of businesses. IFrom descriptions
provided by some refugees, there are approximately 300 businesses owned by
Colombians. although mainly in partnership with Costa Ricans. It was not possible to
find a directory of Colombian businesses like the ones existing in the United States. Yet,
it was possible to identify different businesses owned by Colombians during the
fieldwork. There is for example a chain of bakeries called "Panaderia Santa Clara" that
has become one of the best-known bakeries in San Jose, and a firm of engineers called
Hl Ingenieros" that is constructing several public projects in Costa Rica. There are also
two radio stations operated mainly by Colombians, "Radio Reloj' and "La Voz Dial", a
cultural magazine called -Colombia Tica", and a community newspaper called
"Renacer". There are as well different important Colombian companies operating in
Costa Rica including Carvajal S.A., Metalco, and Socoda. Additionally, from the paid
advertising found in the cultural magazines mentioned above, it is also possible to see an
ample array of businesses owned by Colombians ranging from medical serx ices, to
beauty shops, restaurants, consulting services, construction ser"ices, and
telecommunication services, among others.
Yet, despite this fairly significant number of businesses owned or operated by
Colombians, the refugee community does not seem to have an active interaction with the
entrepreneur community. Most of the businesses found were started in the late 90s and
early 2000s. This means that this entrepreneurial class is just forming and was not
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established by the time refugees started to arrive. Since the business community is just
starting to consolidate in Costa Rica, it is probably not easy for them to become a support
base for the refugee community. Actually six of the refugee families interviewed said
they know about the existence of several Colombian companies in Costa Rica and only
one refugee said he knew %ery few companies. One of these cases explained that some of
the reasons w hy the Colombian entrepreneurs are not able to become a support base for
refugees include the fact that most of these businesses are owned in partnership with
Costa Ricans and therefore they cannot give prefcrence to fellow Colombians for
employment. Also, a couple of refugees, including Rocio, who had previously cstablished
her own business in Costa Rica, explained that according to the Costa Rican labor law,
businesses owned by foreigners must employ a high percentage of nationals and cannot
operate only with employees of their country of origin. Finally, another refugee said
Colombian entrepreneurs prefer to employ close relatives and friends rather than refugees
since Colombian entrepreneurs have a negative perception of Colombians with refugee
status in Costa Rica.
In relation with this stereotyping actually it is worth mentioning the perception of
a couple of Colombian entrepreneurs interviewed during the fieldwork. One of them, an
owner of a small bakery, said she did not like refugees because she thought those were
Colombians who were mostly taking advantage of the welfare system in Costa Rica.
Another entrepreneur interviewed, also owner of a small coffe house, mentioned
refugees are dangerous and actually warned ne about them saying that many guerriIcros
and parmiliar-es were disguised in Costa Rica with the refugee status.
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To make the interactions between refugees and entrepreneurs even more
complicated, distrust towards Colombian entrepreneurs also became noticeable among
the refugees. From the 17 families interviewed 8 said Colombian entrepreneurs tend to
exploit other Colombians in less favorable conditions. Some argued Colombian
entrepreneurs pay less than what they are supposed to pay as they recognize the needy
condition of refugees. Others argued that Colombian employers usually force felloxw
Colombians to work longer hours without pay and with no benefits. One of the
respondents also argued Colombian entrepreneurs tend to be very arrogant, as they have a
more favorable position, and prefer to employ Costa Ricans instead of Colombian
refugees.
in addition to these eight cases that do not have a positive image of Colombian
entrepreneurs another four families also recognized that Colombian entrepreneurs tend to
pay less to Colombian refugees. Yet, these cases argued Colombians pay low to be
competitive and also recognized some Colombian entrepreneurs would prefer to employ
Colombians if the salary conditions were similar to Nicaraguans, for example, and that
although paying low at least these entrepreneurs give an opportunity to Colombians.
1hese results from the interviews in regard to the perceptions between the refugee and the
entrepreneurial community are therefore not alleviating. From the 17 families, 8 felt they
were exploited by Colombian entrepreneurs; another 4 recognized the advantage taken by
Colombian entrepreneurs but also recognized they at least try to give a helping hand
when they can; another 4 families recognized Colombians entrepreneurs cannot help
Colombian refugees and gave different explanations for this behavior; and the last case
said he did not knowx about the existence of many Colombian entrepreneurs.
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(I) Grops and Networks in the Colombian C onnmni/y: To understand the nature
of groups and networks within the Colombian community in Costa Rica the analysis in
this section will rely on the definitions used in the World Bank Working Paper on
"Measuring Social Capital" (G rootaert, Narayan, Jones, Woolcock, 2004). This document
describes groups along different dimensions including the density of the membership, the
diversity of the membership, and the extent of democratic functioning. By looking at
these characteristics it will be possible to examine if the nature of these memberships can
be a source of social capital of the bonding or the bridging type. As seen in Chapter 1 the
bonding social capital is the type where networks are created by kin or by people who are
linked by crucial similarities, such as ethnicity, and is more inward looking. The bridging
social capital is the hardest to create, as it is conformed by networks of different types of
people who are more outward looking, and it is apparently more efficient for the
development of a community.
To start looking at the participation of Colombians in groups and networks it is
helpful to provide an overall glance at the type of social relations refugees seem to
engage in. In this respect one family said they do not know anybody outside their family
nucleus and do not go out at all. They just go to work and back to home. Light families
said they know people mainly from work but do not go out much or have many social
relations with people outside their family nucleus. Some of them actually attributed this
behavior to the feeling that they do no have real friends. From this group of people it is
worth noting, however, that three of these cases have been able to develop enough
contacts to keep themselves employed at least in their informal activities. Another flive
families said they have a group of friends mainly from Colombia and go out to social
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gatherings every once in a while. Finally, three cases considered themselves to be very
acive socially since they know a lot of people, have a fairly active social life, and have
been able to make connections that have helped them obtain employment. For the
purpose of analy zing social capital it is important to see if, although limited, some of
these social interactions are done within a formal group or association, in wxhich case the
analysis of their membership can provide a better description of the type of social capital
these refugees are developing.
Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, and Woolcocks' document (2004) classify the density
of membership by the prime objectives and the scope of the group, meaning the extent of
connections to other groups. The diversity of membership is based also on different
criteria including kinship, religion, gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, education, political
affiliation, and income level. Finally the extent of democratic functioning is defined by
this document as a measure of participation on the decision-making process x ithin the
organization.
Unfortunately during the interviews the refugees mentioned very fewx groups and
very fe7 cases actually knew about the existence of groups or organizations, making the
analysis of these groups then very limited. Eleven families of the 17 interviewed
responded they did not know about the existence of any type of organization or group
lbrmed by Colombians, Costa Ricans, or both. Another four cases said they knew about
the existence of a Colombian organization named ASDECOR, wIhich had been dissolved
by the time of the interviews. Rocio, one of the refugees interviewed and one of the three
cases considered socially aetixe, was actually cofounder of this organization. She
explained the organization was initially formed to become a base of support to all the
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refugees arriving to Costa Rica as in the beginning the processing of their status was very
slow and they did not have access to many rights. Net, the organization dissolved shortly
after due to power struggles within its board of directors, which can also give a sense as
to the limited democratic functioning of the group. Rocio explained she abandoned the
board of directors before the group dissolved because her opinions were not taken into
account and the president of the organization was trying to impose his personal agenda.
She also explained the members of the organization were all Colombians but with mixed
income levels. The other three cases that knew ASDECOR, however, said the members
of the organization were mostly refugees and all of low-income levels. These refugees
said they attended some of ASDECOR meetings, although never became members. One
of them said he stopped attending the meeting because he sawe too much lack of
organization and he realized he needed to concentrate on finding employment.
Rocio also mentioned other organizations formed by Colombians or were she has
seen Colombians participating. One of them was an organization led by a Colombian lady
and formed with her friends to do charity work in Costa Rica, although not necessaril to
help Colombian refugees in the country. Rocio also mentioned an organization of
Catholic Prolessionals and an informal public relations group where both Colombians
and Costa Ricans, although Colombians in less proportion, do networking. In addition to
these professional groups Pilar, another refugee interviewed, also mentioned other groups
including FOCUSIN and the Association of Professionals in Alternative Medicine. She
also described these groups as professional in nature where members were mostly
interested in receiving trainings and opportunities in their professional field. Both Rocio
and Pilar described these professional groups as very closed and elitist. In regard to the
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scope of the groups they explained that members usually did not seek to develop relations
with members of different groups or with members of similar groups in other cities. Thus
the groups are probably limited in their potential for developing bridging social capital. It
is likelyr members of these groups could only be able to develop bonding social capital
due to their common professional interest.
Another group described during the interviews was a group of soccer players. The
only refugee who knew about such group was F rancisco; actually one of the only
refugees interx iexed who had a formal employment and economic stability. Ile described
the group as div erse, wvith play ers both from Colombia and Costa Rica. ie also
mentioned they are all from similar social levels although economically he explained
some members are doing better than others. Additionally, he explained the group tends to
be closed, since they have a limited number of players and the only interactions outside
the group is when they play with other teams. Yet, he joined the group within the first
months of arrival and explains that Colombian members of such group actually became
creditors when he was at his first job, which allowed him to sustain the business he xas
in fbr some time. Thus, this group can be identified as one of the few examples of groups
that create actual social capital since its members have been able to develop resources
from their interactions and since the group has allowed this member in particular to find a
social space for development.
In addition to the few groups mentioned by refugees, the networks are also
another space where they can develop social capital. According to Grootaert, Narayan,
Jones, and Woolcock's document (2004),
a network is seen as a circle of "close friends'*- that is, people one feel at case
with, can talk to about private matters, or call upon for help. The size of the
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network then is captured by the number of such close friends. The usefulness of
the network is assessed by asking the respondents whether they could turn to the
network in a series of hypothetical emergency situations." (pp. 1 1 - 12).
The first section of the following table will provide the results from the interviews
needed to measure the networks and their effectiveness. This section measures the
number of friends, the number of people willing to lend money to the refugees, and the
number of people actually able to lend money to refugees. Each refugee responded with
the number of friends in each case. The second section of the table will provide the
number of social interactions reported by refugees, which will help verify the strength of
such networks. This section measures the number of social interactions in different
scenarios, including number of visits to friends or neighbors, number of calls to friends
and neighbors, number of weekend social activities, and number of times refugees bump
into friends or acquaintances when they go out. The measurements in the second section
of the table where given by the refugees in a scale of 0 to 5 with 0 being no social
interactions at all and live being several social interactions.
Table 7. Number of Social Interactions in Networks of Colombian Refugees and
Networks Usefulness
Iigher Lower Mean Number of
Number From Number from Families
Respondents Respondents Interviewed
Number of close friends 15 (2 cases) 0 (2 cases) 5.3 friends 16
Number of people willing to 15 (1 case) 0 (4 cases) 3.18 people 16
lend her/him money
Number of people able to 1 5 (1 case) 0 (6 cases) 2.75 people 16
lend her/him money
Number of social 5 (10 cases) 0 (6 cases) 3.05 17
interactions with neighbors interactions
or friends during week
before interview
Number of social 5 (10 cases) 0 (4 cases) 3.31 phone 16
interactions measured by calls
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phone conversations during
week before interview
Number of social 5 (1 cases) 0 (4 cases) 2 activities 16
interactions measured by
activities during weekends
Number of social 5 (7 cases) 0 (2 cases) 3.56 times 16
interactions by times
refugees see friends or
acquaintances in the street
These results show that most of the families interviewed have people they
considered close friends, as only two families saw themselves with no real friends.
Actually five cases responded they have between 9 and 15 friends, which can be seen as
rather large networks of friends, given the fact that they are out of their country of origin
and have had only few years to develop these networks. Then another Iour cases said they
have between 4 to 5 friends and another five cases said they had between 1 to 3 friends.
This means the networks of friends exist and although not all cases may have large
networks, it seems many cases have at least a network to be supported by. Yet, when
looking at how well such networks could be functioning by assessing the refugee's
responses in case they need help, it is also interesting to note that from the live cases that
reported to have over 9 friends, only two cases said their friends would be willing and
able to lend them money. One of these two cases actually specified such help could not
exceed borrowing $5 US. Most of the cases who had networks of 1 to 5 friends said all of
their friends would be willing to lend them money, although much less would be able to
do so. This means that despite the existence of networks, their functionality seems weak
and not too reliable.
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Is it important also to note that the cases with higher nunber of friends are not
directly proportional to better economic conditions among the respondents. For example
Francisco, who has a stable econornic condition, says he has 10 close friends, while other
unstable cases like Camilo or Pilar responded they have approximately 1 close friends.
These two cases have informal employments and one even resettled to the United States
already due to lack of security conditions in Costa Rica. Also, it is interesting to note
complex cases like the one of Rocio. She feels that she is very active socially, while
reporting she only had 1 friend and explaining she almost never goes out for fun on
weekends. Still, she responded with high numbers when measuring her social interactions
by phone calls, visits to other friends or neighbors, or seeing known people in the street.
It is also possible to see that refugees seem to have a high number of social
interactions from the second section of the table. The scale measures the interactions
from 1 to 5 and most interactions' means are above 3, with only the interactions on
weekends, which wxere considered mostly entertainment activities, with a mean of 2.
These results confirm indeed the fact that many refugees may have informal networks
large enough to allow for several social interactions. Yet, the interactions in these
networks are not necessarily leading to the development of bonding social capital since
the efficiency of such networks seems to be low.
Another variable that can be used to measure the efficiency of such networks is
the support perceived by refugees from both Colombians and Costa Ricans. If refugees
perceive other Colombians and/or Costa Ricans as supportive, this can indicate that they
have had good experiences with these groups within their netwxorks and therefore that the
network is strong. Yet, in the 0 to 5 scale used to measure the refugee's responses, the
130
mean measuring the support from Colombians is only 2.8 while the mean measuring the
support from Costa Ricans is only 2.1. Actually wvhen responding about the nationalities
of their friends only two cases responded they had friends from Costa Rica, everybody
else had friends mostly from Colombia. Thus, even though the closest friends were
mostly Colombians, the perception refugees hax of their fellow nationals seems to be
similar to the perception they have of Costa Ricans, who they recurrently complaint about
during the interviews. It is important to note here that due to the fact that most refugees
responded their friends were mostly from Colombia, the social capital that could develop
would be of the bonding type. The factor uniting these networks of friends, although
1eak, seems to be the nationality and even though they engage in several social relations
with Costa Ricans for work purposes, these refugees do not seem keen to have Costa
Ricans as close friends.
The results about groups and networks actually show that the majority of the
refugee families intrv iewed are part of networks where they are able to sustain social
relations: only one family said they do not know other people or go out at all, and just
two families said they do not have friends at all. Yet, since the networks have low levels
of functionality the fact that the majority of these families have social relations does not
mean that their participation in them would always provide a basis for the formation of
social capital. Thus, even though they may have the potential of developing netxworks
because at least they seem to have many social relations, there seems to be an additional
variable that inhibits their strengthening of friendships and indeed the creation of
networks and participation in groups -namely their trust levels.
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(2) So/id/ariy and Trust: To better understand the reasons why refugees are not
able to develop social capital from their interactions within networks and groups it is
indispensable to look at their trust and solidarity levels. These variables provide the
foundation for healthy interactions within such groups and networks. First, it is important
to understand if Colombian refugees believe there is solidarity arnong them and with
other Colombians who are not refugees. Portes and Sensenbrenner explain in their model
that if migrants face conditions such as (2.1) outside discriminations based on cultural
differences, (2.2) blockage on 1n exit option, and (2.3) the preservation of a cultwra
repertoire brought fromn home, then it is more likely to see the presence of bounded
solidarity. This bounded solidarity, they explain, is then considered a source of social
capital along with enforceable trust.
Before examining if these three factors exist, it is important to address the current
perceptions refugees have of the solidarity levels among Colombians in general. [he
picture that can be drawn from the interviews is not very positive, though. From the 17
families interviewed 10 believe there is no solidarity among Colombians at all and that
Colombians are not united since usually they tend to act in self-benefit only. Another 2
tamilies said they prefer not to be united with Colombians since there are many criminals
among Colombians in Costa Rica. The other 5 families said there is some solidarity
among some Colombians, or at least that there is more solidarity from fellow Colombians
than from Costa Ricans.
To have a more detailed picture of their levels of solidarity, the refuigees also
ansvered six different questions from statements given to them and hypothetical
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scenarios. Their answers were also be tabulated since they were given in a 0 to 5 scale
and are provided in the following table.
Table X. Solidarity Among Colombians in Costa Rica
I ll t rox r can Number of
Number From Number from Fanilies
Respondents Respondents lntcrxvieed
Perception of solidarity and s
unit among Colombians
Indiidual solidarity with others 5 (II cases) 0 (1 case) 4.3 16
(not only Colombians)
Solidarity in action through 5 (4 cases) 0 (10 cases) 1.56 16
xvolunteerin and he hing others
Solidarity with others in 5 (7 cases) 0 (2 cases) 3.4 6
scenario ot someone s car
getting damage in front of
respondent's house
Ethnic solidarity through 5 (15 cases) 0 (1 case) .7 16
scenario of helping unknown
Colombian in problems
Ethnic solidarity through 5 (14 cases) 0 (1 case) 4.4 16
scenario of giving preference to
Colombian for enpomn r ~ l<__ ____ -_:, it -
Shese results are very helpful to see the great gap betxween the refuiee's
xillingness to help and their actual involvement in activities to help others. When asked
about their belief on the need to help others, most respondents expressed they believe
helping others is positive and only one case responded such help depended on xwho was
receix ing it while other refugee said it was hard for her to trust others and indeed to help
them. Yet, when asked about actual examples of helping others and their involvxement
throgh volunteering activities most cases iould not give an cxample, to cases said they
ha e other Colombians just a couple of times, and only four cases said they have
helped others many times. Regarding this lack of involvement refugees like Lucas and
Rodrigo said for example they do not haxe time or money to get irnvol ed in an
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volunteering activity although they would want to be more involved. Other refugees like
Sofia said she thinks Colombians in particular would like to help other Colombians and
that the lack of help among them is not a problem of lack of willingness. She explained
that the actual problem is the lack of capacity to help since most Colombians have the
same problems and therefore each one needs to look out for him/herself before looking
out for others, or even wanting to do so.
This argument may explain why when given potential scenarios of helping other
Colombians in different situations, most refugees answer with the higher score, meaning
they would always be willing to help other Colombians if they can. Yet, when answering
about their perception of solidarity among Colombians, only one case responded he
thought there was solidarity among Colombians and actually 10 out of the 16 fiamilies
interviewed gave a score below 3 to this question, meaning most refugees do not believe
there is solidarity or unity among Colombians in Costa Rica.
(2.1) Oiu/side discriminatiions hased on culiurial d('!rences: The different
responses between the scenarios of helping other Colombians and the scenario of helping
anybody, not necessarily Colombian, contributes to understand the response to common
adversities faced by refugees. The scenario of helping a stranger with a car broken in
front of their house had a mean of 3.4 while the scenario of helping an unknown
Colombian either by paying a lawyer or by giving this person employment got means
over 4.4. In general most refugees throughout the interviews complained about the
limited support provided by Costa Ricans for their integration. Their perception of
xenophobia was explained in Chapter 3 and can also be seen from the low mean
measuring the support of Costa Ricans in the previous section. Thus the fact that most
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refugees are willing to help other Colombians if they had the power or capacity to do so,
even more than they have the willingness to help anybody else, proves that at least there
is the potential for a positive response to the common adversity of discrimination fIced
by many of these families, even if not all have suffered such discrimination directly. Yet,
it is important to note here that as proven by the refugees' actual involvement in helping
others, the good willingness they may have to face a common adversity, in this case
discrimination, does not alway s transforms into actions. Thus, it is hard to establish, in
the case of these families of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica, that facing common
adversities will necessarily transform into bounded solidarity as a source of social capital.
(2.2) Blockaige of on exi op/ion: In the case of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica,
the blockage of an exit option is not a variable contributing to the generation of bounded
solidarity either. The problem in this case may be the knowledge the families interviewed
had about the resettlement option for refugees. From all the families interv iewed 1 0
applied to be resettled, and only 3 were actually granted resettlement after the fieldwork
was completed. Another 2 families were interested in applying for resettlement and
although the other 5 families knew about this option, they were not interested in applying
by the time of our interview. Ihe word about this option spread very fast among
Colombian refugees in Costa Rica and since the UNHCR or the ACAI officials gave no
clear information about this option to refugees, most refugees had misleading information
about resettlement. On one hand, officials do not disclose the criteria for resettlement
provided by the countries taking these refugees to avoid fraudulent cases to be receivin
this benefit. On the other hand, since refugees are not aware of these criteria they go
through the process of applying or have this option constantly in their mind. This
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sometimes creates more instability in their processes of integration. For example some
cases had been waiting for over three months to hear a response about their application.
Instead of concentrating on obtaining employment these cases preferred to stay home
leaving out of savings, charity, or the profit of sporadic sales in the street. One of these
cases was actually striking since during the interview, as she was telling her story, she
actually realized how fool she had been for having lost so much time waiting for such
response. In the beginning she felt very angry and cried out of frustration with the
agencies that had left her waiting for so long. Then her reaction was full of energy She
seemed to have gathered the courage to say that instead of leaving the country she would
stay to speak out about her case and to make a good.
(2.3) (ulural repertoire brought fomi home: The last variable that requires
exploration to identify bounded solidarity, as a source of social capital among Colombian
refugees in Costa Rica, is the cultural repertoire brought from home by refugees. This
variable was defined by Portes and Sensenbrenner as needed for the refugees to construct
an autonomous portrayal of their situation and therefore as a catalyst for them to unite.
Most of the families identified the existence of a cultural repertoire and expressed they
enjoyed sharing their Colombian culture in Costa Rica with other Colombians. One
refugee said she enjoyed seeing Colombians o ercoming their challenges and
demonstrating the best qualities that characterize them, such as their hard work, their
positivism, and their good spirit. Most said they talk a lot about Colombia, the good
things they left behind, and they also enjoy talking about the good things of the country
to project a more positive image. From the families only two cases said they do not
recognize a cultural repertoire and that actually Colombians do not try to preserve their
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culture, wxhile one case actually said -The paisas talk a lot about Colombia and they have
a very strong cultural repertoire, but I get desperate with so much talking, it is like they
are already here and they do not want to recognize it".
In fact, when responding about the existence of a cultural repertoire, most of the
families interviewed talked about the positive things in Colombia and how much they
like to share their home culture in their new country of residency, through attending
cultural events if they can or just sharing with other Colombian friends. Yet, none of the
cases connected this very positive cultural repertoire with the challenges they face in
Costa Rica. It seers, rather, that the cultural repertoire serves effectively to bring
together Colombians into a space of entertainment and pleasant sharing of memories.
Yet, that within such space there is no place to discussions about possible actions to face
their challenges. At least eight refugees did mentioned that in such spaces they at least get
to share their problems with others that may be going through similar issues. Yet, there
was no evidence from these interviews to prove that the spaces of cultural repertoire
sharing have led to construct and autonomous portrayal of the situations they face in
Costa Rica, meaning that besides sharing their problems they do not come together due to
common challenges. Rather, the cultural repertoire helps them keep alive the memories
and cultural values brought from Colombia.
In addition to assessing solidarity, it is also necesry to look at the trust levels
among Colombian refugees in an effort to find enforceable trust as a source of social
capital. As defined by Portes and Sensenbrenner and explained in Chapter 1, enforceable
trust as a source of social capital is based on the internal sanctioning capacity of the
community itsel. Thus. members of a group behave according to expectations out of
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fear of punishment or in anticipation of rewards. Arcas of such punishment or rcwaid
usually include financial networks or business networks in enclaves. For the existence of
enforceable trust these authors identified the existence of three factors: (2.4) the hlockage
of oulsale social and economic oppor/nnities, (2.5) he availability ol in-group economic
rcsourccs, and (2.6) the community 's capacity Of monitoring and sanctioning.
Before looking at these three factors it is important to examine the actual levels of
trust among Colombian rcfuges and their actions based on trust through hypothetical
scenarios. The following table provides a close look to the levels of trust among the
Colombian refugee families interviewed.
Table 9. Trust Levels Among Colombian Refugee Families
higher L ower Mean Number of
Number From Number from Families
Respondents Respondents -i_ Intervieed
Lack of trust among community 5 (7 cases) 2 (1 case) 4.06 16
members in relation to money
issues
Trust in other Colombians 4 (3 cases 0 (7 cases) 1 68 17
Trust in Costa Ricans 4 (1 case) 0 (9 cases) 1 05 17
Lack of trust in others - you need 5 (8 cases) 0 (2 cases) 3.58 17
to be alert because others would
try to take advantage of you
Trust in Costa Raicn government 5 (1 case) 0 (9 cas 1.06 15
I rust in stran ers 3 (2 cases) 0 (9 ces) .88 17
Trust in neighbors through 5 (1 case) 0 (8 cases) 1.37 16
scenario of having them watch
over your child in case of
emergency _____________________
lowcr of exclusion within 5 (7 case) 0( ca )
Colornbian community
These results provide a clear picture of the lack of trust the families interviewed have
towards other Colombians, toward Costa Ricans, toward strangers, ow ard neighbors, and
toward the Costa Rican government. The means for trust in Colombians and Costa Ricans
138
are very low compared to the mean in the scenario of other people trying to take
ad antage of them. This may be related to the fact that some of the reftiee families
interviewied are not entirely distrusting of others, especially in relation to issues of
employment since most understood this scenario in relation to their work life.
Yet, besides this relatively positive attitude in not believing other people are always
trying to take advantage of them, the extremely low means in all the other questions
testing trust are a rather negative foundation for the creation of any type of social capital
The lack of trust towards Colombians can be founded in the faet that refuges come fromn
environments of crime, kidnapping, and killings perpetrated by other Colombians
sometimes directly against them. Also it derives from the fact that many refugees see
themselves vulnerable in Costa Rica due to the apparent presence of gueirrilleros and
paraImilitares in the streets of the main cities, many times even disguised as refugees and
businessmen. As explained by Eduardo and Doris, "coming from a culture vhere you
cannot trust anybody you cannot just open the doors of your house to strangers. If you
want, you need to try to help someone else in ways that would not put you at risk, and
that is usually very hard".
Other refugees like Adrian, who worked as a security manager in a hotel in Costa
Rica, cven said "I cannot trust Colombians because at least 50 percent of the Colombians
here are thiev es and when I was working in the hotel they would always come to me to
offer me partnership in criminal activities since I had access to the security code in the
hotel". Adrian's trust levels were so low that when I got the chance of introducing him to
another refugee during the fieldwork he introduced himself w ith a different name in an
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effort to disguise himself in case the person he was meeting was just a criminal like the
many he thought there were around.
Cesar, another of the refugees interviewed also has a strong reason for his lack of
trust, which was not common in the refugee's accounts but still interesting to note.
Although Cesar was able to start his own independent activity in the construction
business after receiving several referrals from another Colombian, he also said he does
not trust Colombians at all. I us lack of trust comes from the time he referred a
Colombian friend to work in the financial firm where he was working before he got into
construction. This friend he referred ended up robbing the company for a large quantity
of money and going to jail. Since Cesar was the person who referred her, then he got in
problems too and from that time he prefers to avoid helping other Colombians. Ilis trust
in Costa Ricans is actually a couple of points higher than the trust in Colombians since he
works with many Costa Ricans and they gave him an employment opportunity when he
did not even had the refrigee papers. Ile still commented Costa Ricans are not sincere and
thereiore he does not feel he could trust them entirely either.
In regard to the perception the other refugee families interviewed have of Costa
Ricans the negative results were also founded in many fears. Some families would fbir
example complain about the insecurity in San ose; about the child abusers in the street;
or about the fact that Costa Ricans envy Colombians for their level of professionalism
and hard work to the point of confabulating against them. Other refugees like Karen say
Costa Ricans are interested persons and they are not sincere, so that it is actually better to
trust Colombians even though they would also try to take advantage of you if they can.
Actually, the only refugee who had high trust levels for Costa Ricans was Rocio, and
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evcn higher trust than towards Colombians. This may be due to the fact that despite all
the people she knows and has had social relations with, the only friend she said she had is
from Costa Rica.
(2.4) Blockage ofoutide social and economic opporuniuies: Chapter 3. where the
eConomic conditions of the retugee families were explored, provides a general picture of
the perception refugees have regarding their outside social and economic opportunities.
which is the first factor identified by Portes and Sensenbrenner for the existence of
enflorceable trust. In this chapter it was possible to see that most refugees inter iewxed feel
xery frustrated due to the lack of employment opportunities. It was also established that
while few cases felt more comfortable with the opportunities ahead of them, most of the
people interviewed felt vulnerable due to security conditions in Costa Rica and therefore
wxere also interested in leaving Costa Rica to rebuild their lives. Since only one case from
the 17 interviewed felt there were outside social and economic opportunities, it is
therefore appropriate to assume that for the group interviewed there seems to be a
blckage of such opportunities.
(2.5) Alvailahility on in group economic resource s: Chapter 3 along with the first
section of this chapter \ here the Colombian entrepreneur community is explained from
the refugee's perspective. can provide a picture of the second factor identified by Portes
and Sensenbrenner, which in this ease is a lack of in-group economic resources. The
existence of an entrepreneurial class was established and within this group of people
there may be enough economic resources to strengthen the sanctioning capacity w, ithin
the Colombian comnmunity. Yet, most refbgees' accounts evidence the entrepreneurial
class is xery distant to the refugee community and only two of the 17 refiugee farilies
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interviewed argued that entrepreneurs actually would like to help refugees. Rocio is one
of them. She claims she has helped 4 or 5 families of refugees by connecting them to
entrepreneurs that wanted to help. She said these entrepreneurs prefer to stay away from
organizations like UNCI R and ACAI because they perceive these organizations as too
bureaucratic and corrupted. Thus, the main barrier she finds for the refugees to be helped
or supported by entrepreneurs is not the lack of willingness but the absence of connecting
channels between these two communities of Colombians. These explanations fOr the lack
of unity between Colombian entrepreneurs and Colombian refugees, along xith the
mostly negative perceptions refugees have of Colombian entrepreneurs help understand
the reasons behind the lack of economic resources within the refugee community.
(2.6) Comzmnity s capaiy of nonitoring and sanctionng: The last factor needed
for the existence of enforceable trust, as a source of social capital, is the community's
sanctioning capacity. The results for this question were also provided in the last row of
table 3 and show that seven cases believe the community has the power of exclusion,
especially for commercial purposes, and only two families believe the Colombian
community does not have any power at all. These answers can be related to the fact that
many of the families interviewed are aware of the capacity of the Colombian
entrepreneurial community, as evidenced in their descriptions of these communities in the
first section of the chapter. The answers can also be related to the fact that other
Colombians in terms of employment hae actually excluded many of these refugees, as
some entrepreneurs have not supported them through employment.
This capacity is also tested through the existence of financial or business
networks, as explained by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). In the previous network
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section it was established that most of the networks created by refigees are fragile and
mainly considered a space they have created to share their culture and Colombian
customs. 'There is very little evidence of financial networks x ithin the community, as
only two families said they have borrowed money from other Colombians and this is no
evidence of the existence of a network but of isolated solidarity actions. In the case of the
business networks at least the eight families who said that they know many people from
work seem to rely on such social interactions for the maintenance of their activities in the
informal sector. Yet, as shown already since only very few of these social interactions are
actually performed within a network of people trusting each other, then it is difficult to
conclude there are consolidated business networks within the Colombian community.
Some of the refugees interviewed like Cesar, Rocio, or Adrian, would argue they are part
of business networks since their acti ities in the construction, sales and mnarketing, and
handcrafts sectors respectively, are sustained mainly by knowing both Costa Ricans and
Colombians and interacting with them. Yet, all these cases also claim to have ,ery few
real friends while also tending to have low levels of trust towards others.
From the refugees' answers regarding their trust levels and exploring the presence of
blockage of outside social and economic opportunities, economic resources w ithin the
Colombian community and presence of a sanctioning capacity in this community, it is
difficult to conclude that enforceable trust exists as a source of social capital within the
Colombian community. First, despite the fact they seem to have more trust towards
Colombians than towards Costa Ricans or strangers, the trust levels of refucees towards
other Colombians is in any case xvery low. The blockage of outside social and economic
opportunities seems to exist judging to the repeated frustrations expressed by refuigees
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when responding about their employment and economic conditions. Yet, despite the
existence of this factor and the existence of resources owned by Colombian entrepreneurs
in Costa Rica, refugees do not have access to these resources and both communities are
separated by a wide gap filled with lack of trust and solidarity. T hus, regardless of the
blockage of outside opportunities, refugees do not find resources within the community
and therefore the development of enforceable trust may be inhibited. Finally, despite the
fact that refugees perceive the Colombian community as powerful and endowed wNith a
sanctioning capacity, the lack of business and financial networks within the entire
Colombian community make this sanctioning capacity inefficient as entrepreneurs are not
connected to refugees and therefore are not able to exercise their power.
(3) Potential for Collective Action Within the Coloimhian Connunity : To complete
the analysis about the existence of social capital among Colombians in Costa Rica it is
also necessary to look at the potential for collective action among the refugee community,
as an output measure of social capital. In addition to the perceptions refugees have on this
subject it will also be helpful to look at some responses they gave regarding their reasons
for participating in groups and networks. These responses may highlight the potential for
collective action.
First the families were asked to give examples of Colombians coining together to
face common challenges. Then they were asked about Colombians coring together due
to havig a common identity. These questions helped to further understand the nature of
their interactions and whether or not these interactions can be considered an output o1
bounded solidarity as a source of social capital. The responses confirmed that the lorce
uniting these refugee families with other Colombians is the interest of sharing their
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culture to fem closer to home and that these famnilies do not perceive Colombians have
had the ability to organize and come together to face common challenges.
It is important to note that from the 17 families interviewed 5 families mentioned
the organization ASDECOR as an example of Colombians coming together to face
common challenges. However, since this organization dissolved itself, all of these
families (and another nine families that did not know about the existence of ASDlCOR),
believe that Colombians are not able to organize themselves; that they talk about their
issues but never talk about solutions: and that one of the reasons why they cannot come
together is their lack of trust among each other. On a more hopeful note, the remaining
three families believe that Colombians are uniting now and there is a strong sense of
brotherhood among them that many may not recognize. Yet, even these families that see
a more positive side of the Colombian community believe Colombians are not able yet to
face challenges together.
Since the only example of Colombians coming together is AS[ECOR, it is
important to take a look at this organization. Refugees around the year 2001 formed the
organization. Andres Ramirez, Director of jNI ICR in Costa Rica by the time of the
interview in the year 2003, explained that a group of refugees came together and started
demanding the resettlement option claiming that paramilitaries were present in Costa
Rica and referring to killings of Colombians in the country that had not been originally
reported. Mr. Ramirez explained that by that time the UNIHCR was very involved in
speeding up the process of refugee status approval for Colombians and then suddenly this
group of refugees organized a protest in front of the Spanish Embassy in San Jose. The
refugees were demanding a letter from Costa Rica's Foreign Minister acknowledging the
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country was not able to provide protection to Colombians and requesting the help of the
U.JNI ICR to initiate the resettlement program. After this protest, the UNI ICR started a
small resettlement program with Canada and the United States as receiving countries.
After this common action Rocio, who was co-founder of ASDECOR. explains that the
organ ization started to disintegrate because its president continued the allegations against
both the Costa Rican government and the UNICR and adopted positions not all members
of the organization agreed with. Eventually, the Costa Rican Department of Migration
cancelled the refugee status of the president of the organization and none of the people
interviewed who knew about him were able to say if he stayed in Costa Rica or went to
another country.
This exaMple shows, as few of the families interviewed are able to notice, that
Colombians are able to come together when facing common challenges and they are able
to achieve results. However, not many of the refugees interviewed were aware of this
example and it is likely that a refugee like Rocio, who was close to these developments,
is exceptionally aware of the capacity of Colombians and therefore continues to develop
relations with them as much as she can. However, It is also possible to assume that
precisely due to the inability of this organization to continue working for Colombians, the
other refugee amilies who knew about this organization became skeptical about the
capacity of Colombians to organize again and unite effectively to face common
challenges.
The tact is, this organization can be considered an example of collective action
from bounded solidarity as a source of social capital. Through it Colombians came
together, trusting each other, to face a common challenge. T'hey actually succeeded by
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pushine the U NI C R to start the resettlement program. Yet, hy the time of the interiex s
maybe these families did not see a challenge they could face together. Also, their
inlormal networks are formed mainly to just share their culture, which does not require
much trust. Actually, wxhen responding to the reasons why they xere part of groups or
informal networks, just five families recognized this participation could improve their
living standard while nine said they participated just for recreation and entertainment and
12 said they participated just to stimulate their renories about Colombia. IThus, most of
these refugees may not be exen close to realizing that they have the potential for acting
together if they could overcome their lack of trust and fears toward other Colombians.
Judging from their answers to the reasons ftr their lack of participation in
informal netwxorks or groups, the potential for collective action might not have existed by
the time of the interviews but could be developed at some point. It is interesting to see
that xhen responding to these questions seven families ansxered they do not participate
due to lack of trust in Costa Ricans while only three refugees said they do not participate
in these groups or networks due to the lack of trust in Colombians. Actually out of the 16
families responding to these series of questions a total of II families said they would like
to participate in groups or formal netxxorks but they just do not have information about
them and therefore are unable to join. These responses are important to highlight
because, despite the lack of trust they have expressed. they demonstrate that most of the
families interx iexed are still xilling to participate in groups or formal netxorks. Itihus,
even though most do not show interest in becoming community leaders, they still show
the capacity of becoming flloxwers in case someone else decides to start something they
can join.
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Concalusio ns
To have a better understanding of the capacity Costa Rica's Colombian refugee
families may have to integrate socially, the main purpose of this chapter was to analyze
their community and identify the variables needed to be present for their integration.
From this analysis it is possible to support the third hypothesis of this thesis and affirm
that due to the negative conditions of the host labor market, the lack of bounded solidarity
and enforceable trust xithin the Colombian community, and the lack of potential
formation of social capital among Colombian refugees. the success of their integration
process is inhibited.
First, based on the model of immigrant modes of incorporation developed by
Portes and Rumbaut (1990) it was necessary to identify if the Colombian refugees had
arrixed to the Central American country having there a pre-existent and hiher-income
community of Colombians willing to support them. Since this conmunity was not
present by the time of their arrival, these authors argued that the fate of the refugee
population would depend on the conditions of the labor market. Chapter 3 shoxwed that
the conditions of the labor market were not appropriate for their integration. Then,
following Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) ideas about the potential of an immigrant
community to benefit based on the d.velopment of social capital, it became necessary to
analyze this issues.
The focus thus turned on the presence of bonding social capital ('iather than
bridging social capital), since in studies about this phenomenon done by Portes and
Sensenbrenner (1993) such variety of social capital was found to be more likely to
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develop among immigrant communities. The results show evidence of Colombians
tending to come together in informal networks and having the potential of developing
bonding social capital. lowever, since the sources of social capital are absent, neither
bonding nor bridging social capitals can be considered present among Colombian
refugees in Costa Rica, even though there has been potential for collective action.
To identify the presence of social capital of any type it was important to look at its
levels in Colombia itself, as refugees may have brought those assets from home. Yet, the
studies of social capital in Colombia show that social capital there does not seem to be a
factor favoring the development of the community. Some studies concluded that social
capital in Colombia is weak while others concluded social capital in Colombia is rather
perverse and therefore favored the emergence and sustainability of illegality. I lowever,
based on the results from the analysis of the potential generation of social capital among
Colombians in Costa Rica, it is not possible to conclude that the potential formation of
social capital among this population would be perverse. Yet, it is possible to conclude
that the low levels of trust and membership participation in civic activities in Colombia
were transferred to Costa Rica.
Moreover, the absence of sources of social capital in the form of bounded
solidarity and enforceable trust lead to the conclusion that unless Colombian refugees
start trusting each other and therefore start participating more in activities of mutual
interest, it would be very difficult for this community to evolve and enjoy the
development that social capital could bring them.
From the refugees interactions in groups and networks it was possible to see that
most of their interactions are within informal networks formed with mainly other
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Colombians and that due to lack of information most families do not participate in groups
or organizations. From the type of memberships of the few cases that participated in
groups it was also possible to conclude that there is no potential for the development of
bridging social capital, as the memberships were usually based on their nationality and
the groups did not seem open for interactions with other organizations. F or the intormal
networks the level of participation was rather high and the families interv icwed seemed
w illing to support other Colombians if needed. Yet, since the actual support and
solidarity perceived from other Colombians and other Costa Ricans is rather low, while
most of these refugees claim to have very few friends, then the functionality of these
networks for the generation of social capital would be very low and not reliable.
With a vulnerable foundation for the existence of social capital given by the
weakness of their participation in groups and the inefficiency of the networks created by
these families, it was also necessary to loot at enforceable trust and bounded solidarity as
sources for the creation of social capital. First of all, the results show that most refugees
do not believe there is solidarity or unity among Colombians in Costa Rica. Even though
they may claim to be willing to help other Colombians their actual inxolvement in
voluntary or helping activities is very low. Additionally, despite the presence of outside
discrimination established in Chapter 3, the results in this section do not show that
refugees see this discrimination as a common challenge. Rather, many families alienate
themselxes from the group of refugees and justify in some cases the discrimination they
perceive towards Colombian refugees by admitting there are good and bad Colombians
within their community. Thus, the factor of outside discrirination does not contribute
towards the generation of bounded solidarity either. Neither do the last two factors. the
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blockage of an exit option and the cultural repertoire. On one hand, the blockage of an
exit option is weakened by the knowledge refugees have of resettlement. On the other
hand, the cultural repertoire brought from home by refu:ees is used for the maintenance
of their identity as Colombians but has not served as a factor bringing them together to
face some of their common challenges.
For the existence of enforceable trust the presence of another three factors wxas
tested, (a blockage of outside social and economic opportunities, resources within the
community, and a sanctioning capacity within the community). In this respect while there
was evidence of a blockage of outside social and economic opportunities, given by the
frustrations expressed by the re fugees interviewed in regard to employment opportunities.
there was no evidence of the existence of resources or a sanctioning capacity within the
community. The absence ot these two tactors can be attributed to the fact that the refugee
community is not integrated with the community of Colombian entrepreneurs. Thus, even
though refugees may perceive that the community of entrepreneurs may have the pover
to exclude them, the fact is that since there are no channels of communication or
interaction between these two communities then refugees do not have access to their
resources and the entrepreneurs cannot support them or sanction them. These results,
along with evidence of the low levels of trust these Colombian refugee fimilies have
towards other Colombians, lead to the conclusion that there is not a strong loundation for
the development of enforceable trust as a source of social capital.
Despite this rather negative scenario for the development of social capital among
the Colombian refugee community in Costa Rica at the moment, there are some aspects
that could lead to its development in the future. First of all, the foundation of ASI)ECOR.
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created wx hen refuees needed the resettlement option, is a significant precedent of
collective action. The goal of obtaining resettlement had enough strength to pull the
forces of a group of people willing to unite for their own benefit and the benefit of other
Colombians. It is probable that the absence of a common cause contributes to the lack of
unity among refugees now. By the time of the interviews, for instance, refugee families
seemed to seek very diverse goals. Some were interested in better security conditions:
others in securing an employment in their professional field; others in securing any type
of employment; and yet some more in living without haxing to face discrimination.
Despite the lack of groups and formal networks, enforceable trust, bounded
solidarity, and collective action, it is also important to highlight that the Colombian
refugees interviewxed have a strong willingness of helping each other based on their
common identity as Colombians. This may lead to the generation of strong ethnic
solidarity if these refugees are able to trust each other. It is also important to see that
some of the factors missing for the presence of enforceable trust and bounded solidarity
have to do with the lack of connections between the Colombian entrepreneurial
community and the refugee community. Even with many refugees believing
entrepreneurs just want to take advantage of them., evidence from the arguments
presented by some of the refugees interviewed shows that entrepreneurs xwould be
actually willing to support refugees. One of the refugees participating in the survey, fbr
instance, took me to the bakery of the Colombian entrepreneur that I interiewed. The
interesting scenario comes from the Colombian entrepreneur actually telling me she did
not like refugees and preferred to stay away from them because they tended to abuse the
system, xxhile simultaneously offering a referral for employment to the refugee that took
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me there. She actually told him "It's so good to see you Adrian, I had you in my mind a
lot. Ilave you found employment yet? Because I have a very good referral for you. and
it's in the field of security where you have worked before". Thus, while on one hand the
entrepreneur was being very negative towards refugees, on the other hand she was
actually helping one of them. This example is useful to see how despite the absence of
strong networks and even the existence of a wide gap between refugees and their co-
nationals in Costa Rica, there is still an apparent solidarity foundation for the
improvement of the community as a whole. The fact remains that if these two
comnulnities do not come together, then it would be hard for the refugee community to
develop any type of social capital. Their social integration would thus continue to be
inadequate.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to strengthen the imegraion of C olom bian r.u gs in Costa Rica, not only
from the legal but also frorm the economic and social perspective, the overnment o
Costa Rica should giv back to r f.e the right to apply for residency 2 years after
receiving their refugee status approval. The eforts of the UN I ICR lcal department
to strengthen the nationa ilation and advise the Costa Rican oxernmenl in the
drafting of the newx migration law does not include recommendations to reinstate this
right to refue es. The refugee ID has been inefficient as an employment
authorization, as many employers do not recognize it. Moreovr the ID serves to
identify refugees as such and while such characterization gives them acc ss to some
social benefits, it also places individuals in a category that has been gively
ypif ed in Costa Rica. Thc UINHCR and the Unirity ol Costa Rica are currentlv
developin and implementing a campaign to educ te the Costa Rican population
about the Colombian refugee community with the goal of reducing the xAn phobic
sentiments. Yet, the limited funds assigned for thee Cfforts may be v. d in -acc of
such an overwhelming goal; educating a community that for over 20 years has seen
refugees as a burden to the country and as lower class individuals. Thus, to reduce
xenophobia towards Colombian refugees, UNICR and AC AI officials should instead
focus on fighting for bringing down the Executive Decree that in 2003 limited the
right for re ugees to apply for permanent residency.
Another area that ne ds great attention is the efforts currently underwxay to integrate
Colombian refu into the Cos Rican l bor mark t. Chapter 3 provided enough
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evidence about the limited capacity of the employ ment program established in 2003.
None of the refugees interx iewed who had attended the employment orientation
meetings prepared by the ACAI with help of the Labor Ministry had found
employment from a referral from this program. By February of 2005 only two people
at the Labor Ministry and another two people at the ACAI office x here in charged of
running the employment program. This personnel is not sufficient to research the
labor market in Costa Rica, meet with unemployed refugees, meet and educate
employers about the refugee population, and find employments for the great amount
of refugees who seem to live under precarious conditions. The employment programs
managed by different resettlement agencies in the U.S. should be used as example for
the management of the employment program in San Jose. The quality of the
employment program in San Jose should be judged as some programs are judged in
the U.S.. by the number of employments found and by making the refugee family
self-sufficient within a determined period of time. Refugee families should not only
be receiving counseling and emergency cash assistance when needed, as this tends to
make refugees dependent on aid. The programs to help refugees in Costa Rica should
be based on finding an employment or an economic activity that would make
refugees self-sufficient and therefore able to integrate economically into the host
labor market and the host economy.
The Colombian community in Costa Rica seems to have the potential to develop
social capital and therefore to rise as a strong community as refugees seem to have
more interactions with Colombians than with Costa Ricans and there is precedent of
collective action in the refugee community. Yet, this potential is truncated mainly by
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the fact that Colombians haxve cry low trust lexels among them and thereflre the
networks they form are weak and vulnerable. Additionally by the lact that there is
lack of unity betxeen the Colombian refugee community and the Colombian
entrepreneurs. The gap betxxeen these two communities affects the resources both
parties could have available for them if more networks were to exist among them.
Finally the potential to generate social capital is truncated by the fact that formal
networks .,here Colombian refugees could interact with Colombian entrepreneurs or
even Costa Ricans are inexistent. In this area the Colombian Elmbassy as wxell as the
ACAI office and the UNHCR in Costa Rica should take a stronger role. The ACAl
office organizes fairs xxhere refugees meet and present their businesses. These eflorts
are not sufficient though. These agencies should take an active role in helping
refugees to organize in professional groups with Costa Rican or Colombian mentors
that hax e succeeded in each professional activity. While refugees seem to lack
information on any type of groups. mnost of them expressed. however, willinuness to
attend and participate in groups if they knew about their existence. Thus, iI' the
refugees have the willingness to participate in formal networks, the agencies in
charged of making their integration efficient as well as the Colombian [mbassy in
Costa Rica should support them in this arena.
F inally refugees should also be led into a change of attitude towards other
Colombians. Making Colombians trust each other is not an easy task and it may
require many decades to change the negative stereotyping Colombians seem to have
of their o-vvn co-nationals. This thesis will not go into recommendations for this
m3onumental educational task. Yet, it hopes to contribute towards the general
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understanding about the great opportunities Colombians can be missing or their lack
of trust and solidarity. It is ironic to find that Colombians abroad seem to have such
high regards for the country they left behind, yet that some have other Colombians in
such negative terms. Thus, now that so many communities of Colombians are
Iorming in different countries it may be helpful to start educating. not only Ioreigners
about the positive aspects of Colombians, but to start educating Colombians about the
positixe face of the Colombian people as well.
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